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Abstract 
This thesis is comprised of three separate chapters in Behavioural Science. The general 
underlying theme of the seven studies presented in this thesis involves a rank approach and 
influence in the elicitation and response to contextual distributions. Specifically, Chapter 1 
addresses the influence of other people’s contributions (created to represent a diverse range of 
distributions of others’ contribution decisions) on aggregate cooperation and individual 
contributions in public goods games. It was found that participants take into account and are 
influenced by subtle aspects of what others contribute, providing a basis for the model we 
developed according to which participants have a preference for placing themselves at a 
specific relative ranked position within their inferred social norm of others’ contributions. 
Chapter 2 discusses the elicitation of participants’ market price distributions, quality estimates 
and market price estimates of a specific item in an endowment effect study in order to develop 
a model based on the quantification of “good dealness”. The model assumes no cognitive bias 
or ownership-induced changes in underlying preferences. It was found that sellers demanded 
a market-appropriate price for the item given their beliefs about the item’s relative quality and 
their beliefs about the distribution of market prices of similar items in the market. Buyers, in 
contrast, offered less than what they believed the appropriate market price to be because they 
would only offer a price that represented a good deal. Chapter 3 examines the elicitation of 
individuals’ subjective estimates of entire income and wealth distributions and also tested the 
idea that the unclear pattern of findings between income inequality and individual subjective 
well-being in previous literature reflects individual differences in people’s perception of 
income inequality. We found that on aggregate people are relatively accurate (and consistent 
across time) in their estimates of income and wealth inequality, although they overestimate 
incomes at all levels and overestimate low and high levels of wealth. However, there were 
some small individual differences in perceived inequality. Higher perceived inequality was 
associated with lower income/wealth and more liberal ideology. Various measures of 
subjective well-being were not predicted by perceived inequality of either income or wealth. 
Yet, people’s subjective well-being was best predicted by their subjective estimates of where 
they rank in the population, with the overall pattern of findings being consistent with a model 
in which people care about their perceived relative rank position within income and wealth 
distributions. 
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Rank Effects and Context Effects within Social Norms 
in Public Goods Games 
 
 
 
“You can discover more about a person in an hour of play than a year of 
conversation.”-Plato. 
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1.1  Introduction 
Most studies investigating behaviour in social dilemmas use four-player 
repeated public goods games in which participants only receive information about the 
average contributions of other players in the previous rounds. These are situations that 
produce conflict between what is rational for an individual and what is best for the 
group. Many of these studies find a positive relationship between an individual’s 
contribution and the contributions made by others (Bardsley, 2000; Keser and van 
Winden, 2000; Weimann, 1994). On the basis of such experiments it is however not 
possible to determine whether participants are concerned with how their own 
contribution relates to the mean of others' contributions or with how their contribution 
ranks within an inferred distribution of others' contributions (the "social norm"). 
However, intuition, and experimental evidence in psychology, suggests that 
individuals may show rank-sensitivity in their contributions.  
The aim of this chapter is therefore to examine the effects of context and social 
norms in the context of the frequently used public goods game, an abstract social 
dilemma decision task whereby participants are asked to contribute to a group pot. We 
intend to investigate how aspects of the other group members’ behaviour affect one’s 
decisions. Our goal is to examine more subtle effects of the context besides what is 
typically been studied (the mean of others’ contribution behaviours). Moreover, we 
hypothesised that when participants see the whole distribution of others’ contributions, 
they infer a social norm in which they have a preference to place themselves at a 
specific rank position.  
The chapter is structured as follows. We first discuss some key definitions and 
the literature regarding the provision of information on public goods games. Second, 
we outline the details of the first study (P-experiment) we conducted, report the results, 
primarily on an aggregate level, and then formulate our rank-based model of decision 
making and demonstrate how it accounts for our observations (additional analysis 
regarding individual differences in the P-experiment is reported in the Appendix to 
this chapter). We then outline the details of our second study (C-experiment), report 
the results and conclude with a discussion.  
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1.1.1 Social Norms 
People’s choices, and the attitudes they express, are strongly influenced by social 
context — it has long been known that people compare themselves with others and 
often adjust their behaviour in the direction of a social norm (e.g., Buunk & Gibbons, 
2007; Festinger, 1954; Hyman, 1942). More recently, much attention has been given 
to the idea that providing people with information about social norms can influence 
behaviour such as energy usage (Allcott & Rogers, 2014; Ayres, Raseman, & Shih, 
2013; Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007) and alcohol 
consumption (Neighbors, Larimer, & Lewis, 2004) with the mean energy consumption 
or alcohol consumption being provided as the social norm. Behaviour change achieved 
by giving people information about social norms is one category of “nudge”  (Thaler 
& Sunstein, 2008) which may provide policy-makers with cost-effective ways of 
changing people’s behaviour without restricting their freedom of choice (Benartzi et 
al., 2017). 
Social norm effects are found in a wide variety of domains. Martin and Randal 
(2010) found that the size of visitors’ voluntary donations to an art gallery were 
strongly and systematically influenced by the amount and typical denomination of 
previous donations (visible in a transparent donation box), and preferences for music 
are strongly influenced by social norms (Salganik, Dodds, & Watts, 2006). Chen, 
Harper, Konstan, and Li (2010) found that the number of ratings provided by the 
median user of a movie rating site could be increased by more than 500% by providing 
users with information about the number of ratings given by other people. Hallsworth 
et al. (2016) used suitably-framed messages based on social norms  (“The great 
majority (80%) of practices in [NHS Area Team] prescribe fewer antibiotics per head 
than yours”) as part of an intervention to reduce undesirable over-prescription of 
antibiotics. Local debt-norm messages that HMRC used in letters sent to customers 
led to increases in tax revenue of 210 million pounds, showcasing how social influence 
and subtle changes in the context of choice can affect behavior (BIT staff, 2013). 
There is thus a wide variety of evidence that people’s behaviour can be influenced 
by social norms, and such findings have important policy implications. There remains, 
however, a striking lack of theory of the underpinnings of social norm effects. In this 
chapter, we offer some initial steps towards a theoretical framework along with 
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experimental evidence. We do so in the specific context of multi-person social 
dilemmas, where it is already known that provision of social norm information can 
influence cooperation and contributions (e.g., Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010). Our 
focus here is on descriptive social norms — information about other people’s 
behaviour — although we note that the term “social norms” is used in a number of 
different ways in both the economic and psychological literatures (Bicchieri, 2006). 
1.1.2 Cooperation and Social Dilemmas  
Cooperation between individuals, a basic component of human society, typically 
occurs within a social context where other agents make similar decisions. Your 
decision of how much to donate to charity, for example, is commonly made with the 
knowledge, or at least perception, of how much others gave. For an individual the 
decision to cooperate, or not, is consequently based on their own internal preferences 
along with the influence of information they receive from the collective. Many studies 
of cooperative behaviour involve multi-person social dilemmas (Dawes, 1980), 
situations that raise a conflict between what is individually and collectively optimal 
(there are dilemmas involving only two people, such as the famous prisoner’s 
dilemma: Rapoport & Chammah, 1965). If the most rational behaviour in economic 
terms is chosen by most individuals, then the collective suffers, and the opposite is 
also true. Abstract decision tasks inspired by game theory, coined “experimental 
games”, have been used to model these situations either in the laboratory or the field. 
Participants typically have to choose between a range of cooperative and no 
cooperative strategies that will have consequences for them through their experimental 
payoffs (typically money or other prizes). 
1.1.3  Types of multi-person Social Dilemma 
The Public Goods dilemma and the Common Goods dilemma are common types 
of social dilemma that have been modelled as experimental games. Common goods 
possess two characteristics: They are rivalrous and non-excludable (Olson 1965; 
Samuelson, 1954). Consumption by one does prevent the consumption by another 
person but nobody can be excluded from consumption. The classic example is fish 
stocks. Nobody is excluded from fishing, but if there are no limits or regulations 
involved, the amount one person fishes now will influence the amount a future 
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fisherman could fish. The “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968) occurs when we 
gain short-term benefits by extracting or overusing resources without acknowledging 
the long-term consequences. A public good on the other hand is a good that is both 
non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Everyone can consume it with no exclusions and 
one person’s consumption does not affect or prevents another’s. Nevertheless, if 
everybody free rides by not contributing to the good then the good will not be produced 
and no one will receive its benefits. National defense, street lighting, education and 
fire brigade are some examples of public goods. Here, we focus on public goods social 
dilemmas (although see section 1.6 for pilot studies that utilised a common pool 
resource dilemma). 
1.1.4 Public Goods Games-Decision Situation 
Public goods games can be thought as creating positive externalities. In such 
games typically, the linear voluntary contribution mechanism is used. Participants are 
split into groups of typically N = 4 people. Each member receives an endowment 
typically of e = 20 points and must decide how many of these points to allocate to 
their private account, which yields constant returns and how many to contribute to the 
public account which yields benefits to all group members. Each member’s payoff is 
then determined by 
 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑒 − 𝑥𝑖 + 𝜏∑𝑥𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
, (1) 
 
where 𝑥𝑖  is the amount player i contributes to the public good. The marginal per capita 
rate of return, 𝜏, is typically set at 0.5 and cannot exceed 1 or be less than 1/N. This 
is because having 𝜏 <1 sets the dominant strategy to be not contributing at all to the 
public good, while 𝜏 >1/N will maximise the aggregate payoff if each player 
contributes e. With this kind of parameterisation the Nash (individually optimal) 
equilibrium is to contribute nothing and free-ride, while the Pareto (socially optimal) 
equilibrium is for all players to contribute their entire endowments. This is what 
creates the social dilemma. 
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1.1.5 P-experiment 
P-experiments have been solely used for public goods games and utilise the 
strategy method (Selten, 1967; see also Fischbacher, Gächter & Fehr, 2001 who first 
coined the term P-experiment—P for preference). These experiments elicit 
participants’ contribution responses to different hypothetical average contributions 
(the social norm is the average of others’ contributions) made by the other group 
members. For example, if initial endowments were 20 points, participants are asked 
how much they would contribute if the average of others was 0, 1, 2, 3, and so on up 
to 20 points. The experiments do not have a repeated nature and correspond closely to 
one shot public goods games. If participants were asked how much to contribute under 
ten hypothetical average contributions of others’ then this is similar to taking part in 
ten one shot public goods games but simultaneously knowing what others are 
contributing. They offer the ideal means to understand what influences cooperation 
and what people condition it upon. 
1.1.6 C-experiment 
This is the direct response version of a public goods experiment. Participants take 
part in the public goods game C-experiment for multiple rounds (although one shot 
direct response games are also common; C for choice). On each round each member 
receives an endowment in points (the points correspond to money or prizes at an 
exchange rate set by the experimenter) and must decide how many of these points to 
allocate between their private and public account. After each period participants are 
told their earnings and total contributions to the public account and sometimes are also 
given feedback regarding the average contributions. Participants can change groups 
after each round (stranger design) or remain in the same group across all rounds 
(partner design). The decision situation payoff structure is the same as in the public 
goods P-experiment. 
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1.2 Literature Review on the Provision of Information of 
Others’ Behaviour  
Many people cooperate in public goods games under conditions where 
conventional economic theory predicts that rational utility-maximising individuals 
will, if they lack other-regarding preferences, contribute nothing.  
In a typical four-player public goods P-experiment, around 50% of players can be 
characterised as conditional cooperators — they increase their contributions as the 
mean of others’ contributions is increased (e.g., Fischbacher, Gächter & Fehr, 2001). 
More recently, reanalysing the data from six previous public goods studies and using 
hierarchical clustering analysis, Fallucchi, Luccasen and Turocy (2017) identified four 
behavioural types: zero contributors, others, conditional cooperators and weak 
conditional cooperators (those who match other participants’ average contribution at 
a rate less than one). One interpretation of such behaviour is that conditional 
cooperators are sensitive to the social norm represented by others’ average 
contributions and seek to conform to their perception of this social norm.  
In a typical four-player public goods C-experiment, contributions are found to 
decline significantly between first and last rounds, exhibiting a downward trend, either 
in a partner or a stranger design. This effect has also been attributed to conditional 
cooperation, with researchers suggesting that participants try to match the mean of 
contributions of others in the previous round but at a lower rate (Fischbacher & 
Gächter, 2010). Others have also hypothesised that participants learn their dominant 
strategy through the rounds. This is not consistent with all findings, however: if 
participants re-enter a second game their contributions start higher than those in the 
last round of the previous game (Andreoni, 1988). 
Even though the economics literature on public goods games is immense (see 
Chaudhuri, 2011 for a review), there are only a few studies that have tested the 
influence of full information about others’ contributions or feedback on contribution 
decisions. Some of these studies have compared treatments where subjects are either 
given full information on individual contributions after each round of the game or 
information on aggregate contributions (total contributions and/or average is 
presented) made by the group. Weimann (1994) and Bigoni and Suetens (2012) found 
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no significant differences between these treatments: Sell and Wilson (1991) found that 
individual level feedback increased contributions, while Wilson and Sell (1997) found 
that it reduced contributions significantly. In a recent study Gächter, Kölle and Quercia 
(2017) found that in the aggregate feedback treatment contributions were not higher 
or lower compared to the individual treatment feedback. Nevertheless, when the 
decision frame was changed to a payoff-equivalent take game the individual treatment 
led to more extreme behaviour (increased free-riding and full cooperation). In the give 
game there was more free-riding within the individual feedback treatment compared 
to the aggregate in the partner design but not in the stranger design. Full cooperation 
within the give framing was invariant to feedback treatment for both the partner and 
stranger matching.  
Some studies have explored the provision of information other than the average 
or total contributions. For example, in a study of public goods C-experiment with 4 
players (Croson & Shang, 2008), it was found that partial information about a single 
contribution in the previous round (max, min or random contribution) affected 
contributions but only if the feedback mechanism (i.e. which of the three was given to 
participants) was not revealed. To examine evidence from the field Shang and Croson 
(2009) studied the effects of social comparison on public radio donations, finding a 
positive effect of social information on individual contributions but more specifically 
finding that the most influential effect on increasing donations came from social 
information that was drawn from the 90th to the 95th percentile of previous 
contributions.  
Experimental studies that have explicitly examined the content of the full list of 
others’ contributions (individual feedback) rather than merely its presence or absence 
compared to an aggregate feedback treatment are even fewer in number. These studies 
are reported below and have tested for the influence of the amount of others’ 
contributions on aggregate and individual contributions. Their findings are consistent 
with effects of quantities other than the mean. Cheung (2014) studied feedback 
heterogeneity in a three-person public goods P-experiment, where information about 
others’ contributions consequently contained only two entries, with ten hypothetical 
scenarios, where entries took values 0, 2, 4 or 6. While increasing the average feedback 
increased the average contributions, increasing the difference between feedback 
entries (which can be thought of as a proxy for standard deviation) decreased 
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contributions. A similar effect was found in a four-person public goods P-experiment 
by Van den Berg, Molleman, Junikka, Puurtinen and Weissing (2015), who used ten 
hypothetical scenarios with entries only taking the values of 0, 10 or 20. Van den Berg 
et al. (2015) also found a phenomenon whereby increasing the variation of the 
feedback scenarios increased the variation of the contributions. Hartig, Irlenbusch and 
Kölle (2015)1 studied four-person public goods games also by using a P-experiment, 
with 35 hypothetical scenarios and entries taking values between 0 and 20. Their 
results showed that increasing the standard deviation of their three-component 
feedback scenarios decreased contributions, but with a large variation amongst 
individuals, with the majority of conditional cooperators guided by others’ median or 
average contribution and others reacting strongly to the minimum and maximum 
contribution of others. Croson (2007) divided subjects into groups of four and each 
group took part in a ten-round public goods C-experiment. A positive relationship 
between individuals’ contributions and the aggregate contribution of others was found. 
When information not only about the aggregate contribution but also about the 
individual contributions of the other three members was revealed, the median 
contribution was found to be a better predictor of an individual’s contribution than 
was the minimum or the maximum, with the proposed explanation being that 
participants try to match the contributions of other members.  
In other experimental games besides public goods games Bilderbeck et al. (2014) 
used individual level feedback and found evidence for conformity to rank-based social 
norms in a three-person repeated harvesting game (although inconsistent use of social 
norms was found for serotonin-depleted participants). In Messick et al. (1983) 
participants were placed in 3x2 conditions during a six-person repeated harvesting 
game. The first variable corresponded to overuse, underuse and optimal use feedback 
(this was fake feedback and roughly corresponded to the mean of extractions); the 
second two corresponded to low and high variance. Their results showed that high 
variance only increased extractions compared to the low variance treatment in the 
underuse condition, otherwise there was no difference. The overuse and optimal use 
conditions irrespective of low or high variance showed a constant pattern in decreasing 
extractions across rounds. Measuring giving behaviour in a three-person dictator game 
                                                 
1 Cheung (2014), Van den Berg et al. (2015) and Hartig et al. (2015) developed their designs independently of our 
own. 
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Panchanathan, Frankenhuis, and Silk (2013) found on average no significant peer 
effects (the extent to which a behaviour of a peer affects one’s giving). Nevertheless, 
there was a considerable amount of heterogeneity with some dictators being positively 
influenced by their peer, others decreasing their giving if the peer gave more and some 
remaining unaffected. Therefore, it was proposed that participants may have perceived 
differently what constitutes a norm.  
1.3 Traditional and Rank-Based Approach of Context Effects in 
Psychology and Economics 
The aggregate mechanism with which many early models in psychology 
incorporated the effect of context was through comparison with a fixed reference 
point. For example, in the psychophysics, price perception and wage satisfaction 
literature context effects on judgements have been modelled through a single neutral 
reference point, typically the mean or other average of a contextual distribution 
(Helson, 1947, Helson, 1964a; Helson, 1964b; Briesch, Krishnamurthi, Mazumdar, & 
Raj, 1997; Mazumdar, Raj, & Sinha, 2005, Clark & Oswald, 1996). Indeed, most of 
the traditional public goods games studies use the mean of other’s contributions as 
feedback and information regarding the social norm and compare contributions 
relative to a mean. This perspective, in which the response to a single reference point 
(the mean) is the primary observational criterion, can be compared to the 
aforementioned theories in which judgements are made relative to a single neutral 
reference point.  
An influential step in moving beyond single reference point comparison is 
Parducci’s Range Frequency theory (RFT) (1965). According to RFT many 
comparison stimuli affect the judgement of a particular item through a weighted sum 
of range and frequency (rank) components, which measure an item’s range and relative 
rank position in the set of contextual stimuli. More recently the Decision by Sampling 
(DbS) (Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006) framework has hypothesised that the range 
component of RFT can be accounted for by rank effects. In DbS an individual initially 
retrieves a contextual sample from memory. A judgement is then made by computing 
the relative rank position of some quantity within a comparison set. 
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This work, showing that the subjective magnitudes or judgments of simple 
psychophysical quantities such as size and weight (e.g., Parducci, Calfee, Marshall, & 
Davidson, 1960; Parducci & Perrett, 1971; Riskey, Parducci, & Beauchamp, 1979), 
quantities as diverse as fairness (Mellers, 1982, 1986) and prices (Niedrich, Sharma, 
& Wedell, 2001; Niedrich, Weathers, Hill, & Bell, 2009) are determined partly by the 
relative ranked position they occupy within a comparison context has led to the idea 
that people may be sensitive to the ranked position that they occupy within an observed 
or inferred social distribution. Indeed, this idea has seen much currency within 
psychology, but the idea has typically not been translated into models within 
economics.2 Effects of perceived relative rank are found within both economic and 
psychological domains. For example, people’s anticipated and experienced 
satisfaction with a wage are both related to how the wage ranks within a social context 
(Brown, Gardner, Oswald, & Qian, 2008) and attitudes to anticipated debt are 
similarly determined by the ranked position of the anticipated debt relative to that of 
others (Aldrovandi, Wood, Maltby, & Brown, 2015). Rank of income, rather than 
income per se, determines satisfaction with that income (Boyce, Brown, & Moore, 
2010; Smith, Diener, & Wedell, 1989). Melrose, Brown and Wood (2012) showed that 
an individual’s self-evaluation of symptom severity in depression and anxiety was 
driven by rank-based comparisons with symptoms of others. Wood, Boyce, Moore 
and Brown (2012) found that the relative rank of an individual’s income can predict 
risks of current and future mental distress. Rank-based decision making has also been 
found in social judgments (Wood, Brown, & Maltby, 2012) relating to the perception 
of alcohol consumption.  
1.4 Applying a Rank-Based Approach to Public Goods Games 
As discussed most of public goods game studies use the mean of other’s 
contributions as feedback and information regarding the social norm. It is clear though 
that other attributes of others’ behaviour may also affect contributions. As a simple 
example consider the following situation. Suppose there are two pairs of contribution 
profiles regarding the contributions of others in a public goods game: 9, 10, 11 and 1, 
10, 19. In both cases the mean of the feedback is ten. However, there are many other 
                                                 
2 Although see Hopkins and Kornienko (2004). 
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aspects of these profiles that one can take into account that would give different 
contributions. The natural way to study these effects is with P-experiments and indeed 
this what three studies have done so far (all of which came out while we were planning 
or conducting ours: Cheung, 2014; Van den Berg et al., 2015; Hartig et al., 2015). 
These studies have found that feedback heterogeneity (differences between entries as 
proxy for standard deviation) may also have an effect additional to that of the mean. 
These studies were however not able to offer a model of individual behaviour or what 
may underpin their findings. 
While the existence of context and rank effects on judgement, preferences for risk, 
and life satisfaction (e.g., Parducci, 1965; Brown et al., 2008, 2015), along with the 
psychological processes that underpin them, is well documented, there is a paucity of 
evidence regarding the influence of contextual stimuli on cooperative behaviour and 
the relevant psychological mechanisms. On the basis of the typical public goods games 
designs it is not possible to determine whether participants are concerned with how 
their own contribution relates to the mean of others' contributions or with how their 
contribution ranks within an inferred distribution of others' contributions (the "social 
norm").  However, intuition and experimental evidence in psychology discussed 
previously suggests that individuals may show rank-sensitivity in their contributions, 
judging themselves in terms of their ranked position within a social sample (rather 
than comparing to a mean). For example, consider again the two sets of others’ 
contributions in a public goods game: 9, 10, 11 and 1, 10, 19. In both cases the mean 
of the feedback is ten. It seems intuitive, however, that a fourth contribution of 8 will 
seem to conform less well to the social norm in the former case (where it is 2 standard 
deviations away from the mean of the best fitting normal distribution to others’ 
contributions) than in the second case (where the contribution of 8 is 0.22 standard 
deviations away from the mean).  
We illustrate the key idea of our model in Figure 1.1 below, which shows two 
hypothetical sets of other players’ contributions in a public goods game. Each filled 
circle represents a contribution (we assume 10 players, and hence 9 “others”). The 
superimposed normal distributions represent the different “social norms” that the 
observer (the tenth player) might infer in each case. Thus, if the observer made a 
contribution of 7 it would lie at the 14th percentile in distribution A, but at the 29th 
percentile in distribution B (vertical dashed lines). Conversely, we might hypothesise 
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that the observer has a preference for making a contribution that lies at the 80th 
percentile of the social norm. This would equate to a contribution of 12.3 in set A, but 
to a contribution of 14.6 in set B (vertical solid lines). The model that we develop 
below is essentially a generalisation of this approach.  
 
Figure 1.1. Two hypothetical sets of other players’ contributions to a public goods game. Each filled circle 
represents a contribution. The superimposed normal distributions represent the different “social norms” that the 
observer (the tenth player) might infer. The dashed lines show that a contribution of 7 lies at the 14th percentile 
in distribution A, but at the 29th percentile in distribution B. Conversely, the 80th percentile equates to a 
contribution of 12.3 in set A, but to a contribution of 14.6 in set B (vertical solid lines). 
1.5 Present Work 
Here we adapt and extend the rank-based approach to social norms in public goods 
games. Informed by our pilot studies (see section 1.6), we develop and test a model of 
rank effects within social norms in a public goods P-experiment setting with groups 
of ten players.3 In our model players are sensitive to the relative ranked position of 
                                                 
3 The large majority of public goods experiments use groups of at most five players. Only a few studies have used 
groups of ten players, e.g., Isaac & Walker (1988); Isaac, Walker, & Williams (1994); Carpenter (2007). The effect 
of group size in social dilemmas has been recently investigated by Diederich, Goeschl and Waichman (2016) who 
found that increasing group size by a factor of 10 increased the size of the public good by 10, with cooperators 
cooperating more in larger groups and cooperation ratings declining more slowly in larger than smaller groups. 
Free-riding remained unchanged with group size.  
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their own contributions within a social norm. The social norm is assumed to be a 
continuous distribution that is inferred from the contributions of other players. 
Following Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001), our study used a variant of the 
strategy method (Selten, 1967) to create a modified public goods game P-experiment. 
Individuals are presented with a series of contribution profiles consisting of others’ 
contributions and asked how much they would contribute in each case. Our use of ten-
player groups allows for large variation in the profiles of others’ contributions and 
thus provides the opportunity to explore the effects of subtle characteristics of these 
profiles. This is in contrast to contributions given by a smaller group, containing for 
example four individuals as in Van den Berg et al. (2015) and Hartig et al. (2015), 
where the feedback would possess only 3 entries and so have only three variables— 
specifying the mean in such a profile leaves only two other parameters to vary.4 Also, 
in these studies the contribution profiles are shown simultaneously to participants on 
a single screen with ascending order of the mean. We use different screens for each of 
our constructed contribution profiles, the order of which was randomised for each 
participant. 
In the present work we do not make an attempt to explain or understand social 
preferences or why people want to be fair or care for social welfare, but to describe 
and understand specific strategies in the game. What we attempt is to show that the 
social norm can be more than just the mean of others’ contributions and that 
participants may have a preference for occupying a ranked position in the profiles of 
others’ contributions. We do not posit that rank-based cooperators care about fairness 
or inequality aversion (although a rank model could potentially nest such preferences). 
Our first key finding is that the first three moments of the distribution of others’ 
contributions (the mean, variance and skewness) all have significant effects on 
contributions. Increasing the standard deviation of the contribution profiles increases 
the standard deviation of responses. The results indicate that comparison with a single 
                                                 
4 The contribution profiles contain information on contribution decisions and not individual earnings. We do not 
make any attempts to generalise our hypotheses and results from contribution space to earning space. Analyzing 
the data from 71 studies that used the voluntary contributions mechanism, Fiala and Suetens (2017) showed that 
transparency about individual earnings reduced contributions while transparency about individual choices 
increased contributions but to a lesser extent. 
32 
 
reference point cannot accurately model the influence of feedback on individual’s 
decision making.  
We then develop a model according to which an individual uses rank-based 
decision making to place themselves within an inferred ‘social norm’ (a continuous 
distribution inferred from the contribution profile). We assume that the selected 
contribution reflects a utility-maximising compromise between the utility gained from 
free-riding and the individual’s desire to conform to a perceived socially appropriate 
value 𝜈𝑖. We fit the rank-based model to individual data and compare its fit to that of 
two other models – a “constant contribution” model and a “mean relative” model 
according to which participants are assumed to have a concern with how their 
contribution relates to the mean of others’ contributions. Most participants’ (85%) data 
were significantly better fit for one model than by another (i.e., there were “clear 
winners”). Of these clear winners only 24% were unaffected by the context of others’ 
contributions (6.2% were altruists; 10.9% were free riders). The majority of 
participants (45%) were best described by the rank model, while 31% of participants 
were best described by the mean relative model.  
We also conducted and report on a public goods C-experiment study which is not 
as controlled as the P-experiment, results of which are reported after the discussion of 
the P-experiment. 
1.6 Pilot Studies that Informed Present Studies 
Many studies treat the public goods and the common pool resource dilemma 
games played over multiple rounds or one-shot as equivalent (Ledyard, 1994), only 
acknowledging the framing and wording as the main difference between them, with 
resource games being reduced to take-some games and public goods games to give-
some games. This is not true as the harvesting common pool resource game, for 
example, has a dynamic layer. Actions and payoffs in one round influence actions and 
payoffs in the next. In such a game, participants have access to a common resource 
pool filled with money, points or fish which they have to harvest in a series of rounds. 
After each round the resource gets replenished by a factor. If the resource collapses 
from over-depletion there will be no points to go around. Therefore, it is individually 
rational to extract as much as possible but if everyone is behaving in such a way the 
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resource will collapse because the replenishment rate will be smaller than the total 
extractions and there would be no opportunities for future gains. A typical structure 
involves the following: Group of N = 4 players. In each round, players must choose 
to harvest from 0-20 points from a common shared resource. The size of the resource, 
R, is replenished each round by a fixed factor f = 5% as 
 
𝑅𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑓)(𝑅𝑡 −∑𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
), (2) 
where 𝑥𝑖, is the amount player i harvests from the common resource. What is extracted 
by players cannot be returned back to the pool in future rounds.  
Motivated by Bilderbeck et al. (2014), who found preliminary evidence for 
conformity to rank-based social norms in a repeated harvesting game (although 
inconsistent use of social norms was found for serotonin-depleted participants) using 
three-person groups, we focused our efforts on expanding their work and generalising 
their findings to bigger groups (groups of ten) as well as groups without confederates 
(two out of their three group members were confederates). We first ran pilot 
experiments using both a direct response harvesting game C-experiment (with 46 
participants) and a strategy method harvesting game P-experiment (with 200 
participants) in order to test our stimuli (the extraction profiles we had created) and 
our software. We utilized the extractions profiles S24-S27, see 1.18.2 Appendix II. 
Initial results from the pilot P-experiment showed that increasing the standard 
deviation of others’ extractions increased average extractions, even when the mean of 
other’s extraction was constant (see  Figure 1.2). 
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Figure 1.2. Increasing standard deviation in the extraction profiles increased average 
extractions, showing that not just the mean of others’ extractions was influential. 
Nevertheless, we only used ten extraction profiles as stimuli without controlling 
for symmetry within them (see 1.18.2 Appendix II which explains the idea of 
symmetry in the constructed profiles) and no individual-level models were developed 
at that point. Moreover, results from the harvesting C-experiment were not able to help 
us test our theories since participants depleted the resource after 4-5 rounds. More 
importantly we realised that it was extremely difficult for participants to understand 
their dominant strategy in the harvesting game and neither would we as experimenters 
would be able to provide them with such information through quiz questions (since 
the equilibrium would change depending on participants’ extractions in each round 
and the replenishment rate). The dominant strategy and equilibrium of extracting the 
maximum of points allowed is easy to understand in one shot games with no 
multiplication factor but the harvesting game has an interior stationary Markov 
equilibrium where players extract too much relative to the efficient benchmark 
(Mailath & Samuelson, 2006) and what qualifies as “moderate” or “too much” may 
not have been understood by participants. 
Thus, it would be difficult to communicate effectively to participants of this 
efficient benchmark and so their dominant and non-dominant strategies through 
comprehensive questions regarding the instructions of our experiment. For future 
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work, the harvesting game can be modified to not include a dynamic layer by changing 
the framing of the public goods game. Instead of giving to a public good, participants 
can be asked to take from the public good. The structure and equilibrium would be the 
same in both of these give and take some games.  
We now turn our focus to the current study of public goods games, which are not 
defined by a replenishment rate or the fact that current payoffs are not affected by 
previous ones. The design of the public goods P-experiment is discussed below. 
1.7 P-experiment Study  
1.7.1 Methods  
1.7.1.1 Design 
Our version of the public goods game took the following form. 𝑁 individuals, 
labelled by an index 𝑖 ∈  {1,2, … ,𝑁}, are asked to contribute a proportion of an initial 
𝑃 points, 𝑥𝑖, to a group project. The payoff for the individual is then given by (2) where 
𝜏 < 1 is the marginal per capita rate of contribution. The restriction 𝜏 < 1 is required 
for the Nash equilibrium to be zero cooperation, i.e. to create a social dilemma.  
We used 𝑁 = 10, 𝑃 = 100 and 𝜏 = 0.5. Furthermore, we required 𝑥𝑖 to be an 
integer between zero and a hundred, with the large range of possible contributions 
allowing for the creation of a wider variety of others’ contributions.  
1.7.1.2 Procedure 
After an introduction to the study, participants read an outline of the decision 
situation in which the number of group members and the calculation of group project 
payouts were described (1.18.1  Appendix I). Participants were required to answer 
comprehension questions in order to confirm that they understood the rules of the task; 
participants who did not successfully complete these questions were not allowed to 
continue the experiment. The decision task itself was composed of two parts. The first 
part elicited each participant’s choice of unconditional contribution. The second part 
of the task exposed the participants to 27 contribution profiles each consisting of nine 
numbers between zero and one hundred, presented to the participants in a random 
 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑃 − 𝑥𝑖 + 𝜏∑𝑥𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
 (3) 
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order. An example of how participants saw these 27 profiles is given below (here 
profile S1 is used):  
“In the following you will be presented with possible sets of allocations to the group 
project from the 9 other group members. You will be asked to specify your preferred 
level of allocation to the project given the allocations of the other members. Each set 
of allocations is not connected to the others and you should think of them as distinct 
scenarios.” 
The allocations of the other group members are the following: 
Player A       96 
Player B       89 
Player C       76 
Player D       74 
Player E       70 
Player F       66 
Player G       64 
Player H       51 
Player I        44 
“How many of the 100 points do you allocate to the group project?” 
We did not use the wording “invest in a group project” throughout our instructions 
as it could reflect a risky property. We also did not ask them for their “conditional” 
contribution to the project as is typically asked in P-experiments but instead asked 
what would they do in a situation where others contributed S [vector of others’ 
contributions]. 
To understand how different contribution profiles influence contribution patterns 
in public goods games we designed the profiles in such a way that adoption of different 
simple decision strategies would lead to different patterns of contributions across the 
different profiles. For example, we show below that the standard deviation influences 
rank-based decision-making, whereas it does not influence mean-based decision-
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making, so the standard deviation of the profiles was varied, from 5 to 40. We varied 
other factors, such as the mean, range and skewness with similar motivations. The 
principle statistics we use to describe our contribution profiles are the mean, standard 
deviation and skewness and we specify a profile with the notation 𝛴(𝜇, 𝜎, 𝑠), where 𝜇, 
𝜎 and 𝑠 are the mean, standard deviation and skewness of the profile. We describe the 
profiles with these three statistics because they are formally independent of each other. 
These constructed sets of profiles might be observed rarely in genuine public goods 
games. To ensure that the profiles we constructed fairly represented all possibilities, 
we required that the average of the means was approximately 50, ?̅? ≈ 50 (actual value 
50.06) and that the average of the skewness was approximately zero, ?̅? ≈ 0 (-0.007). 
Finally, we note also that the average kurtosis of the contribution profiles was also 
approximately zero (-0.0916). To ensure that there was no confounding effect between 
these variables, we constructed them such that all correlations between them were zero 
(see Appendix II, Table T 1.1). 
No profile appears twice and within a profile we do not repeat the same 
contributions more than once. This ensured that a rank-based model could differentiate 
between all rank positions in profiles, as well as avoiding any anchoring effects 
coming from repeated values. As an example of our construction methods, S1 and S2 
were created by holding the range and median fixed, and varying the other elements 
in a symmetric fashion, so that in S2 most contributions were further from the median. 
In this case, the profiles have the same mean, median and range, and so any decision-
strategy based on these profile aspects would not yield a distinction between 
contributions, whereas a decision strategy, such as a rank model, would yield a 
distinction. Profiles S24-S27 were created by beginning with a symmetric low 
variance (S24), with median 50. S25-S27 were then obtained by increasing the 
distance of each element from the median (which was held fixed) by a constant 
amount.  Skewed profiles were created in pairs, related by a reflection, to ensure the 
average skewness was zero. The result of this process was a set of 27 profiles, 
illustrated in Figure 1.3. This set allowed for an exploration of a variety of profile 
shapes without being overly burdensome for the participants. For a full discussion of 
these profiles please see 1.18.2 Appendix II. 
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1.7.1.3 Participants  
The experiments were run on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). 300 individuals 
participated and were paid a flat fee of $3.00 along with a bonus payment which was 
part of the incentivisation mechanism detailed below. The payment of $3.00 was 
similar to the minimum US hourly wage given the average time to complete the study.5 
We incentivized decisions by randomly choosing one of each participant’s responses, 
calculating their payoff according to the rules of the public goods game, and using the 
corresponding contribution profile as the other participants’ contributions. This payoff 
was then converted into a monetary bonus payment in MTurk. If the unconditional 
response was chosen, then unconditional responses of 9 other randomly chosen 
participants were used to compute the payoff. After the experiment was completed, 
one of the 27 profiles and the associated unconditional response was randomly chosen 
for each individual and used to determine their bonus payment.  
After the completion of the P-experiment participants were asked to complete 
some psychological scales relating to personality and conservatism. Detailed results 
of the analysis between contributions and these measurements can be found in 1.18.3 
Appendix III. 
                                                 
5 It has been consistently found that MTurk results are reliable and of high quality in behavioral experiments 
(Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011) including studies in the areas of both judgment and decision making 
(Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010) and economic games (Amir, Rand, & Gal, 2012; Arechar, Gächter, & 
Molleman, 2018). 
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Figure 1.3. Diagrams of contribution profiles used. For a full discussion of these profiles 
please see section 1.18.2  Appendix II. 
1.8  Aggregate Results 
We first looked for evidence of conditional cooperation in the aggregate data. Of 
the 300 participants, 47 gave exactly the same contribution for each of the 27 
contribution profiles they saw. These included 16 altruists (always contributed 100), 
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28 free-riders (always contributed zero) and 3 participants who always contributed 
other constant amounts. As these participants were not sensitive to others’ 
contributions, and indeed we did not expect everyone to be sensitive to or willing to 
consider what others are contributing, we excluded them from the following analysis 
as the theory would not apply to them. Figure 1.4 shows the relationship between the 
mean of the contribution profile and the mean of the contributions made by 
participants, excluding those whose contributions were exactly the same for each 
profile (47 individuals). The correlation r between the two is 0.99, p < .001, indicating 
a very strong linear relationship. This is notable because the participants were not 
shown the mean of the profile during the experiment. Fitting a least squares line to the 
data gives a slope of 0.80 and an intercept of 11.51, showing strong conditional 
cooperation. It is important to note that, as we discuss in section 1.10.1, this result is 
consistent with either a rank-based or a mean-based model of sensitivity to social 
norms.  
 
Figure 1.4. Mean of contributions from individuals whose contribution varied vs. mean of 
contribution profiles, the stimuli participants saw in random order. 
We ran a random effects regression, with the mean, standard deviation, skewness and 
kurtosis of the profiles as independent variables and the individual as a random effect. 
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Here we also selected only those individuals whose contributions were not constant 
(253 out of 300, or 84%)6. The regression took the form 
 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝜇𝑗 + 𝛽2𝜎𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑗 + 𝛽4𝜅𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗, (4) 
where 𝑥𝑖𝑗 is the contribution of individual i for a given contribution profile j, 𝜇 is the 
mean, 𝜎 is the standard deviation, 𝑠 is the skewness and 𝜅 the kurtosis of the 
contribution profile. The coefficients 𝛽𝑖 describe the aggregate effects of mean, 
standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis on individuals’ contributions. We use the 
standard forms for skewness and kurtosis, which control whether the distribution has 
a heavier tail at high contributions (positive skewness) or low contributions (negative 
skewness) and whether the tails of the distribution are heavier than a normal 
distribution (positive kurtosis) or smaller (negative kurtosis). The results of this 
regression are given below. 
Table 1.1. Aggregate random effects regression results for contributions depending on the 
first four moments of the contribution profiles. Significance levels: ***<.001. 
 Estimate Standard Error df t value 
     
(Intercept) 7.86*** 1.47 506 5.37 
Mean 0.80*** 0.01 6574 77.41 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.19*** 0.02 6574 9.15 
Skewness 1.11*** 0.25 6574 4.45 
Kurtosis        -0.04 0.18 6574 -0.24 
Obs:253x27 
 =6831 
    
 
The first three moments, the mean, standard deviation and skewness, all have 
significant aggregate effects on contributions. Since the kurtosis did not display a 
significant aggregate effect we focus on the first three moments, and will not discuss 
                                                 
6 Running the regression for all individuals or those indicated as conditional cooperators (through individual model 
fitting as discussed in 1.12) yielded similar results.   
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it further. As expected from Figure 1.4, the mean had a significant effect on 
contributions, with a coefficient of 0.8, so that an increase in the mean of the profile 
by 1 increased aggregate contributions by 0.8, demonstrating a strong effect of 
conditional cooperation. Despite the considerably different structure of the games 
(number of players, range of contributions etc.), this value is close to the values found 
by Cheung (2014) and Hartig et al. (2015). The standard deviation entered with a 
positive aggregate effect of 0.19. The effect has the opposite sign to that found by 
Cheung (2014) and Hartig et al. (2015) and suggests that increasing the standard 
deviation of the profiles increases contributions. Finally, we note that the skewness, 
which controls whether the distribution has a heavier tail on the right of the distribution 
(positive skew) or heavier tail on the left of the distribution (negative skew), had a 
positive aggregate coefficient of 1.1, suggesting that a heavy tail on the right of the 
distribution increased contributions. We note that this effect is independent of those 
for the mean and standard deviation and corresponds to the effect of varying the 
skewness while keeping these other measures constant. Aggregate effects do not tell 
the whole story here, and there is a large heterogeneity in the distribution of regression 
coefficients for individuals. 
Figure 1.5 shows the distribution of regression coefficients found for individual 
regressions run for each participant (excluding those who contributed a constant 
amount). The regressions were formulated as 
where the symbols have the same meaning as previously, but each individual has 
their own set of regression coefficients. The distribution of coefficients for the mean 
in Figure 1.5 shows a positive coefficient for almost all individuals. Conversely, the 
individual coefficients for standard deviation show a high degree of heterogeneity, 
with a large proportion being negative, as opposed to coefficients on the mean (where 
almost all coefficients are positive). We note, therefore, that any model of individual 
decision-making in these scenarios must be able to incorporate both an increase and a 
decrease in contributions as a function of increasing variance. As we show below, a 
rank-based model can account for this phenomenon (assuming that some individuals 
have a preference to make contributions that occupy a percentile position lower than 
the median of the social norm, while others’ preferences are to contribute above the 
 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖 𝜇𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑖𝜎𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑠𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑖𝜅𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖,   (5) 
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median). An interesting consequence, discussed in detail in 1.10.2, of this spread in 
individual responses to standard deviation is that increasing the standard deviation of 
the contribution profiles should increase the standard deviation of responses. This 
relationship, which can be thought of as a signature of rank-based models, is confirmed 
in Figure 1.6 and demonstrates a strong correlation coefficient of r = 0.76, p <.001. 
 
Figure 1.5. Distributions of individual regression coefficients for individuals who did not 
contribute a constant amount.  
 
Finally, we note that skewness also has different effects for different individuals. 
We will have relatively little to say about these subtle effects of skewness, as neither 
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the rank-based model nor the mean-based model of social norms that we develop 
makes predictions about the effects of skewness7. 
 
Figure 1.6. Standard deviation of contribution profiles versus standard deviation of 
contributions of individuals who did not contribute a constant amount. 
 
1.9 Specification of Models 
In this section we formulate our rank-based model and several alternatives with 
which we compare it. The purpose of this model is to capture the effects of social 
comparison and its interplay with players’ incentives to earn as much from the game 
as possible.  
                                                 
7 We note however that some accounts in the psychological literature (Brown & Matthews, 2011; Brown, Wood, 
Ogden, & Maltby, 2015) argue that, with additional assumptions about individuals’ priors, purely rank-based 
processes can give rise to effects of skewness.  
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  We assume a competition between the utility gained from free-riding and the 
individual’s desire to conform to a perceived socially appropriate value 𝜈𝑖. For the 
purposes of fitting the model we choose the functional form 
 
𝑈𝑖 = 𝑃 − 𝑥𝑖 +  𝜏∑𝑥𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
− 𝛾𝑖(𝑥𝑖 − 𝜈𝑖)
2, (6) 
   
where 𝑃 is the initial endowment (equal to 100), 𝑥𝑖 is the contribution of the i
th 
individual, 𝜏 < 1 is the marginal per capita rate of return in the public goods game, 𝜈𝑖 
is the socially appropriate value to which the individual would like to conform and 
𝛾𝑖 ≥ 0 measures the degree to which the individual i is influenced by the social 
context, which we call ‘norm sensitivity’8. The expected contribution, 𝑥𝑖
∗, is then found 
by maximizing 𝑈𝑖, which requires 𝑑𝑈𝑖 𝑑𝑥𝑖 = 0⁄  and 𝑑
2𝑈𝑖 𝑑𝑥𝑖
2 < 0⁄ . This gives a 
solution for the expected contribution as 
 
𝑥𝑖
∗ = 𝜈𝑖 −
(1 − 𝜏)
2𝛾𝑖
. (7) 
That is, as the norm sensitivity decreases, the second term in the above expression gets 
larger, and the individual’s behavior tends more towards the Nash equilibrium value 
of 0 contribution (which is predicted if all individuals have 𝛾𝑖 = 0). As the norm 
sensitivity becomes very large, i’s contribution tends towards their perception of 𝜈𝑖. In 
terms of this model free riders, those who contribute zero, can be thought of as having 
no norm sensitivity (𝛾𝑖 = 0). 
The key aspect of the model is the choice of 𝜈𝑖, which will in principle depend on 
the profiles of others’ contributions. We will discuss three possibilities for this choice.  
1.9.1 Constant model 
The simplest possibility is a context-independent model in which 𝜈𝑖 is just a 
constant. In this case, we cannot estimate the parameters 𝜈𝑖 and 𝛾𝑖 exactly as they have 
a similar effect. For example, in the case of a free rider, one cannot distinguish the 
                                                 
8 Also, this specification is similar to some recent models in economics that model utility from norm following 
(e.g. López-Pérez, 2008; Dufwenberg, Gächter, & Hennig-Schmidt, 2011; Krupka, & Weber, 2013; Gächter, 
Nosenzo, & Sefton, 2013).  
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following two cases: (a) the individual has a low norm sensitivity and so acts in her 
own self-interest, or (b) her perception of the social norm is such that zero is the 
socially preferred action and she follows this. The constant model is suited to 
describing free riders, altruists, and others who contribute a constant amount 
irrespective of the context provided by others’ contributions and acts as a null model.  
1.9.2 Mean Relative Model 
Another simple possibility for 𝜈𝑖 is to take the mean of the contribution profiles. 
In fact, we will take a constant multiplied by the mean as 
 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖𝜇. (8) 
This model represents the idea that the mean of the contribution profile is the only 
relevant aspect of the feedback for an individual, and can be thought of as a simple 
social norm model of a conditional cooperator9. Correspondingly, it predicts no effect 
of any other aspect of the profiles. The constant 𝑎𝑖 allows for the often-observed 
behavior that conditional cooperators typically contribute a fraction of the mean in 
public goods games (Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr, 2001). 
1.9.3 Rank Model 
The final choice for 𝜈𝑖 is derived from a rank-based model of decision making. 
Our rank model posits that the socially appropriate value, 𝜈𝑖, for an individual, 
corresponds to a specific rank position within the contribution profile. A simple 
version of this model, which we term the ‘discrete rank model’, sets the value of 𝜈𝑖 to 
be equal to the 𝑝𝑡ℎ ranked element of the contribution profile. 𝑝 is a rank parameter 
governing the individual’s behaviour and is an integer between 1 and 9 (we use the 
convention that a rank of 1 indicates the lowest contribution). As an example, if the 
contribution profile is given as (profile S1): 
44 51 64 66 70 74 76 89 96 
                                                 
9 We also fitted a model where individuals had a preference to be placed at a constant distance from the mean 
which for the majority of our participants fit worse than the mean relative model. 
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Then in a public goods game an individual A with rank parameter 𝑝 = 3 would have 
a value for 𝑣𝐴 of 64, and so their contribution would be equal to 
 
𝑥∗𝐴 = 64 −
(1 − 𝜏)
2𝛾𝐴
. (9) 
If we assume that the individual’s norm sensitivity, 𝛾𝐴, is large, then 𝑥
∗
𝐴 = 64, or the 
3rd ranked element of the feedback profile. Another individual B with rank parameter 
equal to 7 would have a contribution 𝑥∗𝐵 = 76.  
With this simple model we can show how a rank-based theory of contributions 
can account for the aggregate responses to increasing the standard deviation of the 
contribution profiles. To see this, take a second example where the contribution profile 
is given as (profile S2): 
 
44 47 49 51 70 89 91 93 96 
 
This profile has the same mean and skewness (as well as range and median) as the first 
example, but an increased standard deviation. Our two individuals, A and B, will now 
have contributions given by 49 and 91 respectively. In the case of individual A, 
increasing the standard deviation of the contribution profiles decreased their 
contribution from 64 to 49, whereas in the case of individual B, increasing the standard 
deviation of the profile increased their contribution from 76 to 91. We see that in a 
rank-based model, individuals have heterogeneous responses to increased standard 
deviation: individuals with low rank parameters will tend to decrease their 
contribution whereas individuals with high ranks will tend to increase their 
contributions. On aggregate therefore, the effect of increasing standard deviation of 
the profile on the mean of individuals’ contributions will depend on whether more 
individuals have high or low rank parameters. However, the aggregate effect of 
increasing standard deviation of the profile on the standard deviation of individuals’ 
contributions will always be positive. 
In this simple model the rank parameter is fixed to one of nine values, and 
individuals’ rank preferences cannot lie between these discrete values, or outside 
them. To allow a continuous rank preference we generalize the rank model to a 
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continuous version. In the continuous model the discrete contribution profile is 
replaced by a continuous PDF, which the individual infers from the context. This PDF 
corresponds to the individual’s perceived distribution of the actions taken by others 
and, as such, we refer to this PDF as the inferred social norm. Given this inferred social 
norm PDF, 𝑓(𝑥), the individual’s socially acceptable value, 𝜈𝑖, then corresponds to a 
particular relative rank position with the social norm PDF. Mathematically, if 𝑓(𝑥) is 
the inferred pdf and 𝐹(𝑥) the associated CDF then 𝜈𝑖  is given by 𝐹
−1(𝑟), where 𝑟 is a 
rank parameter between 0 and 1.  
At this conceptual level our model is very general, we have not specified the 
particular form for the PDF nor the information that determines it. Here we assume 
that the contribution profiles completely determine the form of the social norm PDF. 
The mathematical method we employ is kernel density estimation (KDE), which 
allows a smooth distribution to be inferred non-parametrically from a dataset 
(Rosenblatt, 1956; Parzen, 1962). That the method is non-parametric is key as it is 
important that the shape of the social norm PDF, and thus properties such as skewness 
and standard deviation, are inherited directly from the contribution profiles, without 
being constrained by a particular functional form. As an example, if we created the 
social norm PDF by fitting a normal distribution to the profiles, the result would 
always have zero skewness. The method works by placing a chosen function (the 
kernel) centered over each point in the contribution profiles and aggregating the 
results. We choose the normal PDF as our kernel function and so given a contribution 
profile 𝐷 = (𝑑1, 𝑑2, … , 𝑑𝑛) of contributions by other participants, the inferred social 
norm PDF is given by: 
 𝑓(𝑥) =
1
𝑛
∑𝑁(𝑥; 𝑑𝑖,, 𝑏)
𝑛
𝑖=1
. (10) 
𝑁(𝑥; 𝑑𝑖 , 𝑏) is a normal PDF with mean 𝑑𝑖 and standard deviation 𝑏. The parameter 𝑏, 
the bandwidth, controls the form of the PDF that results from this procedure. Since the 
kernel PDF is created by placing a Gaussian of width b over each point in the 
contribution profiles and then averaging, as the bandwidth increases the smoothness 
of the resulting PDF also increases. This is illustrated in Figure 1.7, where we show a 
series of diagrams describing this effect. When the bandwidth is small, approximately 
0, the resulting PDF consists of a series of spikes centered over each point in the 
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contribution profiles. As the bandwidth increases, the PDF becomes smoother and the 
modality of the distribution decreases until it becomes a uniform distribution over the 
allowed range of contributions.  
The effect of the bandwidth on the contributions of individuals follows from these 
properties. To understand these effects, we will assume a high social sensitivity, so 
that the individual’s contribution is simply given by 𝜈𝑖. On an intuitive level, 
decreasing the bandwidth increases the tendency of an individual to contribute a value 
that is close to one of the contributions they observe. Figure 1.8 shows an individual’s 
contribution as a function of their rank parameter for differing values of the bandwidth. 
We see that for 𝑏 = 0.1, the majority of rank parameters lead to a contribution that is 
equal to a value in the contribution profiles; this corresponds to the plateaus in Figure 
1.8. As the bandwidth increases to 𝑏 = 10 the graph becomes smoother, and the 
majority of rank parameters lead to contributions that lie between values in the 
contribution profiles. 
 
Figure 1.7. Effect of varying the bandwidth on the inferred social norm PDF. When the 
bandwidth is small the inferred PDF is a series of spikes over each contribution in the 
contribution profiles. As the bandwidth increases, the modality of the inferred PDF 
decreases until it becomes a unimodal distribution. 
The behavior of the continuous rank model when the bandwidth is either very 
small (equal to 0) or very large (approaching infinity) is simple, and replicates the 
behavior of other models, the discrete rank model and the constant model respectively. 
When the bandwidth is zero we obtain the discrete rank model that was introduced at 
the beginning of this section, since all the probability in the KDE PDF is concentrated 
over the values in the contribution profiles. When the bandwidth is very large the KDE 
PDF is the uniform distribution between 0 and 100, and so the contribution is given 
by 100 (the range of possible contributions) times the rank parameter. 
50 
 
 
Figure 1.8. Contribution versus rank parameter for two different bandwidths, 0.1 and 10, for 
the contribution profile S2. When the bandwidth is small (0.1) most rank parameters 
correspond to contributions close to values in S2 (denoted by the horizontal dashed lines). 
As the bandwidth becomes larger (10) the curve becomes smoother, and contributions vary 
smoothly between the values from the profile. 
 
1.10 Model Predictions  
We will now show how, on both an aggregate and an individual level, the rank 
model predicts responses to changes in the structure of the contribution profiles. We 
will focus on the effects of the mean and the standard deviation. 
1.10.1 Mean 
Consider a profile that produces a particular set of contributions from individuals, 
whom we suppose make their decision according to the model specified above. We 
can now ask what contributions we will obtain if the mean of the profile is increased, 
which we do by increasing the value of all entries in the profile by a fixed amount, say 
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10. Then, the pdf that is inferred from the profile will just be shifted by 10, and so the 
contribution associated to any given rank parameter will also increase by 10 (see 
Figure 1.9). Thus, the model predicts linear increase in contributions as a function of 
the mean of the feedback on both an individual and aggregate level. This linear relation 
is precisely what we observe and indeed is the behavioral archetype of the conditional 
cooperator as defined by Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001).  
 
 
 
Figure 1.9. Increasing the mean of the inferred social norm pdf can be accomplished by 
shifting the entire distribution to the right. As a result, the contribution corresponding to 
each rank parameter is also shifted by this same amount. 
1.10.2 Standard Deviation 
  We now turn to the predicted effect of increasing the standard deviation of the 
feedback on contributions. In contrast with the previous case of increasing the mean, 
the rank model predicts heterogeneous individual responses to changing the standard 
deviation of the contribution profile. Increasing the standard deviation of the 
contribution profile increases the standard deviation of the inferred social norm pdf, 
which can be thought of as a widening of the inferred pdf, as illustrated in Figure 1.10. 
Increasing the standard deviation of a distribution without affecting other moments 
such as the mean or skewness can be accomplished by pushing each element in the 
profile away from the mean. The result of this is that individuals with low rank 
parameters will decrease their contribution, shown as α, and individuals with high rank 
parameters will increase their contribution, shown as γ. The crossover point between 
 
Contribution 
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the two effects is at the value of the rank parameter corresponding to the median of 
the distribution which will typically be around 0.5, shown as β. Standard deviation 
therefore has a markedly different effect to the mean: increasing standard deviation 
will either increase or decrease the contribution of an individual depending on the 
value of their rank parameter. 
  
 
Figure 1.10. Increasing the standard deviation of the contribution profile can either 
decrease an individual's contribution (α), increase their contribution (β) or result in no 
change (γ), depending on the rank parameter. As a result, the standard deviation of 
individuals’ contributions will increase on aggregate. 
Of interest here is therefore the aggregate effect. It is clear from this that our model 
unequivocally predicts that increasing the standard deviation will increase the standard 
deviation of the contributions. This is precisely what we observe, as shown in  
Figure 1.6. The effect of increasing the standard deviation on the mean of contributions 
is more subtle. The direction of the aggregate effect will depend on the spread of rank 
parameters within the population. If the average rank parameter is low then we expect 
the aggregate effect to be negative. If the converse is true we expect the aggregate 
effect to be positive. Certainly, however, if there are significant numbers of individuals 
   A 
 B 
Contribution 
α β 
γ 
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with both high and low rank parameters we expect the aggregate effect to be small. 
Our data shows a small positive aggregate effect of the standard deviation. 
Interestingly Cheung (2014) and Hartig et al. (2015) found an aggregate effect of 
standard deviation in the opposite direction. These findings are not necessarily 
inconsistent however, since, as discussed, the aggregate effect may vary. Depending 
on the sample and the individual preferences, high variance can lead to different or 
mixed results. 
1.11 Model Implementation 
To compare the rank-based model with the two other candidates (mean-based and 
constant), we fit the models to the data from individual participants. This is done 
through a maximum likelihood framework (as in Lewandowsky & Farrell, 2010). We 
take the log-likelihood for individual i to be 
 
𝐿𝐿𝑖 =∑log𝑁𝑠(𝑥(Σ𝑗; 𝜃𝑖) − 𝑐𝑖𝑗, 𝜎𝑖)
27
𝑗=1
, (11) 
where 𝑐𝑖𝑗 is the measured contribution of individual i in contribution profile j. 
𝑥(Σ𝑗; 𝜃𝑖) is the predicted contribution from the model for j, with parameters 𝜃𝑖 . 
𝑁𝑠(𝑥, 𝜎𝑖) is a modified version of a normal PDF with mean 0 and standard deviation 
𝜎. It is made by discretizing the normal distribution over the integers between 0 and 
100 (inclusive). All the probability above 100 is added to the value of 𝑁𝑠 at 100. The 
psychological motivation for 𝑁𝑠 is to account for the constrained intention of an 
individual to contribute below 0 or above 100. That is, if an individual would like to 
contribute 125, but cannot due to the game rules, they will instead contribute 100, so 
all the probability of contributing above 100 is added to 100. The equivalent process 
is applied to contributions below 0. Parameter values 𝜃𝑖 (which contains three 
parameters for the rank model, two for the mean model and one for the constant model) 
and 𝜎𝑖 are then found by maximizing the log-likelihood. Note that because we have 
used a discrete distribution, the log-likelihood is always ≤ 0. 
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1.12 Individual Results 
Table 1.2 below shows the results of evaluating the three competing models —
the rank-based model, the mean-relative model and the constant model. We fit each 
model for each individual using maximum likelihood estimation. Since the models 
contain different numbers of parameters we use AICc to compare them (following 
Lewandowsky & Farrell, 2010). We say that one model has a clear advantage over 
another if its AICc differs by two or more. It is clear that even using AICc to correct 
for the number of parameters the rank-based model fits a substantially higher number 
of people than either the constant model (the majority of the winners for the constant 
model are free riders and altruists) or the mean relative model. 
Figure 1.11 shows the effect on the proportions of the clear winners for each of 
the models as the AICc threshold is varied. The rank model increases its advantage as 
the threshold increases, illustrating the robustness of our findings.10 
Table 1.2. Results of model fitting. Average AICc is for all participants, not just clear winners, 
showing the rank model with the superior average AICc. 
Model Clear Winners Percentages 
Of Total Clear 
Winners 
Average AICc Number of 
Parameters 
Constant 61 (including 16 
altruists and 28 
free-riders) 
24% 175.903 2 
Mean Relative  80  31% 159.354 3 
Rank  115  45% 150.983 4 
Total Clear 
Winners 
256     
Total 
Participants 
300    
 
                                                 
10 The average contributions of rank and mean relative winners were 54.60 and 52.13 respectively. The average 
standard deviations of the contributions of rank and mean relative winners were 18.06 and 22.71 respectively. 
These were not found to be significantly different. 
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Figure 1.11. Effect on clear winner proportions as the AICc threshold is increased. 
 
Figure 1.12 shows selected estimates of model parameters for the rank model and 
the mean relative model obtained through maximum likelihood estimation. The 
estimates of the rank parameter, 𝑟𝑖, show a peak at around 0.5. Notably, this 
distribution has more individuals above this modal value than below it. This is 
consistent with our discussion of the effect of the standard deviation, where we showed 
that if a majority of individuals have a rank parameter above around 0.5, then we 
expect a positive aggregate effect of standard deviation on contributions. The 
estimates of the bandwidth, 𝛽𝑖, show a monotonically decreasing shape. The mean 
bandwidth is 17.2, with the majority of individuals having a bandwidth below 20. We 
can conclude that the majority of rank winners potentially take into account some more 
subtle aspects of the feedback profiles. We also see the estimate for the mean slope 
parameters, 𝛼𝑖, in the mean relative model. We note that there is heterogeneity within 
the clear winners and that all the coefficients are positive. The mode of the distribution 
is approximately 1, indicating that these individuals tend to follow the mean of the 
distribution very closely.   
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Figure 1.12. Estimated model parameters obtained through maximum likelihood. From left 
to right. Estimated rank parameters for rank clear winners. Bandwidth parameters for rank 
clear winners. Mean parameters for mean relative clear winners. 
Figure 1.13 shows predicted versus observed contributions for two participants, 
illustrating rank-based decision making, and the advantage that the rank model has 
over the mean relative model for those participants. A perfect fit is given by points 
that lie on the line x=y. The left panel of the figure shows data from a participant with 
an estimated rank parameter of 0.29, with bandwidth 0.1 and (1 − 𝜏) 2𝛾 = 0⁄  (i.e. a 
very large norm sensitivity). The corresponding parameters for the mean model give 
a slope of 1.01 and (𝜏 − 1) 2𝛾 = 12.30⁄ .  
The situation in the right panel is similar, with the participant having an estimated 
rank parameter of 0.05, a bandwidth of 0.1 and a high norm sensitivity, 
(1 − 𝜏) 2𝛾 = 0⁄ .  In this case the parameters for the mean model are a slope of 0.99 
and (1 − 𝜏) 2𝛾 = 27.72⁄ . In both these cases the best fit bandwidth parameter is 
small, 0.1, suggesting discrete rank behavior, and indeed this is what we observe, with 
effective discrete rank parameters of 3 and 1 respectively. It is clear from Figure 1.13 
that mean-based decision making does not capture this behavior. Indeed, we could not 
find any examples of participants for whom the mean model produced a vastly better 
fit, capturing qualitatively different behavior. Indeed, from our observations it seems 
that there is no pattern of behavior that the mean model can display which the rank 
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model cannot. We can explain this heuristically by observing that setting the 
bandwidth to a moderate value (say 20), a rank parameter of 0.5 will be close to the 
mean of the profile and so produce similar results to the mean model. Additional 
figures illustrating a better fit for the rank model can be found in  Appendix IV. 
 
 
Figure 1.13. Predicted versus observed contributions for two participants, with both the 
mean relative and rank models, displaying a better fit for the rank-based model. In both 
cases the rank model perfectly fits the observed contributions, which can be seen by 
observing that the rank values fall on the line x=y.  
 
1.13 Discussion P-experiment 
We found strong influences of the context of others’ behaviour and rank effects--
the influence of the perception of own’s ranked position within a perceived social 
norm-- clearly distinguished.  
Specifically, we found that, in a public goods P-experiment with ten players, 
aspects of players’ contributions other than the mean had a significant effect, both at 
an aggregate and individual level, on contributions. This suggests that individuals care 
about what the average contribution is comprised of. Our study used a variant of the 
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strategy method, allowing us to explore a full range of possible contribution profiles. 
We reproduced the well-established dependence of individual’s contributions on the 
mean of others’ contributions, even though this mean was not shown to participants. 
We found that the standard deviation increased contributions on aggregate, though the 
magnitude, and even the sign, of the effect varied greatly among participants. We have 
shown that this phenomenon is consistent with a rank-based model of decision. Further 
evidence for this hypothesis was given by showing that the standard deviation of the 
contribution profiles increases the standard deviation of the contributions observed.  
On an individual level we found that a rank-based model of decision making 
incorporating effects of standard deviation can predict individuals’ decisions better 
than a model in which the mean is taken to be the only aspect of the feedback to which 
people attend, even though it has more parameters for which it is penalized.  
We note that in the economics literature there are two well-known models of 
social preferences, by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), 
which take into account social comparison, though they are typically applied to games 
with smaller numbers of players. However, it has been shown by both Cheung (2014) 
and Hartig et al. (2015) that these models do not give appropriate predictions for what 
we observe in our results. In Bolton and Ockenfels’ model (2000) individuals prefer 
an equal split of payoffs between them but also prefer to earn more. As such 
participants will not contribute more than the average of others’ contributions and 
what constitutes the average will not matter to them. In Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
participants feel envy if they have a lower payoff than others and compassion if their 
payoff is higher than others. According to this model Hartig et al. (2015) showed that 
in bigger groups and with full information regarding individual contributions, a 
participant will not contribute more than the minimum of others’ contributions. The 
behavioral predictions of these models about how people react to heterogeneity in 
others’ individual contributions were not able to capture the effects we reported in this 
chapter. 
 Our findings are in accordance with many demonstrations within the 
psychological literature that individuals are sensitive to relative rank effects in for 
example psychophysical (Riskey et al., 1979), economic (Boyce et al., 2010; Wood et 
al., 2012) and social (Wood et al., 2011) contexts.  
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One assumption we have made in the formulation of our rank model is that 
comparisons between individuals are made on the basis of contributions, that is, the 
value of 𝜈𝑖 is a preferred contribution. An alternative perspective, which could form 
the basis of a future study, is that earnings or payoff matter. In this case, one rephrases 
the model such that 𝜈𝑖 is a preferred payoff.  Indeed, it is possible that there is 
heterogeneity amongst individuals as to whether their preference is to think in terms 
of contribution space or earnings space. Experiments exploring feedback in terms of 
earnings in social dilemmas (Bigoni & Suetens, 2012; Nikiforakis, 2010) have found 
that contributions can be reduced by comparison with others’ earnings rather than 
others’ contributions and that participants exhibit a tendency to follow the best 
performer.  
Our model, which has more general application than the experiment considered 
here, provides a new way to model perceived social norms. Many social norm 
interventions or experiments using social norm ideas (Schultz et al., 2007) provide 
participants with a number representing the mean level of others’ activity (such as 
energy consumption). Our perspective suggests that such interventions might be more 
effective if they included information about an individual’s ranked position within a 
social group. Two recent studies are consistent with this idea: Taylor et al. (2018) 
found that telling people how their drinking level ranked within the distribution of 
others’ drinking elicited more health-related information-seeking than telling them 
how their behavior related to the mean level of others’ drinking, and Aldrovandi, 
Brown, and Wood (2015) found that students’ level of concern about their 
consumption of unhealthy foods was predicted in majority by the subjective rank of 
their own consumption within the social distribution. Moreover, relative willingness 
to pay for healthy vs unhealthy foods was similarly affected in that provision of rank-
based social norm information about others’ consumption of unhealthy foods (“You 
think 80% of students eat more chocolate than you do; in fact only 15% of students 
eat more chocolate than you do”) was more effective than provision of mean-based 
social norm information (“You think the average consumption is 6 bars of chocolate; 
in fact it is 3).  
Our model moves beyond a simple model of feedback without requiring an 
explicit comparison with every other individual, instead assuming the inference of a 
PDF. On a practical level the use of Kernel density estimation is to better estimate the 
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rank parameters as there exists no other statistical distribution that can perfectly model 
all the different types of contribution profiles we gave to participants. For example, 
when profiles had different skew or modality it was not appropriate to use beta or 
Gaussian distributions. However, depending on the specific form of the profile, other 
types of estimation can serve the same purpose, depending on the properties of stimuli 
that one uses. 
1.14 C-experiment Study 
This experiment was designed to understand the effects of the full feedback of 
contributions and their content on aggregate and individual contribution decisions. 
Additionally, its goal was also to examine rank effects besides what is typically been 
studied which is the mean of the contributions in the previous round. 
1.14.1 Methods 
1.14.1.1 Design 
Participants took part in an incentivised repeated public goods game coded using 
the Bonn Experimental System (BoXS). We used a partner design to achieve a higher 
and more stable level of contributions and to avoid the problems of large samples 
needed in order to bypass repeated encounters when large group of players are used 
(stranger design). 
1.14.1.2 Participants 
We recruited 56 participants using Warwick University’s pool of volunteers. 
Each participant was promised a flat fee of £3.00 but was told that, depending on their 
choices, they could earn up to £1011.  
1.14.1.3 Procedure 
Participants were in groups of 9 or 10 and took part in the game for 30 or 50 
rounds in the Warwick Business School Behavioural Science Laboratory. Although 
we had overbooked the lab in order to have at least ten participants turning up in each 
session of the study, unfortunately a lot of them did not show up and so we had to 
                                                 
11 The experiment was incentivised so that participants had a motivation to make payoff relevant decisions and 
attend to the decision task. We run an initial pilot version of this, testing the interactive software, with 20 
Psychology students who took part in exchange for course credit. Their data are not included in this analysis. 
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modify our code in order to create groups of nine. In total there were six sessions: four 
groups of nine players who took part in the public goods game for 50 rounds and two 
groups of ten players who took part in the public goods game for 30 rounds. Each 
session lasted approximately 60 minutes. 
The game had a similar payoff structure to our P-experiment. On each round each 
player received an endowment, 𝑃, of 100 points. Payoff in each round was given by 
 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑃 − 𝑥𝑖 + 𝜏∑𝑥𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
, (12) 
where 𝑥𝑖 is the amount player i contributes to the public good. We set 𝜏 =
5
10⁄  , the 
marginal per capita rate of return for the public good. The payoff structure here is 
exactly the same as the one we used in the P-experiment making our studies 
comparable in terms of parameterisation of the decision situation. An example of what 
participants saw after a given round is given below: 
“You are player “E”. You contributed “70” Points. The average amount contributed 
is “33” Points, your payoff for this round was “196” Points." 
The contributions from all players in decreasing order were: 
Player "E":70 
Player "D":68 
Player "H":48 
Player "A":42 
Player "G":30 
Player "C":28 
Player "F":25 
Player "B":10 
Player "I": 5 
Player "J":5 
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By observing themselves in the feedback, participants could infer their own relative 
rank position within this feedback after each round. To avoid the possible confound 
of hedging we did not paid participants according to their running total payoff but we 
randomly picked one round for each participant and paid them according to their 
decisions and the decisions of the other group members for that round (see 1.18.5 
Appendix V for full instructions used in the C-experiment). 
1.15 Results  
The basic quantity typically measured in a public goods C-experiment is the 
average contribution over time. We show this in Figure 1.14. Figure 1.15 shows the 
average contributions for each of the six groups over time and showcases the large 
degree of heterogeneity among groups. Note the decreasing level of contributions in 
both figures. This is a typical pattern seen in such experiments as participants try to 
contribute an amount slightly below the average of the previous round and provides 
evidence that our design has worked well on a basic level despite the increased group 
size not typically used in the literature. 
 
Figure 1.14. Average contributions as a function of trial number. 
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Figure 1.15. Average contributions over time for individual groups. 
As in the analysis of the P-experiment we ran a random effects regression with the 
mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis of all contributions in the previous 
round as independent variables, the individual as a random effect, trial number as a 
fixed effect and contribution in the current round as dependent variable. The regression 
took the form  
 𝐶𝑖𝑗 = β0 + β1 μj−1 + β2σj−1 + β3sj−1 + β4κj−1 + β5j + εi + εij, (13) 
where 𝐶𝑖𝑗 is the contribution of individual i for round j, μ is the mean, σ is the standard 
deviation, s is the skewness and κ the kurtosis of all the contributions in the previous 
round. The coefficients βi describe the aggregate effects of mean, standard deviation, 
skewness and kurtosis on contributions. We use the standard forms for skewness and 
kurtosis, which control whether the distribution has a heavier tail at high contributions 
(positive skewness) or low contributions (negative skewness) and whether the tails of 
the distribution are heavier than a normal distribution (positive kurtosis) or smaller 
(negative kurtosis). The results of this regression are given in Table 1.3. 
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Table 1.3. Aggregate random effects regression results for contributions depending on the 
first four moments of the previous round.  
 Estimate Standard Error t statistic p value 
     
(Intercept) 22.86 5.61 4.07 <.001 
Mean 0.65 0.07 8.78 <.001 
Standard 
Deviation 
-0.045 0.08 -0.60 0.55 
Skewness 3.26 1.46 2.22 0.02 
Kurtosis 0.13 0.24 0.56 0.58 
Trial Number 
Obs:2344 
-0.26 0.05 -5.39 <.001 
 
The mean and skewness had significant aggregate effects on contributions. The mean 
had a positive and significant effect on contributions, with a coefficient of 0.65, so that 
an increase in the mean of the feedback by 1 in the previous round increases the 
aggregate contributions by 0.65 in the current round, demonstrating a strong effect of 
conditional cooperation similar to that found in Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) 
despite the considerably different structures of the games (number of players, range of 
contributions etc.). The standard deviation entered with a small negative aggregate 
effect but not a significant one. This is not evidence against a rank model, however — 
as we discussed previously in 1.10.2, if participants have heterogeneity in their rank 
preferences and those are symmetric around the median then one might observe no 
aggregate effects of standard deviation. Finally, we note that the skewness, which 
controls whether the feedback had a heavier tail on the right of the distribution 
(positive skew) or heavier tail on the left of the distribution (negative skew), has a 
positive coefficient of 3.3, suggesting that a heavy tail on the right in the feedback of 
the previous round will increase contributions in the current round. There is also a 
strong negative effect of trial number which confirms the effect observed in  regarding 
the overall decreasing pattern of contributions. 
The unique part of our analysis studies the effect of relative rank on participants’ 
contribution decisions. If a participant has a preference for a relative rank position 
within the feedback they receive after each round then we would expect an S-shape 
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pattern between their change in contribution from round to round and their rank 
position. We illustrate this idea in Figure 1.16. If at a particular round a participant’s 
rank was lower than their preference, they increased their contribution next time, so 
ΔC was positive. If at a particular round a participant’s rank was higher than their 
preference, they decreased their contribution next time, so ΔC was negative. For 
example, a participant has a preference to be at rank 4, they receive feedback regarding 
the contribution of all players in the previous round in descending order (this gave 
them an indirect idea regarding where their contributions ranked among others) with 
their contribution of 20 points corresponding to rank of 7 and not 4. This means that 
they should increase their contribution in the next round and so their change in 
contribution should be positive, ΔC>0, since they were at a lower relative rank 
position than they would like to (here the rank positions between 1 and 9 or 1 and 10 
correspond to the highest and lowest contribution respectively). The middle in the 
figure represents the stable relative rank which participants try to return to, which for 
a given participant could be any rank position. The stable rank represents the point at 
the figure at which a participant would neither want to increase nor decrease their 
contribution. 
Figure 1.16. Schematic representation of rank effects in the C-experiment. 
With this in mind, we used a novel approach for this analysis and constructed, for 
each participant, a graph that plots their change in contribution as a function of their 
rank (Figure 1.17, Figure 1.18). This graph captures each participant’s response to 
their rank position within the feedback profile of the previous round. The graph 
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consists of pairs of numbers: the x axis is the participant’s ranked position in the 
feedback profile in any given round, and the y axis is the difference in contributions 
between the current round and the next round. Therefore, if the value on the y axis is 
positive it means that at that rank position the participant decided to increase their 
contribution.  A y-axis value of zero implies that a participant did not change their 
contribution between rounds. Observing these figures, we can find some initial 
evidence that many of our participants displayed rank sensitivity. 
Figure 1.17. Changes in contribution as a function of rank. 36 plots of individual 
participants that completed 50 rounds of the game. 
0 5 10
-100
0
100
0 5 10
-100
0
100
0 5 10
-50
0
50
0 5 10
-50
0
50
0 5 10
-50
0
50
0 5 10
-50
0
50
0 5 10
-50
0
50
0 5 10
-100
0
100
0 5 10
-100
0
100
0 5 10
-50
0
50
0 5 10
-100
0
100
0 5 10
-50
0
50
1 1.5
-1
0
1
0 5 10
-50
0
50
4 6 8
-20
0
20
6 8 10
-1
0
1
0 5 10
-100
0
100
0 5 10
-200
0
200
0 5 10
-100
0
100
0 5 10
-100
0
100
2 4 6
-50
0
50
0 5 10
-100
0
100
0 5 10
-100
0
100
0 5 10
-100
0
100
0 5 10
-100
0
100
0 5 10
-200
0
200
0 5 10
-100
0
100
0 5 10
-100
0
100
1.5 2 2.5
-1
0
1
0 5 10
-100
0
100
0 5 10
-200
0
200
0 5 10
-100
0
100
0 5 10
-100
0
100
0 5 10
-50
0
50
0 5 10
-100
0
100
0 5 10
-100
0
100
67 
 
Figure 1.18. Changes in contribution as a function of rank. 20 plots of individual 
participants that completed 30 rounds of the game. 
 
Setting the fitted 3rd order polynomial to zero and solving for x the roots of the 
polynomial can identify the positions of stable ranks for each individual from Figure 
1.18. Here, the rank positions between 1 and 10 correspond to the highest and lowest 
contribution respectively. If multiple participants contributed the same amount then 
the rank position was given as the mean of the rank positions that the participants 
occupied. 
Figure 1.19 shows the histogram of stable rank preferences. It shows a large peak 
around rank 5. This suggests that the most common stable preference was to be in the 
middle of the feedback. A rank of 5 does not correspond to 50 points which is the 
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middle of the range (0-100) of possible contributions but to the middle contribution at 
a given round. Assuming participants’ internal preferences were constant, then this 
leads to the identification of a stable ranked position i.e., a rank at which a participant 
had no incentive to change his or her contribution. However, one can conduct a similar 
type of analysis and show a similar pattern between rounds whereby the change in 
contribution is affected by the mean of contributions in the previous round.  
 
Figure 1.19. Histogram of stable ranks.  
To distinguish between the effects of mean and rank we also ran an aggregate 
random effects regression with one’s own contribution in the previous round, average 
of others in the previous round and rank cubed in the previous round as independent 
variables, trial as a random effect and contribution in the current round as dependent 
variable. The regression took the form 
 𝐶𝑖𝑗 = β0 + β1 𝑂𝑤𝑛 𝐶j−1 + β2𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠j−1 + β3𝑂𝑤𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘
3
j−1 + εi + εij, (15) 
where 𝐶𝑖𝑗 is the contribution of individual i for round j. The results of this regression 
are reported in Table 1.4. 
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Table 1.4. Aggregate random effects regression results for contributions in the current round 
depending on an individual’s contribution in the previous round, the average contribution of 
others in the previous round, and an individual’s relative rank postion cubed in the previous 
round.  
 Estimate Standard 
Error 
t value p value 
     
(Intercept) 14.4 4.2 3.5 0.834 
 
Own Contribution  
 
Average Contribution 
 0.33 
 
 0.425 
0.04 
 
0.007 
 
8.25 
 
60.71 
<.001 
 
<.001 
Rank (cubed) -8.8 3.6 2.4 0.015 
Obs:2344     
 
Own contributions in the previous affected significantly and positively contributions 
in the current round. Increasing the average contribution of others in the previous 
round also affected contributions in the current round significantly and positively. 
Rank cubed was found to have the strongest effect compared to rank but still the result 
is marginal (p = .015). The fact that rank cubed gave us the best result suggests that 
the observed marginal effect of rank came from ranks which were high. Participants 
who were at relative high rank positions in the previous rounds decreased their 
contributions more in the current round. 
Rank here was defined from 0 to 1, corresponding to the lowest and highest 
contribution respectively. The rank coefficient being negative here supports the 
conclusion of the individual analysis suggesting that people tend to revert to a stable 
rank. If the rank is high in the previous round then it would have a negative effect in 
their contribution in the current round. Decreasing rank in the previous round, 
increases contribution in the current round ceteris paribus.  
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1.16 Discussion  
Even though we tested bigger groups of players we found similar patterns of 
decreasing contributions in the C-experiment compared to studies that use only 4 
players. With these bigger size groups, we also found a significant effect of the mean 
of the feedback on aggregate contributions, providing evidence for conditioning on 
the mean cooperative strategies. Nevertheless, no significant effects of standard 
deviation were found as in the P-experiment. Although this is not evidence against a 
rank-based model, an effect of standard deviation might not have been captured 
because the range of standard deviation in the experiment was small (it ranged 
approximately between 36 and 45 among all rounds). The use of confederates could 
be useful in that regard, allowing for a bigger range of standard deviation of 
contributions. However, this was predominately achieved in the P-experiment where 
we controlled for different aspects of the contribution profiles and thus the purpose of 
the C-experiment was to see what happens “in the wild”. 
Although from Figure 1.17 and Figure 1.18 we can observe a lot of our 
participants being fit well by a sigmoidal curve running a mixed model showed 
marginal effects for rank. Thus, our results remain mixed and inconclusive. Moreover, 
it was clear that the strong effect of trial number precluded the possibility of treating 
the C-experiment as a series of one-shot games, not allowing us to conduct or test the 
social norms models presented in the P-experiment. Additionally, we could not rule 
out possible confounding effects due to strategic considerations or beliefs in this game. 
Due to these, we focused our analysis on the P-experiment presented in the previous 
section in which temporal effects were controlled for by the random ordering.  
We believe that it is difficult to isolate the effects of the mean and rank given that 
participants were presented with overlapping information; participants saw feedback 
regarding what others did in the previous round, the average of all contributions in the 
previous round, their earnings in the previous round, and all the contributions of all 
group members including themselves in descending order. 
Future studies could compare between treatments, where one treatment receives 
feedback about others’ contributions in the previous round without giving information 
about the mean, one treatment where information about the mean in the previous round 
71 
 
is presented as well as all the individual contributions (but participants cannot see 
themselves in the distribution and a third treatment where participants would see the 
full list of contributions of others and their explicit (in numerical terms and not just 
visually) rank position within that feedback, testing specifically for rank effects and 
leaving every other information aside. 
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1.18 Appendices  
1.18.1 Appendix I 
Instructions P-experiment 
Thank you for agreeing to help us with our research on decision making.  
  
In this study, you will take part in a decision-making task. Instructions will be 
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provided on exactly how to do this shortly. After that, you will also be asked to 
provide to fill in some short questionnaires.  
The aim of our research is to investigate decision making. 
 
The study will take approximately 30 minutes to complete.    
  
If at any point you wish to withdraw you can do so although payment will only be 
given to those who complete the entire experiment. Your payment is in two parts. 
The first part is a constant fee and the second part is a bonus payment that will be 
calculated based on your responses and will be explained later.                    
 
Questions or concerns 
 
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact the researchers at the 
email address provided, and we will assist you to the best of our abilities.  
Enquiries to: 
     e.achtypi@warwick.ac.uk 
During the experiment you will not be asked to reveal your identity and all data 
obtained from your decisions will be kept anonymous. All data will be handled by 
experimenters only, and will not be shared with any third party. 
  
Before proceeding with the experiment, you: 
         Confirm that you have read and understood the information above. 
         Agree to take part in this study, and will not hold the Department of 
Psychology at the University of Warwick responsible for any mishap.  
By selecting "Yes" at the bottom of this consent form, you agree that have read and 
understood the information presented above, and give full consent to proceed with 
the study. 
Please do not talk to anyone else while completing this study. We are interested in 
your individual opinions. 
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Please read the instructions carefully. After the instructions there will be 2 examples. 
Following the examples, you will be asked to answer a short quiz to check your 
understanding of the decision situation. You will not be able to proceed to the HIT 
until you answer these questions correctly. 
  
In order to confirm you have read these instructions, rather than clicking the "Next" 
button, first click the "A" on the University of Warwick logo above which will 
highlight green. Only once this has been completed you will be able to continue. 
 
Once again, thank you for taking part in this study; your participation is greatly 
appreciated. 
 
 
Please read the following description of the Decision Situation carefully, as it is an 
essential part of the task you will be required to complete. 
 
You will learn how the task will be conducted later. Firstly, we would like to 
introduce you to the decision situation. 
 
The decision situation involves a group of ten people. Each member of the group is 
given 100 points and must decide what to do with their points. 
  
You and the other group members must each state simultaneously, independently 
and anonymously how many of the 100 points they would like to contribute into a 
Group Pot without seeing the choices of anybody else. You keep any points that you 
do not contribute to the Group Pot. 
 
Each point you and the other members put into the Group Pot is multiplied by five. 
The resulting total points are then split evenly among all group members. 
 
Your Total Payout is comprised of two parts: the points you kept and your share of 
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points from the Group Pot. The Total Payout of all the other players is calculated in 
exactly the same way as yours. We will illustrate this with a few examples on the 
next page. 
  
In order to confirm you have read the Decision Situation, rather than clicking the 
"Next" button, first click the "De" on the Decision Situation title above which will 
highlight green. Only once this has been completed you will be able to continue. 
Here are some examples to illustrate how the decision situation works: 
 
Example 1: 
 
You contribute 20 points to the group pot and keep 80. The other players contribute 
the following amounts. 
  
         
   Group 
pot contribution 
  
      
  Player A   60     
  Player B   56     
  Player C   51     
  Player D   45     
  Player E   41     
  Player F   37     
  Player G   32     
  Player H   30     
  Player I   28     
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  You   20     
            
           
Sum of contributions to the group pot 400     
Payout from group pot 400 x 5 = 2000 
Each player’s payout from the group 
pot 
2000 / 10 = 200 
 
 
Payout 
  
The total contributed to the group pot is 400. This comes from total contribution of 
the other 9 people contributing a total of 380 and your contribution of 20 
(380+20=400). This is multiplied by 5 to give 2000. Each member of 
the group therefore receives a payout from the pot of 2000/10 = 200. 
 
You receive a payout of 200 points from the group pot. You also keep the 100-
20=80 points you did not contribute giving you a total payout of 80+200=280 
points.  
 
The other players also receive a payout of 200 from the group pot. Their total 
payouts also include the amounts they keep. So, the other players receive a total 
payout in the range 240 - 272 points. 
 
Example 2: 
 
You contribute 50 points to the group pot and keep 50. The other players contribute 
the following amounts. 
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   Group 
pot contribution 
  
     
  Player A  75     
  Player B  71     
  Player C  64     
  Player D  54     
  Player E  50     
  Player F  46     
  Player G  36     
  Player H  29     
  Player I  25     
         
  You  50     
         
            
Sum of contributions to the group pot 500     
Payout from group pot 500 x 5 = 2500 
Each player’s payout from the group 
pot 
2500 / 10 = 250 
 
 
Payout 
  
The total contributed to the group pot is 500. This comes from total contribution of 
the other 9 people contributing a total of 450 and your contribution of 50 
(450+50=500). This is multiplied by 5 to give 2500. Each member of 
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the group therefore receives a payout from the pot of 2500/10 = 250. 
 
You receive a payout of 250 points from the group pot. You also keep the 100-
50=50 points you did not contribute giving you a total payout of 50+250=300 
points.  
 
The other players also receive a payout of 250 from the group pot. Their total 
payouts also include the amounts they keep. So, the other players receive a total 
payout in the range 275 - 325 points. 
 
Example 3: 
 
You contribute 80 points to the group pot and keep 20. The other players contribute 
the following amounts. 
          
   Group 
pot contribution 
  
      
  Player A   74     
  Player B   71     
  Player C   67     
  Player D   65     
  Player E   60     
  Player F   55     
  Player G   53     
  Player H   49     
  Player I   46     
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  You   80     
            
            
Sum of contributions to the group pot 620     
Payout from group pot 620 x 5 = 3100 
Each player’s payout from the group 
pot 
3100 / 10 = 310 
 
Payout 
  
The total contributed to the group pot is 620. This comes from total contribution of 
the other 9 people contributing a total of 540 and your contribution of 80 
(540+80=620). This is multiplied by 5 to give 3100. Each member of 
the group therefore receives a payout from the pot of 3100/10 = 310. 
 
You receive a payout of 310 points from the group pot. You also keep the 100-
80=20 points you did not contribute giving you a total payout of 310+20=330 
points.  
 
The other players also receive a payout of 310 from the group pot. Their total 
payouts also include the amounts they keep. So, the other players receive a total 
payout in the range 336 - 364 points. 
Quiz 
 
In order to make sure that you have understood the Decision Situation we would like 
to ask you to complete the following quiz, consisting of three parts. You need to get 
each part right to move on to the next part. You can only proceed to the actual task 
of the HIT once you have correctly answered all questions. 
Let us remind you of the basic rules of the game:  
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You are a member of a group consisting of ten people.   
Each member of the group is given 100 points and must simultaneously and 
anonymously decide how many of their points to contribute to a group pot. 
Each point you and the other members contribute to the group pot will be multiplied 
by five. The resulting points will be evenly distributed among all group members 
regardless of who contributed what. 
You keep each point that you do not contribute to the group pot. 
Your total points are comprised of two parts: your share from the group pot payout 
plus the points you chose not to contribute. 
You contribute 0 points to the group pot, and keep 100 points. The 9 other players all 
do the same, contributing 0 points to the group pot and keeping 100. 
 
What is your total payout? 
What is the total payout of each of the other players? 
Quiz - Part 2 
 
Let us remind you of the basic rules of the game: 
You are a member of a group consisting of ten people.   
Each member of the group is given 100 points and must decide simultaneously and 
anonymously how many of their points to contribute to a group pot. 
Each point you and the other members contribute to the group pot will be multiplied 
by five. The resulting points will be evenly distributed among all group members 
regardless of who contributed what. 
You keep each point that you do not contribute to the group pot. 
Your total points are comprised of two parts: your share from the group pot payout 
plus the points you chose not to contribute. 
You contribute 100 points to the group pot, and keep 0 points. The 9 other players all 
do the same, contributing 100 points to the group pot and keeping 0. 
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What is your total payout? 
What is the total payout of each of the other players? 
Quiz - Part 3 
 
Let us remind you of the basic rules of the game: 
You are a member of a group consisting of ten people.   
Each member of the group is given 100 points and must decide simultaneously and 
anonymously how many of their points to contribute to a group pot. 
Each point you and the other members contribute to the group pot will be multiplied 
by five. The resulting points will be evenly distributed among all group members 
regardless of who contributed what. 
You keep each point that you do not contribute to the group pot. 
Your total points are comprised of two parts: your share from the group pot payout 
plus the points you chose not to contribute. 
The 9 other players together contribute a total of 400 to the group pot. You 
contribute 20 to the group pot, keeping 80. 
 
What is your total payout? 
The 9 other players together contribute a total of 400 to the group pot. You 
contribute 60 to the group pot, keeping 40. 
 
What is your total payout? 
 
Introduction to the Task 
 
Thank you for your attention so far.  You've finished the learning part of the study as 
well as the quiz. 
 
This part of the study is split into two tasks. In the first task you will be asked how 
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much you would contribute to the Group Pot in the decision situation we have 
described to you. 
 
In the second task you will be asked what you would choose to do in a variety of 
situations like the ones you have seen in the examples. You will be presented with 
some possible combinations of contributions. You will be asked to specify how 
much you want to contribute given these circumstances. You should think of these 
combinations as distinct scenarios, separate from each other. 
 
Your responses to these two tasks will determine your bonus payment. One of your 
answers will be randomly selected and played out for real as per the rules of the 
decision situation. Your total payout for that situation will then be converted into a 
bonus payment at a rate of 100 points to $1. 
 
If your response to task one is chosen, then the responses of the other group 
members used to determine your payment will be made up of real answers given by 
other people participating in this same study. If one of your responses to task two is 
chosen, then the contributions of the other group members will be the combination 
of contributions you saw when giving that response. Please note that all responses 
across both tasks are equally likely to be chosen. 
 
Since you do not know which of your responses will be played out for real, you 
should treat all decisions in the HIT as if they determine your payment. 
 
Here is an example: 
The situation chosen to determine your bonus payment had a total contribution by 
the other group members of 700. Your choice of contribution to the Group Pot for 
this situation is 40. Your Total Payout is therefore 430. This is made up of 60 points 
that you kept and 370 points from the Group Pot. This is would then give you a 
bonus payment of $4.30 = $1*430 points/100 points. 
 
We can learn a lot from the opinions you give us in this part of the study, so please 
consider each answer carefully. 
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Part One of the HIT 
 
You are taking part in the decision situation and you are given 100 points. 
 
How many of your 100 points would you contribute to the Group Pot? 
 
Part Two of the HIT (Presented on a separate screen) 
 
You will now be presented with some sets of possible contributions in descending 
order. In each case you must decide how much you would like to contribute to the 
Group Pot. Each set of contributions is not connected to the others and you should 
think of them as distinct scenarios. 
  
Suppose the contributions of the other group members are the following: 
    
  
Group Pot 
Contribution 
Player A 96 
Player B 89 
Player C 76 
Player D 74 
Player E 70 
Player F 66 
Player G 64 
Player H 51 
Player I 44 
How many of the 100 points do you contribute to the group pot? 
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Suppose the contributions of the other group members are the following 
    
  
Group Pot 
Contribution 
Player A 77 
Player B 70 
Player C 57 
Player D 55 
Player E 51 
Player F 47 
Player G 45 
Player H 32 
Player I 25 
 
How many of the 100 points do you contribute to the group pot? 
/////Participants saw next the rest 25 contribution profiles in random order and 
separate screens. ////// 
Thank you for completing the task. We would now like to ask you some survey 
questions related to the task you just completed. Following that you will complete 
some short questionnaires. All data will be kept strictly anonymous and private. 
 
Your answers are very valuable to us. 
Thank you for your participation, we are grateful for your contribution to our study. 
Your unique completion code is: 
  
${e://Field/code} 
Please enter this code into Amazon MTurk to complete the HIT. 
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1.18.2 Appendix II 
Contribution Profiles 
Table T 1.2 shows the profiles used in the experiment, along with some basic statistics. 
They are described in the form Σ(𝜇, 𝜎, 𝑠), where 𝜇, 𝜎 and 𝑠 are the mean, standard 
deviation and skewness. We describe the profiles with these three statistics because 
they are formally independent of each other though other aspects, such as the range, 
were taken into account when designing them, detailed below. Our profiles were 
designed to cover a large range of possibilities. As a consequence, and according to 
the strategy method paradigm, many of the constructed stimuli may only be observed 
rarely in genuine public goods games. To ensure that the profiles we constructed fairly 
represented the possibilities, we sought that the average of the means was 
approximately 50, ?̅? ≈ 50 (actual value 50.06) and that the average of the skewness 
was approximately zero,?̅? ≈ 0 (-0.007). Finally, we note also that the average kurtosis 
was also approximately zero (-0.0916). To ensure that there was no confounding effect 
between these variables, we constructed them such that all correlations between them 
were zero, shown in Table T 1.1. 
Table T 1.1. Correlations between contribution profile statistics. None are significant. 
 𝜇 𝜎 S K 
𝜇 . 0.003 -0.08 -0.0009 
𝜎 . . -0.007 -0.09 
s . . . 0.002 
  
Many of the profiles with zero skew were constructed according to a symmetric 
principle. A profile Σ(𝜇, 𝜎, 𝑠) = (𝑑1, … , 𝑑9), has eight differences of consecutive 
values, ∆𝑖= 𝑑𝑖+1 − 𝑑𝑖, the symmetric profiles were created by choosing ∆1= ∆8, ∆2=
∆7 and so on, which guaranteed zero skew. They did not contain any repeated values 
within. This ensured that rank-based models could differentiate between all rank 
positions in the profile, as well as avoiding any anchoring effects coming from 
repeated values. As well as satisfying these overall constraints, many of the profiles 
were constructed as series which controlled for other aspects of the distribution. For 
example, the pairs S1, S3, S5 and S2, S4, S6 correspond to unimodal and bimodal 
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distributions respectively, in which we have controlled for the mean, skewness, 
median and range and varied the modality and standard deviation. The series S21 
through S23 also gives a progression from unimodal to bimodal distributions, with a 
high range. The pairs S7, S9, S11 and S8, S10, S12 correspond to high and low skew 
distributions respectively, in which we have controlled for the mean, standard 
deviation and range, but varied the skewness. The pair S19 and S20 correspond to 
controlling all aspects of the distribution except for the mean, which is varied. The 
groups S24-27 correspond to distributions that have the same mean, skewness, and 
modality but vary in the standard deviation. The pairs S13-14 and S15-16 correspond 
to varying the standard deviation while keeping the mean low and high respectively. 
Finally, the pair S17 and S18 correspond to controlling the standard deviation and 
range but changing the skewness and the mean. 
Table T 1.2. Contribution profiles used in the experiment. 
Profiles Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Skewness Values 
S1 70 16.5 0 96 89 76 74 70 66 64 51 44 
S2 70 22.4 0 96 93 91 89 70 51 49 47 44 
S3 51 16.5 0 77 70 57 55 51 47 45 32 25 
S4 51 22.4 0 77 74 72 70 51 32 30 28 25 
S5 29 16.5 0 55 48 35 33 29 25 23 10 3 
S6 29 22.4 0 55 52 50 48 29 10 8 6 3 
S7 60 17.0 -1.53 73 72 71 69 66 63 60 45 21 
S8 60 17.0 1.53 99 75 60 57 54 51 49 48 47 
S9 51 17.0 -1.53 64 63 62 60 57 54 51 36 12 
S10 51 17.0 1.53 90 66 51 48 45 42 40 39 38 
S11 39 17.0 -1.53 52 51 50 48 45 42 39 24 0 
S12 39 17.0 1.53 78 54 39 36 33 30 28 27 26 
S13 20 7.0 0 30 28 25 23 20 17 15 12 10 
S14 20 15.8 0 40 38 35 27 20 13 5 2 0 
S15 80 7.0 0 90 88 85 83 80 77 75 72 70 
S16 80 15.8 0 10
0 
98 95 87 80 73 65 62 60 
S17 33 34.4 0.92 98 76 50 30 16 10 8 5 4 
S18 67 34.4 -0.92 96 95 92 90 84 70 50 24 2 
S19 13 4.9 0 20 19 16 14 13 12 10 7 6 
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S20 87 4.9 0 94 93 90 88 87 86 84 81 80 
S21 50.3 25.7 -0.04 97 64 62 59 53 41 38 36 3 
S22 51.1 31.4 -0.11 97 78 74 68 50 32 26 22 3 
S23 50 39.5 0 97 92 86 81 50 19 14 8 3 
S24 50 4.9 0 57 56 53 51 50 49 47 44 43 
S25 50.1 14.6 -0.02 71 68 59 53 51 47 41 32 29 
S26 50.2 24.4 -0.03 85 80 65 55 52 45 35 20 15 
S27 49.8 34.1 0.02 99 92 71 57 48 43 29 8 1 
 
1.18.3 Appendix III 
Individual Differences in the P-experiment 
After the completion of the P-experiment participants were asked to complete 
some psychological scales relating to personality and conservatism. Detailed results 
of the analysis between contributions and these measurements can be found here. 
Overview 
Here we focus on the effects of individual differences to gain a more holistic 
understanding of the determinants of behaviour in the public goods P-experiment. 
Our P-experiment provided an ideal platform to not only test the relationship 
between absolute contribution levels and individual measurements but also look at the 
people who were better fit by the rank model and those who were better fit by the 
mean relative model and try to find if they differed in other respects. More specifically, 
we focused on the effects of personality and conservatism. 
Personality  
Personality traits can be considered innate characteristics describing the nature of 
an individual compared to values that can be learned from the environment and others’ 
behaviours and the interplay between nature and nurture (Olver & Mooradian, 2003). 
Personality influences have been investigated in social dilemmas, for example, 
cooperation is higher for individuals low in narcissism (Campbell, Bush, & Brunell, 
2005), envy (Parks, Rumble, & Posey, 2002) and high in sensation seeking and self-
monitoring (Boone, Brabander, & van Witteloostuijn, 1999). Participants with high 
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honesty–humility exhibited more cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma; participants 
low in honesty–humility free rode more. (Hilbig, Zettler, Leist, & Heydasch, 2013).  
In Koole, Jager, Van den Berg, Vlek and Hofstee (2001) participants low in 
extraversion and participants high in agreeableness harvested less from a common 
resource than did those with high extraversion and low agreeableness. Those low in 
extraversion and those high in agreeableness decreased their extractions when the 
common resource was more depleted. Extraversion relates to being more sociable, 
active and talkative and agreeableness relating to trusting and tolerating others. 
The longitudinal study by Volk, Thöni and Ruigrok (2011) is the only other study 
we are aware of that examined cooperation preferences in a P-experiment public goods 
and personality. In a series of three public goods games that were conducted over the 
course of five months, results showed that agreeableness was a significant predictor 
of cooperation. Participants low on agreeableness were more likely to be free-riders 
compared to participants high on agreeableness who were more likely to be 
conditional cooperators.  
After the completion of the P-experiment participants were asked to complete the 
psychological scales discussed below relating to personality. 
We measured our participant’s personality profiles with the ten-item personality 
TIPI scale (Ten Item Personality Inventory), which includes two items for each of the 
Big-Five personality dimensions. Participants rated the extent to which trait applied to 
them on a 7-point scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree) (Gosling, Rentfrow, & 
Swann, 2003).  
I see myself as: 
1.Extraverted, enthusiastic. 
2.Critical, quarrelsome. 
3.Dependable, self-disciplined. 
4.Anxious, easily upset. 
5.Open to new experiences, complex. 
6.Reserved, quiet. 
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7. Sympathetic, warm. 
8.Disorganized, careless. 
9.Calm, emotionally stable. 
10.Conventional, uncreative. 
(R denotes reverse-scored items): 
Extraversion is measured by 1, 6R 
Agreeableness by 2R, 7 
Conscientiousness by 3, 8R 
Emotional Stability by 4R, 9 
Openness to Experiences by 5, 10R 
Results Personality  
The first analysis was an OLS regression with as its dependent variable the 
contributions of the individuals and as independent variable their personality 
measures. We incorporated the different contribution profiles participants saw as a 
random effect. The results of this regression are shown in the table below. 
Table T 1.3. Aggregate random effects regression results for contributions depending on the 
Big Five personality items. 
 Estimate Standard Error t statistic p value 
     
(Intercept) 34.80 3.13 11.10 <.001 
Extraversion -0.85 0.21 -4.06 <.001 
Agreeableness 1.57 0.31 4.99 <.001 
Openness -0.23 0.26 -0.86 0.39 
Conscientiousness 2.31 0.29 7.97 <.001 
Emotional 
Stability 
-0.43 0.26 -1.67 0.10 
Obs: 8100     
 
These results demonstrate that all but two of the personality measures (openness, 
emotional stability) showed significant effects. More importantly, the effects of 
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agreeableness and extraversion were in the same direction as others have found (Lu & 
Argyle, 1991). We also found a positive effect of conscientiousness (being organized, 
careful and taking tasks seriously). Running a regression with robust standard errors 
showed no differences in estimates nor standard errors and exhibited the same 
significant results. 
Moving beyond this, we were interested in the difference between individuals 
whom we identified as mean relative winners and rank winners. To investigate this 
difference, we ran a logistic regression. Because we have a large sample size (of order 
one hundred in each class) we used all the personality measures. The model showed 
no significance (Chisq = 0.44, p = 0.99), with odds ratios detailed in the table below. 
Reference category was mean relative winner. 
Table T 1.4. Logistic regression results. 
 
We conclude that there were no significant differences in personality measures 
between rank winners and mean relative winners. 
Ideology-Conservatism  
There is not much published research on the effect of ideology on cooperation in 
experimental games. Although national survey results show that Democrats and 
liberals are more likely to favor spending on public programs, there is no evidence that 
ideology or political preferences affect contributions in a public goods game. In 
Anderson, Mellor and Milyo (2005), after playing a C-experiment public goods game 
subjects were asked to indicate the political party to which they belonged, the political 
 λ Standard 
Error 
Wald Z p value Exp(λ) 
      
Extraversion 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.91 1.01 
Agreeableness 0.00 0.15 0.03 0.98 1 
Conscientiousness 0.03 0.13 0.27 0.79 1.03 
Openness -0.06 0.12 -0.52 0.60 0.94 
Emotional 
Stability 
-0.03 0.12 -0.23 0.82 0.97 
Obs: 195      
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party that best represented their interests (including Democrat, Republican, other, and 
none), and to rate their political ideology leanings on a scale from zero to 10 (0-
extreme conservative, 5- moderate, 10 extreme liberal). Because liberals may not have 
behaved more compassionately in the artificially egalitarian setting, inequality among 
subjects (manipulation of the show-up fee) was induced. No effect of political party 
or ideology on public goods contributions were found or interactions of those 
measures with the inequality treatment. The other work we are aware of connecting 
ideology and cooperation (Mestelman & Feeny, 1988) was done with subjects all of 
whom had a negative attitude towards free-riding (group of scientists attending the 
second day of a common-property resource management conference). In this repeated 
public goods game complete free riding did not emerge quickly but the proportion of 
free riders increased steadily.  
In order to investigate the effects of conservatism on contribution decisions we 
used the 12 Item Social and Economic Conservatism Scale (SECS) (Everett, 2013). 
This scale is modern and validated, and measures conservatism in two dimensions: 
social and economic. The SECS measures conservatism, regardless of party affiliation.  
Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they felt positive or negative 
towards the issues reported below on a scale from 0 to 100 (with 100 corresponding 
to extreme conservatism).   
Abortion (reverse scored) (Social Conservatism),  
Limited government (Economic Conservatism),  
Military and national security (Social Conservatism),  
Religion (Social Conservatism),  
Welfare benefits (reverse scored) (Economic Conservatism),  
Gun ownership (Economic Conservatism),  
Traditional marriage (Social Conservatism),  
Traditional values (Social Conservatism),  
Fiscal responsibility (Economic Conservatism),  
Business (Economic Conservatism),  
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the family unit (Social Conservatism),  
Patriotism (Social Conservatism).  
Results Conservatism  
The first analysis was an OLS regression with as its dependent variable the 
contributions of the individuals and as independent variable their social and economic 
conservatism. We incorporated the different contribution profiles they saw as a 
random effect; the results of this regression are reported in the table below. Note that 
conservatism is measured on a scale from 0-100 which contributes to the low values 
of the coefficients.  
Table T 1.5. Aggregate random effects regression results for contributions depending on the 
two conservatism items. 
 Estimate Standard Error t statistic p value 
     
(Intercept) 50.16 2.76 18.88 <.001 
Economic 
Conservatism 
-0.094 0.023 -4.154 <.001 
Social  
Conservatism 
0.084 0.018 4.711 <.001 
Obs:8100     
 
It is interesting that both these coefficients are significant, with similar magnitudes, 
but in opposite directions. Note that while the coefficients seem small, 0.094*100 is 
approximately 10, so going from minimum to maximum conservatism accounts for a 
difference in contributions of around 10. We once again ran a regression with robust 
standard errors which yielded similar results. Participants contributed differently given 
these different natures of conservatism, with individuals high on social conservatism 
perhaps feeling a social duty to contribute more and those individuals high on 
economic conservatism contributing less and thus being more rational in economic 
terms and closer to free riders. However, these results might not be realistic as these 
two measures of conservatism tend to correlate. 
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Again, we looked at the differences between rank and mean relative winners with 
a logistic regression. This had a significant fit (Chisq = 9.78, p = 0.0075). The results 
are shown in the table below. Reference category was mean relative winner. 
Table T 1.6. Logistic regression results. 
 λ Standard 
Error 
Wald Z p value Exp (λ) 
      
Economic  
Conservatism 
-0.035 0.011 -3.00 0.0027 0.97 
      
Social  
Conservatism 
0.018 0.008 2.10 0.035 1.02 
      
Obs:195      
 
Again, the log ratios are small due to the scale of our conservatism measure. Of 
particular interest is that economic conservatism decreases the chance of being a rank 
winner, while social conservatism increases that chance but marginally. An increase 
of the economic conservatism score by one point makes it 0.97 times less likely that a 
participant is categorized as a rank winner instead of mean winner. Interestingly, we 
found that conservatism distinguishes between whether one was classified as a rank 
or mean-based individual.  
 
 
 
 
 
102 
 
1.18.4 Appendix IV 
Supplementary figures for individual fits of the rank model and the mean 
relative model 
Table T 1.7. Comparison of predictions versus observations for rank and mean relative models 
for selected rank winners. Rank estimates and mean estimates in parentheses. 
Participant 8 
(1, 1.93) 
 
Participant 33 
(0.56, 1.08) 
 
Participant 135 
(0.99, 1.54) 
 
Participant 148 
(0.99, 1.51) 
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Participant 209 
(0.56, 1.09) 
 
Participant 217 
(0.48, 0.92) 
 
Participant 2 
(1, 1.89) 
 
Participant 245 
(0.79, 1.30) 
 
Participant 256 
(0.97, 1.49) 
 
Participant 280 
(0.74, 1.27) 
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1.18.5 Appendix V 
Instructions for C-experiment 
//////Introduction/////// 
Welcome to today's session. It will last approximately 1 hour.  
We ask you to answer all sections as honestly and to the best of your ability. 
If you read the following instructions carefully, you can, depending on your decisions, 
earn a considerable amount of money. It is therefore very important that you read these 
instructions carefully. 
You are not allowed to communicate with other participants during the experiment. 
If you have a question at any time, please raise your hand. A member of the 
experimenting team will come to you and answer it in private. 
("Confirm & continue") 
 
IMPORTANT 
You are player (“…”) in group (“…”). Please write down this information on the form 
provided. 
 
/////INSTRUCTIONS//// 
You will be a member of a group of ten people. You will play a decision game 
consisting of 30 rounds {Group number was changed according to the number of 
participants that turned up in the lab as well as the rounds}. 
All participants in the experiment will be divided in groups of ten members.  Except 
for us - the experimenters - no one knows who is in which group.  
At the start of each of the 30 rounds each group member is given 100 points. Both 
your and the other group members’ task is to decide how many of the 100 points to 
contribute to a group project. You keep for yourself any points you do not contribute 
into the group project, and these points remain in your private account. 
105 
 
Each point that you and the other members contribute to the group project will be 
multiplied by five after everybody has decided how much to contribute. These 
multiplied points in the group project will be split evenly between all group members 
at the end of the round. It does not matter who has contributed points to the group 
project; everybody receives the same share from the project at the end of the round. 
Your contribution to the project therefore raises the income of the other group 
members and every other member’s contribution raises your income. The more the 
group invests in the project, the greater the return to each member of the group. 
Thus, the total number of points you will have at the end of each round is made up of 
two parts: the points you have kept in your private account, and your income from the 
group project. The points earned by each of the other players is calculated in exactly 
the same way as yours. Thus, each player’s total points at the end of the round will be 
the number of points they kept in their private account, plus their share of the income 
from the group project.   
Your total income in points = (100 - your contribution to the project) + 5/10*(total 
contributions to the project) 
Feedback will be given after each round for the group you were in, showing how much 
other people in the group contributed to the group project, mean of contributions and 
your own points earned for that round.  
Earnings 
During the experiment your entire earnings will be calculated in points. At the end of 
the experiment the amount of points you have earned in a randomly selected round 
will be converted to sterling at the following rate: 1 point = 1 penny, so 100 points is 
one pound. Since you do not know which round will be chosen, you should act as if 
every round may be the one for which you are paid. This payment will constitute your 
entire earnings from this game and the £3 show up fee will be immediately paid to you 
in cash at the end of the session. 
Next, we illustrate the above with a few examples 
 
////////////EXAMPLES////////////// 
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Example 1: 
Decision  
You keep 100 points in your private account and contribute zero to the group project. 
All the other players do the same. 
Points earned 
You and everyone else each keep 100 points from your private accounts and receive 
zero points from the group project as no player contributed to it.  
This gives you 100 points from your private account and 0 points from the group 
project, which is a total of 100 points for you. 
All other players get the same number of points as you do. 
 
 
Example 2: 
Decision 
You keep zero points in your private account and contribute 100 points to the group 
project. All the other players do the same. 
Points earned 
The total amount contributed to the group project is the other nine players’ 
contributions of 100 points each plus your contribution of 100 points to make a grand 
total of 9x100 + 100 = 1000 points. This is multiplied by 5 to give 5000. Each member 
of the group therefore receives an income from the project of 5000/10 = 500 points. 
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This gives you 0 points from your private account and 500 points from the group 
project, which is a total of 500 points for you. 
All other players get the same number of points as you do. 
 
 
Example 3: 
Decision 
You and the other players each keep 50 points in your private accounts and contribute 
50 points to the group project. 
Points earned 
The total amount contributed to the group project is the other nine players’ 
contributions of 50 points each plus your contribution of 50 points to make a grand 
total of 9x50 + 50 = 500 points.  This is multiplied by 5 to give 2500. Each member 
of the group therefore receives an income from the project of 2500/10 = 250.   
This gives you 50 points from your private account and 250 points from the group 
project, which is a total of 300 points for you. 
All other players get the same number of points as you do. 
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//////QUIZ///// 
Quiz 
Please answer the following questions. These serve to check your understanding of 
the decision situation and earnings calculations. When everyone has completed all the 
questions correctly, the experimental game will start. 
Let us remind you of the basic rules of the game: You are a member of a group 
consisting of ten people. Each member of the group is given 100 points and must 
decide how many of their points to contribute to a group project. Each point that you 
do not invest will stay in your private account. Each point you and the other members 
invest in the group project will be multiplied by 5 and then shared equally between the 
members of the group. That is your total number of points is made up of two parts: 
points kept in your private account and your income from the group project. 
Please input your answers. Only once all answers are correct, the button at the bottom 
changes from 'incorrect entry' to 'continue'.  
If you contribute 0 points to the project and the other 9 participants each contribute 
100 points to the project, what is the total number of points you earn?  
{550,"correct entry"} 
If you contribute 100 points to the project and the other 9 participants each contribute 
0 points to the project, what is your total number of points you earn?  
{50,"correct entry"} 
Please press continue to start the experiment. You will be matched with 9 other people 
for 30 rounds. 
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At the beginning of each trial you will see an input-screen. You have to decide how 
many points you want to contribute to the project by typing a number between 0 and 
100 in the input field. This field can be reached by clicking it with the mouse. As soon 
as you have decided how many points to contribute to the project, you have also 
decided how many points you keep for yourself: This is (100 - your contribution) 
points. After entering your contribution, you must press the Continue button with the 
mouse. Once you have done this your decision can no longer be revised. 
After all members of your group have made their decision a following feedback screen 
will show you how much each member of the group has contributed to the group 
project. This screen will also show your total points earned (how many points you 
have earned in that trial) and the mean of contributions for that trial. 
//////////Please press continue to start the experiment////////////  
How much would you like to contribute from your 100 points to the group project? 
Please enter in the box below: 
 {"Continue", "Please wait for other players"}  
///////// Inform the subjects about the results of each trial//////// 
////////Example of what participants saw after each round/////// 
//display("You are player “…”. You contributed “…” Points. The average amount 
contributed is mean contribution “…” Points, your payoff for this round was (“…” 
Points.) 
//display("The contributions from all players in decreasing order were:") 
Player "E":70 
Player "D":68 
Player "H":48 
Player "A":42 
Player "G":30 
Player "C":28 
Player "F":25 
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Player "B":10 
Player "I":5 
Player "J":5 
 
/////// Inform the participants about their final payoff/////// 
//display("Round “…” was randomly chosen to be played out. You contributed “…” 
Points. The other members contributed “…” Points and your total earned points are 
“…” 
Thank you for completing the experiment. 
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Who is Irrational? The Endowment Effect and Concerns 
with Good-Dealness 
 
 
 
“Not to be absolutely certain is, I think, one of the essential things in rationality”. -
Bertrand Russell. 
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2.1 Introduction 
In economics and psychology there are two central and widely used measures of 
valuation: willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA). The WTP is 
the maximum amount of money an individual would pay to acquire a good and the 
WTA is the minimum amount of money an individual would accept to sell a good. 
These measures have been used in policy to provide valuations for non-market goods, 
consequences of public policies, and to derive compensation for losses. In the absence 
of income or transaction cost effects these two estimates are expected to be equal under 
standard economic theory, leading to indifference between the measures (Willig, 
1976).  
For example, based on the assumption that these two valuations would yield 
similar estimates, WTP elicitation has been solely and widely used to determine the 
gains or losses associated with an environmental improvement or an environmental 
catastrophe (Brown & Gregory, 1999). Nevertheless, much empirical evidence has 
shown that there is a disparity: WTA estimates exceed WTP estimates. Depending on 
the evaluation measure used, the benefit or the cost of a particular policy could 
therefore be underestimated or overestimated.  
This disparity has most frequently between attributed to cognitive bias on the part 
of buyers and/or sellers, and it is typically assumed that owning an item changes the 
owner’s perception of the value of that ownership. The aims of this chapter are to 
move beyond the traditional explanations that have been proposed to explain this 
disparity and to show that the endowment effect reflects strategic considerations rather 
than ownership-induced changes in underlying preferences. We develop an alternative 
model, based on a quantification of “good dealness”, which assumes no cognitive bias 
or ownership-induced changes in underlying preferences. The model assumes that 
item ownership has no effect on beliefs about (a) the quality of the item (b) the 
appropriate market price for the item, (c) the market prices for other same-category 
items or (d) any ownership specific differences in participants’ underlying valuations 
of the item. Instead, the model assumes that sellers rationally demand a market-
appropriate price for the item given their beliefs about the item’s relative quality and 
their beliefs about the distribution of market prices in the market. Buyers, in contrast, 
offer less than what they believe the appropriate market price to be because they 
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typically do not want the item and will only offer a price that represents a good deal. 
We do this in a series of two experiments in which we find support for the model’s 
key assumptions. The chapter is then structured as follows: we firstly discuss the 
literature on the endowment effect and proposed explanations, secondly, we discuss 
in detail our aims and motivations, thirdly we outline the details of each experiment 
performed, present the results, and then conclude with a discussion. 
2.2 The Endowment effect as a Behavioural Bias 
Thaler's study (1980) was the first to establish the term “endowment effect” to 
describe the disparity between WTA and WTP. This disparity, often numerically 
expressed in terms of the ratio WTA/WTP, has since become a poster child for the 
field of behavioural economics. 
One of the first laboratory experiments investigating the endowment effect using 
a consumer good was Knetsch and Sinden’s 1984 study. In their study, two 
experimental conditions were used in which all participants received a redeemable 
voucher. Half of the participants were asked if they were willing to accept $2 to give 
up the voucher and the other half was asked if they were willing to pay $2 to keep it. 
While among those who were asked to pay for the voucher the spread between those 
agreeing to pay and those not was equal, among those who were asked to accept the 
monetary amount only 24% accepted. It was argued by Knetsch and Sinden (1984) 
that valuing a potential loss leads participants to make different trade decisions about 
whether to trade then when valuing a potential gain.  
In subsequent studies by (Knetsch, 1989) participants were found to be reluctant 
to trade their initial endowments of chocolate with mugs and mugs with chocolate but, 
when required to choose between a chocolate or a mug, the spread was fairly equal 
with 56% of participants choosing the mug. Similarly, in Kahneman, Knetsch and 
Thaler (1990) participants were reluctant to trade mugs that were initially endowed for 
pens and vice versa with Knetsch arguing that this result runs against the predictions 
of standard economics and the reversibility of indifference curves, -people should be 
choosing the good they prefer irrespectively of ownership. 
Extensively studied over the last half-century (Horowitz & McConnell, 2002; 
Tunçel & Hammitt, 2014), the endowment effect has been observed with a plethora of 
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goods, from mugs and chocolate bars to nuclear waste repositories, and its observation 
has been found to be robust to a large number of experimental techniques and designs 
(hypothetical or real payoffs; incentive compatibility; open-ended or closed questions; 
student or non-student participants), though the magnitude of the WTA/WTP ratio has 
been found to vary systematically with experimental parameters. For example, both 
market experience of valuing or transacting a good and experimental experience in a 
repeated design has been found to reduce the WTA-WTP disparity, but not eliminate 
it (Tunçel & Hammitt, 2014).  
2.3 Traditional Explanation 
One of the most influential accounts of the endowment effect is the work by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1991, 1992) who explained the endowment effect in terms 
of loss aversion, according to which individuals are hypothesized to weigh a loss 
higher than an equivalent gain when making a decision. This account was crystallized 
with the development of prospect theory, which incorporated an asymmetrical utility 
function relative to a reference point, thus formalizing the concept of loss aversion.   
In prospect theory the reference point is a free parameter and typically being 
assigned to the status quo (although Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006 gave a formal expression 
for the reference point in terms of expectations and past experiences about 
transactions). Championed by Tversky and Kahnemann, the mantra that ‘losses loom 
larger than gains’ has since been cemented in the behavioural sciences lexicon with 
loss aversion being the traditional explanation for the endowment effect. This may 
seem unfortunate given that the valuation gap was empirically established much 
earlier (Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979), and also because loss aversion failed to offer 
much more than just a descriptive label for this particular behavioural phenomenon 
(Gal, 2006).  
The loss aversion explanation for the effect is, of course, not the only one. Over 
the years, many additional cognitive, affective and motivational mechanisms have 
been put forward as possible underlying causes of the WTA-WTP disparity 
(Morewedge & Giblin, 2015). These accounts offer different origins related to where 
the bias comes from — is it sellers who behave irrationally, buyers, or both? 
115 
 
2.4 Who is Biased? 
2.4.1 Sellers overvalue 
In most accounts of the endowment effect, the origin of the WTA-WTP disparity 
can be laid at the feet of sellers, buyers or both. In their classic work, Kahneman, 
Knetsch and Thaler (1991) conducted a standard endowment effect experiment in 
which buyers and sellers were asked whether they would sell or buy a coffee mug at a 
range of prices from $0.25-$9.25. A third group, the choosers, could choose either a 
mug or money for each price. The only difference between sellers and choosers was 
the possession of the mug at the time of the decision; in every other respect their 
situations were identical. However, the choosers behaved as buyers, valuing the coffee 
mug at similar levels to buyers compared to the valuations of sellers. This result has 
been widely accepted as strong evidence that the endowment effect originates from a 
bias among sellers, who overstate the value of an object that they own due to loss 
aversion. 
Beyond the mere loss aversion account, overestimation of an object’s value is also 
consistent with the notion of psychological ownership (Morewedge & Giblin, 2015; 
Walasek, Rakow, & Matthews, 2015). Belk (1988) acknowledged that what we own 
constitutes a large part of our self-identity, and Pierce, Kostova and Dirks (2003) 
argued that it characterizes the human condition. Feelings of ownership have been 
found to have powerful psychological effects such as improving employee attitudes, 
organization and work behaviour as well as self-esteem and citizenship behaviour 
(Dyne & Pierce, 2003). 
For example, Morewedge, Shu, Gilbert and Wilson (2009) extended the classic 
endowment effect paradigm by introducing groups of ‘brokers’ who acted on behalf 
of buyers or sellers. Buyers’ brokers who owned a copy of the target item valued it 
more highly than did brokers who acted on behalf of sellers and did not own the target 
item (see also, Strahilevitz & Loewenstein, 1998). The results of their studies favoured 
the ownership account rather than the loss aversion explanation.  
The concept of ownership was refined by Reb and Connolly (2007) who 
distinguished factual ownership and perceived ownership of an object (a chocolate bar 
or mug). They studied the endowment effect using a 2x2 treatment of possession/no 
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possession and ownership/no ownership. They found that possession, rather than 
factual ownership, led to an endowment effect, indicating that the perception of 
ownership rather than the factual ownership of an item induced the endowment effect. 
The accounts listed above suggest that owned objects are regarded as more 
valuable than non-owned possessions, and that elevated WTAs are a behavioural 
signature of this effect. In fact, it has been argued by Huck, Kirchsteiger and Oechssler 
(2005) that ownership improves one’s position in bilateral trades leading to an 
evolutionary advantage. 
Taken together, the endowment effect literature began, and in part continues, with 
the assumption that ownership status alters one’s preferences. 
2.4.2 Both sellers and buyers are biased  
Other studies have suggested that both sellers and buyers are biased in producing 
the endowment effect. For example, Gal (2006) took a neutral position of whether 
buyers or sellers drive the endowment effect, arguing instead that a status-quo bias is 
ultimately responsible. In a separate and more recent vein, various researchers have 
shown that owners and non-owners differ in how they evaluate products. Carmon and 
Ariely (2000) argued that both buyers and sellers are biased. They theorised that 
individuals weigh more heavily things that they will forgo in the transaction, so that 
buyers emphasise expenditure whereas sellers emphasise giving up the item in 
question. To test this hypothesis they conducted several studies, finding that buying 
price was typically correlated with variables related to expenditure and selling price 
with variables related to ownership. 
Alternative accounts have focused on the cognitive mechanisms of attention and 
perspective as indicative of differences in individual valuations. For example, 
Nayakankuppam and Mishra (2005), extending the work of Carmon and Ariely 
(2000), conducted experiments indicating that sellers focused more on positive 
features of an item and less on negative features than buyers did. The first of their 
three experiments asked buyers and sellers to list thoughts about the item (a pen) and 
indicate whether the thoughts were positive or negative. In the second experiment, 
they found that sellers were less likely to correctly remember negative facts about the 
item, but more likely to remember positive facts. Their third experiment showed that 
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the endowment effect could be moderated by forcing sellers to pay attention to 
negative features and buyers to pay attention to positive features of the item. 
An alternative theory of this type was discussed by Johnson, Haubl and Keinan 
(2007) who hypothesised, using a query theory of the endowment effect, that the 
difference between buyers and sellers is based on different valuation questions they 
ask themselves of the item, as well as the order in which these questions are asked. 
They conducted an experiment asking participants to list aspects of the item that led 
them to reporting their valuation (WTA/WTP). They found that choosers (buyers) 
produced more value decreasing aspects than sellers, whereas sellers produced more 
value increasing aspects than choosers. In a subsequent experiment, Johnson et al. 
(2007) were able to eliminate the endowment effect by forcing sellers to first consider 
value-decreasing aspects and buyers to first consider value-increasing aspects.  
Further support for the bidirectional bias has been found in the context of 
information search. Pachur and Scheibehenne (2012) argued that buyers and sellers 
differ in their approach to information searching. They conducted a within-subjects 
experiment in which participants, buyers and sellers, were asked to determine the 
value of a lottery by experiential sampling. Their results indicated that sellers 
terminated their search after sampling high lottery outcomes, while buyers terminating 
their approach after sampling low lottery outcomes, thus producing the endowment 
effect. 
Ashby, Dickert and Glöckner (2012) also used a lottery task, and contended that 
buyers and sellers differ in the allocation of attention to attributes of the item, arguing 
that sellers shift attention towards value increasing attributes, while buyers shift 
attention towards value decreasing attributes. Their theory predicted an increase in the 
WTA-WTP disparity with deliberation time. In their study participants were shown a 
series of lotteries, presented as a list of outcomes (all positive) and their associated 
probabilities. Participants were asked for their WTA/WTP for each lottery and were 
given a time limit of either 5, 10 or 15 seconds. They found that the endowment effect 
increased for studies with longer deliberation time. A further study included eye-
tracking, allowing them to confirm that buyers spend more time and visual attention 
on value decreasing aspects of the item with sellers focusing on value increasing 
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aspects. Ashby et al. (2012) also found that overall participants focused more on high 
probability outcomes. 
Using a similar eye-tracking methodology Ashby, Walasek and Glöckner (2015) 
extended the investigation of Ashby et al. (2012) beyond monetary gambles to study 
common consumer goods (chosen from the Amazon.de marketplace) by measuring 
the relationship between attention to consumer ratings and valuations. Participants 
were simultaneously shown the average negative rating (between 0 and 2.5 stars) 
accompanied by the percentage of customers that gave a negative rating and the 
average positive rating (3.5 to 5 stars) along with the percentage of people who gave 
a positive rating. The measure of attention (Low-Gaze-Proportion, LGP) was equal to 
the duration of fixations on low rating components divided by the total gaze time on 
all negative and positive rating components. LGP predicted valuations, having a 
significant, negative relationship (even when information about customer ratings was 
altered to a frequential format to resemble the real Amazon marketplace). When 
participants were randomly assigned to take the perspective of either buyer or seller, 
buyers focused on lower ratings more than sellers, although both conditions fixated 
overall more on positive ratings than negative ratings which was partially attributed to 
the location of the positive information on the screen. Contrary to what is found with 
monetary gambles, the effect of perspective on attention in this riskless choice task 
mediated valuations significantly and negatively but to a smaller extent. 
Finally, Plott and Zeiler (2005) have argued that the endowment effect is an 
artefact of the experimental design and that even the use of the words “sell” and “buy” 
can prime owners to sell high and non-owners to buy low. In a situation of strategic 
misrepresentation both sellers and buyers would be biased to not reveal their 
subjective valuations but increase and decrease them respectively. Removing these 
misconceptions in the lab by introducing training, paid practice, anonymity and 
incentive compatible elicitation method, Plott and Zeiler (2005) managed to eliminate 
the endowment effect (see Isoni, Loomes, & Sugden, 2011, for opposition to this 
viewpoint). Contrary to suggestions in Plott and Zeiler (2005), Fehr, Hakimov and 
Kübler (2015) and Bartling, Engl and Weber (2015) still found an endowment effect 
even for participants that understood the BDM mechanism and even when an easier 
price list incentivisation mechanism was used. Regardless of the incentivisation 
mechanism being applied, participants may maintain a habit from every-day life 
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wherein they use the strategy heuristic (Korobkin, 2003) although evidence from 
experiments where participants are not willing to give up their initial endowment for 
other objects show that the endowment effect is still present. 
2.4.3 Bias among buyers 
More recently, some authors have suggested that it is buyers who often understate 
their WTP and that sellers’ valuations are less biased. Buyers have been found to have 
a greater propensity for ambiguity aversion than sellers. In Trautmann, Vieider and 
Wakker (2008) one treatment group faced a choice between a risky and an ambiguous 
prospect and had to explain their decision to the experimenter, while the other 
treatment did not reveal any personal information. This led to fewer participants 
choosing the ambiguous prospect under the first treatment. In a secondary experiment, 
participants completed the FNE (fear of negative evaluation) scale (Leary, 1983) with 
the group that was more sensitive to negative evaluation exhibiting a bigger WTP 
difference (evaluation of the risky minus the evaluation of the ambiguous prospect) 
than did the less sensitive group. In the presence of FNE, WTP decreased (for 
ambiguous prospects) and led to fewer participants choosing the ambiguous prospect. 
Thus, the presence of ambiguity and imagined or experienced embarrassment can bias 
buyers’ WTP. 
Continuing this line of investigation, Trautmann, Vieider and Wakker (2011) also 
found higher WTP for risky prospects compared to the ambiguous ones, using a 
variety of experimental conditions. Nevertheless, in direct choice they observed 
preference reversals for a percentage of participants who preferred the ambiguous 
prospect to the risky prospect (although their WTP was higher for the risky prospect). 
They suggested that participants used the risky prospect as a stronger reference point 
and adjusted the WTP of the ambiguous prospect downwards. When participants were 
first endowed with these prospects and then asked for their WTA, only a minority 
demonstrated these preference reversals. Trautmann and Schmidt (2012) provided 
further evidence for the idea of Trautmann et al. (2011) that the risky prospect acts as 
a stronger reference point in WTP valuations than in WTA valuations and that the 
negative aspects of the ambiguous prospect weigh more heavily than the positives as 
compared to the risky prospect. In their study, WTP and WTA valuations were elicited 
for risky and ambiguous prospects under the comparative (two groups: buyers and 
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sellers) and noncomparative (four groups: two buyers and two sellers, each group 
evaluating only one prospect) between-subjects design and within-subjects design 
(one group: both buyer and seller perspective). WTA valuations were higher than WTP 
valuations in all conditions, with ambiguity negatively influencing both WTA and 
WTP compared to the evaluations for risky prospects. In the comparative condition 
WTP was higher for risky prospects and lower for ambiguous prospects compared to 
the noncomparative condition. In the comparative condition, moving from the 
evaluation of risky prospects to the evaluation of ambiguous prospects decreased WTP 
more than the decrease of WTA, thereby increasing the WTA-WTP disparity under 
ambiguity. 
A theory of loss-attention developed by Yechiam and Hochmann (2013) argued 
that a proposition with potential losses can have a positive impact on performance. In 
their study, participants were asked to choose between two lotteries of differing 
expected value. In an attention-depleted setting (where the lottery was presented as a 
secondary task) participants displayed higher performance, i.e. were more likely to 
choose the lottery with the greatest expected value, when the lotteries included losses. 
This loss-attention account can explain why the WTA for gambles is closer to their 
expected value than WTP, the potential losses of the owner increasing the attention 
assigned to the situation. 
Yechiam, Abofol and Pachur (2017a) re-analysed two earlier studies (Ashby, 
Dickert and Glöckner, 2012; Pachur and Scheibehenne, 2012) and conducted several 
further experiments to examine whether sellers or buyers were more sensitive to 
changes in expected values of lotteries. They found that sellers showed a greater 
degree of sensitivity, or relative accuracy, to the expected value of the lottery except 
in situations with a long deliberation time. Relative accuracy was defined as the rank 
correlation between a series of elicited valuations and expected values. In addition, 
they found that sellers’ valuations were typically closer to the expected value of the 
lotteries than buyers. 
These results were strengthened in a meta-analysis of monetary lotteries. Yechiam, 
Ashby and Pachur (2017b) compared the absolute deviation of buying and selling 
prices for lotteries from their expected value. They also examined relative accuracy to 
account for risk aversion. Their analysis of 35 studies over the period 1967-2016 
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showed that sellers are more accurate, both in absolute and relative, terms than buyers. 
In addition, they found that sellers’ valuations typically showed higher variance 
between participants than buyers’ valuations did, though sellers exhibited a lower 
coefficient of variation (amount of variability relative to the mean). Importantly, 
Yechiam et al. (2017b) noted that while incentivisation reduced differences between 
buying and selling prices, it did not eliminate them. 
These findings are in line with the predictions of the loss of attention account, 
which maintains that sellers engage in more cognitive effort than buyers (Yechiam & 
Hochman, 2013). Owners, who are motivated by the prospect of losing what they own, 
pay more attention to the task and provide valuations closer to the actual objective 
worth of an object. At least in the context of monetary gambles, where the objective 
value is known, the majority of results are consistent with this account. 
2.5 Reference Price Theories 
As evidenced by much of the previous discussion, there is no consensus as to the 
origins of the WTA-WTP disparity amongst current research, which is inconclusive 
in addressing the question of whether the WTA-WTP disparity is due to the behaviour 
of sellers, buyers or both. Furthermore, much of this research is limited to monetary 
gambles, and so does not generalise to other contexts, such as consumer goods. Indeed, 
Yechiam et al. (2017) explicitly state this in the interpretation of their work in other 
contexts.  
There has been recent work (Isoni, 2011; Weaver & Frederick, 2012) arguing that 
the endowment effect originates in ‘bad deal’ aversion. A deal depends on reference 
prices in order to be framed as good, bad or neither. For example, Isoni (2011) suggests 
that the discrepancy between sellers’ WTA and buyers’ WTP reflects not differences 
in ownership underlying preferences for an object, but rather an aversion to a bad deal. 
Specifically, buyers are more averse to the possibility of overpaying for an object than 
they are to potentially miss out on the opportunity to buy the object if they fail to offer 
a high enough price. By taking shaping effects into account, whereby an individual’s 
reference price depends upon recent observed prices, Isoni (2011) was able to move 
beyond the one-shot paradigm of most accounts of the endowment effect and 
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incorporate the well-known reduction in the WTAP-WTP disparity in repeated trials 
into his theory. 
Weaver and Frederick (2012) expounded a reference-price based theory of bad 
deal aversion. Specifically, they hypothesised that the WTA (WTP) is the maximum 
(minimum) of the item’s reference price and the monetary value of their expected 
benefits from using the good (or consumption utility: Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006). This 
theory predicts that the endowment effect disappears as these two values converge, 
and predicts the existence of a characteristic U-shaped curve of the WTA-WTP 
disparity as a function of reference price near to this convergence (where the reference 
price is equal to the consumption utility). In their study, they tested this prediction in 
a series of experiments, in which participants in different treatments received different 
external reference prices for various items, including both regular goods as well as 
risky prospects (lottery goods) and were then asked to specify how much they would 
either pay or sell these items for. The results revealed that sellers’ valuations were 
closer to the retail prices than those of buyers. For instance, in two conditions, a 
candy’s price tag was presented to the participants as either $4.00 or $1.49. Mean 
buying price for the candy was largely immune to the change in the value on a price 
tag (being $1.54 and $1.20 respectively) but selling price was highly sensitive to it, 
being about 80% higher in the high compared to the low-price tag condition ($2.88 
compared to $1.58). These studies obtained the predicted U-shape of the WTA WTP 
disparity as a function of reference price, though in the large-stakes lottery they 
examined the nadir of the U-shape did not correspond to the predicted equality of 
WTA-WTP. In their fourth study Weaver and Frederick (2012) attempted to vary 
consumption utility by using two chocolate bars of the same price but with different 
tastes. They found that WTP was heavily affected by the chocolate bar type, but WTA 
was not, consistent with the consumption utility but not the reference price being 
changed. In their final study they used the exchange of goods paradigm, endowing 
participants with one of two goods and asking if they would like to trade. In the high 
reference price condition, very few participants asked to trade, whereas in the low 
reference price condition more trades were observed. We note that in their review 
Ericson and Fuster (2014) argue that the theoretical approach based on bad-deal 
aversion and reference prices can be accommodated within a loss-aversion theory by 
setting the reference point as the reference price. 
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Based on these findings, Weaver and Frederick (2012) concluded that 
“Consumers evaluate potential trades with respect to salient reference prices, and 
selling prices (or trading demands) are elevated because the most common reference 
prices—market prices—typically exceed valuations.” (p. 696).  
Further evidence for bad deal aversion is provided by Brown (2005) who used the 
verbal protocol technique to understand individuals’ motivations for their WTA and 
WTP valuations in a within-subjects experiment. His study found that the most 
commonly cited reason for giving both a high WTA and low WTP was a form of bad 
deal aversion, or attempt to obtain a good deal. Indeed, the verbal accounts mirrored 
almost exactly the theoretical motivations of Weaver and Frederick (2012), with 
participants’ WTA reflecting their desire to not sell the item for less than its value in 
a sale situation (avoiding a bad deal). In contrast, WTP was typically based on a desire 
to obtain the item for a low price (seeking a good deal) or was based on what 
participants felt the item was worth to them (consumption utility, as per Weaver and 
Frederick, 2012). While as in Weaver and Frederick (2012), reference prices may be 
provided externally, for most common items people have some pre-existing 
knowledge or assumptions about the market.  
2.6 Present Work 
In this chapter we challenge the assumption that preferences are affected by 
ownership status. We propose instead that the behaviour of both buyers and sellers is 
driven by considerations of what constitutes a good deal for them (Isoni, 2011).  More 
importantly, we attempt to move beyond the idea that sellers, buyers, or both sellers 
and buyers are “biased”, because the relevant normative price (departure from which 
would indicate bias) is unclear. Indeed, in most previous experiments the relevant 
normative price (departure from which would indicate bias) is blurred and set by the 
experimenters either ex-post or ex-ante.  
Instead, we elicit participants’ individual perceptions of the quality of a product 
that they have the opportunity to buy or sell, and we also elicit their beliefs about the 
distribution of market prices for that product type. This enables us to determine what 
each participant believes the appropriate market price for a product to be. For example, 
a participant might believe that a coffee mug is high quality (e.g., at the 80th percentile 
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of the quality distribution) and also believe (e.g.) that the 80th percentile of the 
distribution of coffee mug prices is $6.50. We can therefore examine how each 
participant’s WTA or WTP relates to their beliefs about the appropriate price for a 
product, as well as establishing whether ownership status influences perceptions of 
quality, perceptions of market price distribution, or both. Most importantly, we 
quantify the “goodness of a deal” in terms of the difference between the relative ranked 
position of product’s price valuation within the relevant market price distribution and 
the relative rank position of its quality relative to other similar products. For example, 
a coffee mug at the 80th percentile of the quality distribution on offer at the 60th 
percentile price clearly represents a good deal. A 40th percentile (quality) coffee mug 
at the 70th percentile price does not. In the present paper, we set out to determine the 
relationship between what constitutes a good deal for a given product and a person’s 
WTA or WTP for that product. 
Our approach therefore contrasts with previous research which has focused on 
locating the source of bias in either sellers (Morewedge et al., 1997; Reb & Connolly, 
2007; Strahilevitz & Loewenstein, 1998), buyers (Trautmann et al., 2008; Yang, 
Vosgerau, & Loewenstein, 2013; Yechiam et al., 2017b) or both (Ashby et al., 2015; 
Johnson et al., 2007; Nayakankuppam & Mishra, 2005; Pachur & Scheibehenne, 
2012). Instead, we build on and extend recent suggestions that strategic considerations 
such as bad deal aversion may be important in explaining the endowment effect 
(Brown, 2005; Isoni, 2011). However, Isoni (2011) does not offer any direct evidence 
that perception of the target object’s attributes (e.g. its quality and the price it would 
typically sold for in the marketplace) are uninfluenced by the ownership status. While 
both Isoni (2011) and Frederick and Weaver (2012) show that the WTA-WTP gap 
may be influenced by strategic considerations, neither study elicits participants’ 
individual judgments of the appropriate market price for an object. This is important 
because it is possible that ownership status might influence participants’ judgments of 
either the quality of an object or the appropriate price for that object. Such differences 
could occur if, for example, sellers focused on particularly positive attributes of the 
objects that they own or brought to mind higher prices when considering a reasonable 
selling price (Ashby et al., 2015; Ashby et al., 2012; Carmon & Ariely, 2000; Johnson 
et al., 2007; Nayakankuppam & Mishra, 2005; Pachur & Scheibehenne, 2012). 
Moreover, the findings reported by Frederick and Weaver (2012) could be explained 
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by the fact that sellers exhibited more anchoring to (and insufficient adjustment from) 
the salient market value than buyers. This explanation is consistent with Simonson and 
Drolet (2004), who found that selling but not buying prices were influenced by anchors 
related to market prices and buying but not selling prices were influenced by arbitrary 
anchors such as the last two digits of one’s social security number12. This account is 
also in agreement with a study by Sugden, Zheng, and Zizzo (2013), in which buyers 
were more sensitive to random anchors than sellers (though in other studies, the 
reverse pattern was found; e.g., Fudenberg, Levine, & Maniadis, 2012; Maniadis, 
Tufano, & List (2014).  
Our objective in the present work is to re-evaluate the endowment effect in terms 
of buyers’ and sellers’ perceptions about quality and market prices. We offer new tests 
of the accounts that posit that the WTA-WTP valuation gap is not due to preference 
shifts, but rather reflects individuals’ considerations of what constitutes a good deal. 
We achieve this by eliciting participants’ beliefs about quality and market prices and 
examining how their valuations (WTAs and WTPs) relate to what they believe the 
product should cost in the market. In our approach, we elicit quality estimates not by 
asking participants to provide quality ratings on a 1-5 scale, but by asking them where 
they believe the product’s quality ranks within the distribution of other members of 
that product category. This approach is motivated by considerable evidence that 
people base their judgements of quantities such as quality and price on the relative 
ranked position of the relevant quantity within a retrieved comparison set (e.g., 
Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006). In addition, rather than simply asking participants 
for their estimate of a typical market price for the object, we elicit from them their 
beliefs about the whole distribution of the market prices for that category product. This 
enables us to do two things. First, it allows us to predict what a participant should state 
as the appropriate market price for an object. For example, if they estimate a coffee 
mug to be at the 60th percentile of the quality distribution, then (if they are behaving 
coherently) their judgment of the appropriate price for that object should be at the 60th 
percentile of what they believe the market price to be. Second, this rank-based 
                                                 
12 In their second study they asked participants to describe the motivations behind their valuations, with most of 
sellers basing their decision on the expected market price of the item.  
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methodology enables us to quantify the goodness or badness of a deal as described 
earlier.  
Our objective is to determine what a person believes an object should cost in the 
market, based on that person’s perception of the good’s quality and its position in the 
broader market. We must therefore elicit a person’s perceived market price 
distribution for a given product category. Such elicitation is challenging for two 
reasons. First, it can be difficult to avoid biased responding (e.g., anchoring effects) 
when eliciting distributions (Mazar, Koszegi, & Ariely, 2014). For example, Sharpe, 
Goldstein and Blythe (2000) elicit distributions by presenting participants with income 
ranges and requiring them to indicate how much mass of the relevant distribution falls 
within each interval. It is plausible that results would be strongly influenced by the 
location of the largest interval. Second, it is possible that the ownership status 
influences people’s perceptions of either a) the market price distribution and/or b) a 
product’s quality ranking. Our Experiment 1 is designed to determine that we can 
reliably elicit market price distributions with a minimal amount of error. It also allows 
us to establish whether owners and non-owners differ in their perception of the 
market’s structure. To foreshadow: We find that our method works well and that 
buyers and sellers do not have different beliefs about market price distributions. 
In Experiment 2, we complement the design of Experiment 1 by asking our 
participants about their perceived quality rank of the product that they were, or were 
not, endowed with. We are thus able to match people’s perception of quality onto each 
individual’s market price distribution and find what that person expects the object 
should cost. We also elicit the actual perceived market prices of the object, in order to 
determine whether it is true that these reference prices are higher than stated WTAs 
and WTPs (Weaver & Frederick, 2012). We also elicit confidence intervals for both 
price and quality in order to test the hypothesis that owners might be more confident 
about the quality and/or price of the relevant objects even if they did not differ in their 
single-point estimates. To foreshadow: our results show a remarkable degree of 
coherence in the behaviour of owners and non-owners. The two groups do not differ 
in their perception of market prices (as per Experiment 1) nor do they differ in their 
perception of the product’s market price. Sellers and buyers of a product also did not 
differ in their perception of how highly the product ranks among other similar goods 
in terms of its quality. By matching people’s personal beliefs about quality and market 
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price, we found that this appropriate price for a product was very similar to sellers’ 
valuations, but much higher than buyers’ WTPs.  
2.7 Experiment 1 
2.7.1 Methods 
2.7.1.1 Design 
In a between-subject design, we compared valuations of owners (sellers) and non-
owners (buyers) of a University branded water bottle. We also examined their beliefs 
about the market price distribution of the same object. 
2.7.1.2 Participants 
We recruited 79 participants using Warwick University’s pool of volunteers (Mage 
= 20.70, 59% female). Each individual was promised a flat fee of £3.00 but were told 
that, depending on their choices, they could earn between £0.00 and £20.00 extra. Each 
session lasted approximately 30-40 minutes. 
2.7.1.3 Procedure and Materials 
Participants were tested in groups of maximum size 10. In any single session 
participants took on the role of buyer or seller. Sellers were given a brand new water 
bottle with the University of Warwick logo. These bottles were purchased from the 
University of Warwick bookstore (where their RRP was £6.99).  Buyers were told that 
they would receive extra £4.00 (£7.00 in total with the flat fee of £3.00) for their 
participation. At this point, all participants completed an unrelated filler task and 
survey questions about this task that took on average 10 minutes to finish. Once done, 
sellers were reminded that they were given a water bottle and that it was theirs to keep. 
They were also told that they would have the opportunity to sell the water bottle if 
they so desired. Buyers were asked to examine the water bottle that the experimenter 
had just placed on their desk. They were told that they had the option of either buying 
the bottle and taking it home with them or keeping their money. 
We used the BDM (Becker, Degroot, & Marschak, 1964) method to elicit people’s 
valuations. Specifically, we informed our participants that a random price mechanism 
will be used to determine whether they would buy or sell the bottle. Examples of the 
BDM procedure were shown in both conditions; the examples were formulated 
abstractly in order to avoid any numerical anchors (see 2.14.1  Appendix I for the 
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examples used in both conditions and instructions for Experiment 1). Participants were 
informed that at the end of the experiment the computer would generate a random 
offer/price for the water bottle. If the selling price was lower than that offer, then 
participants were required to sell the water bottle for the amount offered by the 
computer and were given that amount in cash. If the selling price was higher than the 
randomly generated offer price, then they were required to keep the bottle. In the case 
of buyers, if the buying offer was higher than that price, then participants were 
required to buy the water bottle for the amount chosen by the computer. If the buying 
offer was lower than the randomly generated price, participants kept their money and 
did not receive the bottle. On the subsequent screen, participants were asked the 
minimum price, in pounds, that they would be willing to sell their water bottle for. 
Buyers were asked the highest amount of money, in pounds, that they would be willing 
to pay for the water bottle.  
After specifying their WTA or WTP for the water bottle, participants were asked 
about the prices of similar products in the market. Participants were shown an image 
of two rows of water bottles. They were asked to imagine that these bottles represent 
all unique bottles in the market and that they are ordered from the cheapest (leftmost 
bottle in the picture) to the most expensive (rightmost bottle in the picture). 
Participants were then asked to give their best estimate of the price, in pounds, 
corresponding to a specific position in the market. We used nine percentiles in total 
(10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, and 90). For each one, participants saw a red line 
corresponding to a particular position in the market (see Figure 2.1). They were then 
asked: 
 
“The line indicates a price. [percentile]% of all water bottles cost less than the price 
indicated by the line, and [1-percentile]% cost more. What is the price indicated by the line 
(in British pounds)?.” 
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Figure 2.1. Example question of the elicitation process that was shown to participants. 
All nine questions were presented in a random order. The elicitation of the price 
distribution was incentivised so that the three individuals who gave the best (i.e. most 
accurate) estimates for prices of water bottles were awarded bonus payments of 15.00, 
10.00 and 5.00 pounds for the first, second and third place respectively, after all 
sessions were concluded. The responses were compared to real price data for water 
bottles extracted from Amazon.co.uk. After the elicitation of the price distribution 
participants were reminded about the BDM procedure and that the computer would 
now randomly generate an offer/price and compare it with their selling/buying 
price/offer. The results of the BDM procedure were shown to participants, who were 
then asked to alert the experimenter. After all transactions were concluded, 
participants were thanked and debriefed. 
2.8 Results 
2.8.1 Exclusions 
First, we removed one participant whose valuation (here WTA) was extremely 
high (> 4 * SD from the mean). We also identified and removed responses from one 
participant who did not provide consistent answers on the distribution elicitation task. 
More specifically, we calculated the Kendall Tau coefficient to determine whether 
people’s responses were monotonically increasing with the percentiles of the 
distribution. We used a cut-off of 0.7 for our correlation coefficient, and we found that 
only one participant scored below this value (0.5). The final sample included 36 sellers 
and 41 buyers. 
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2.8.2 WTA/WTP Ratio 
We found clear evidence of an endowment effect: Our sellers demanded on 
average £5.29 (SD = 3.97) for the bottle whereas buyers were willing to pay only £2.01 
(SD = 1.92) to obtain it. The average WTA/WTP ratio of 2.64 is similar to that 
obtained in the endowment effect literature (Horowitz & McConnell, 2002; Tunçel & 
Hammitt, 2014). The values of WTA and WTP were determined as significantly 
different by both a two-tailed t-test, t (75) = -4.72, p < .001, ci = [-4.67, -1.90]), as 
well as a Mann-Whitney U test confirming that the endowment effect was found, Z = 
-4.52, p < .001, r = 0.51. 
2.8.3 Distribution Elicitation Task 
Figure 2.2 below summarises the mean and median responses on the distribution 
elicitation task. It is evident that owners and non-owners tended to be in agreement 
with regards to the market price distribution of the water bottles. We tested this with 
a MANOVA, in which we found no significant effect of ownership status on people’s 
estimates of market prices (λ = 0.93, p = 0.82). A MANOVA with log-transformed 
values produced similar results (λ = 0.91, p = 0.71). We also conducted t-tests between 
each percentile’s valuations for the two groups, with no significant differences being 
found. 
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Figure 2.2. Median (left) and mean (right) percentile estimates of the market price in 
Experiment 1. Error bars in the right panel represent +- 1 standard errors of the mean. 
 
2.8.4 Distribution fitting 
What percentiles of the market price distribution do participants’ WTAs and 
WTPs correspond to? In order to compute the rank position of each participants’ 
WTA(P) in their elicited distribution of market prices, we fitted a lognormal 
distribution to each individual’s responses (see 2.14.2  Appendix II for results using a 
normal distribution). In the fitting process, we used a least-squares parametric fit to 
lognormal inverse CDF functions. For each fitted distribution, we obtained the rank 
of each participant’s WTA(P). All 𝑅2 values obtained in the fitting are plotted in 
Figure S2 (see 2.14.2  Appendix II ), and show that the quality of the fit was very good 
(M = 0.93, SD = 0.05). 
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We found that the average rank position of seller’s WTAs was considerably 
higher (M = 0.34, SD = 0.26) than the rank of buyers’ WTPs (M = 0.08, SD = 0.15), 
which is unsurprising given that we observed a large endowment effect in the absence 
of any differences in elicited market price distributions. Indeed, we found a significant 
difference between owners’ and non-owners’ ranked valuations, Z = -4.88, p < .001, r 
= 0.56. All ranks are plotted in Figure 2.3. First, it is clear that many owners and non-
owners provided a valuation that ranks very low in their perceived market price 
distribution of all water bottles. This is particularly apparent among buyers the 
majority of whose valuations rank extremely low in the respective market price 
distributions. Among sellers, the price demanded for a water bottle corresponded to a 
wider range of positions.  
  
Figure 2.3. Histograms of WTA(P) ranks within individually fitted market price 
distributions. 
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2.9 Discussion 
In our first experiment, we validated our methodology in two respects. First, we 
replicated the classic endowment effect with an incentive compatible valuation 
protocol. Second, we showed that our distribution elicitation method works well, with 
only one participant out of 78 failing to provide us with monotonically increasing 
market prices. Our results also showed us that buyers and sellers do not differ in their 
perception of the market prices. That is, for none of the percentiles that we used have 
we found that owners overstate the prices of similar products. The results therefore 
provide the first evidence that ownership status does not lead to a distorted perception 
of market prices, and hence that the endowment effect cannot reflect any such bias. 
As a result, valuation of buyers and sellers corresponded (here ranked) differently in 
their elicited beliefs about the spread of the market prices for water bottles. Whereas 
sellers’ valuations reflect a wide range of possible market prices (see Figure 2.3), 
buyers treat the product as worth very little in terms of its market worth.  
We extend this methodology in Experiment 2 to evaluate people’s beliefs about 
the market price of the good, and their perception of its quality. This allows us to 
quantify the degree to which buyers and sellers differ in their concern with making a 
good deal.  
2.10 Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 had three overarching aims. The first aim was to further examine 
whether ownership status influences people’s perception of objects’ attributes. 
Specifically, we elicited participants’ judgments of both quality and market price of 
the objects. We were also interested in whether participants’ certainty about market 
price or quality might be influenced by ownership status. For example, owners and 
non-owners might give the same single point estimates for an object’s quality, yet 
owners might be more confident about their estimate, in which case their 90% 
confidence interval for their estimate would be smaller. Our second aim was to 
determine whether participants’ judgments of the market price of an object can be 
predicted from that person’s judgment of the ranked quality of the item in combination 
with their beliefs about the distribution of market prices. Our third aim was to 
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understand how people’s WTAs and WTPs relate to their estimates of the quality and 
market price of the relevant object. In particular, we wanted to be able to quantify the 
amount of “good-dealness” required by buyers to purchase an object that they likely 
have little desire for, and the amount of “bad-dealness” acceptable by sellers when 
giving up the item. 
2.10.1 Methods 
2.10.1.1 Design 
The design of Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 but with the addition of 
quality rank and market price questions for the specific water bottle participants were 
given, and incorporated counterbalancing (between these two sections) to screen for 
order effects (see 2.14.3 Appendix III for the ANOVA results which found no strong 
evidence of interaction effects between the two orderings). These additional questions 
followed the elicitation of the market price distributions of water bottles.  
2.10.1.2 Participants 
We recruited 92 participants (Mage = 21.90, 63% female) from the University of 
Warwick, who were tested in groups of no more than 10. Each individual was 
promised a flat fee of £3.00 but were told that, depending on their choices, they could 
earn between £0.00 and £20.00 extra.  
2.10.1.3 Procedure and Materials 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, but extended to accommodate 
new measures. Following the market price elicitation task, participants were asked to 
specify their best estimate of the actual market price for the target water bottle. To 
measure the uncertainty in their price estimates, participants could also specify an 
upper price (that they were 90% certain the true price was below), and a lower price 
(that they were 90% certain the true price was above). The exact question wording can 
be found in 2.14.1  Appendix I). Next, we elicited estimates of the quality of the water 
bottle. Participants were shown a new picture of all water bottles in the market, but 
now ordered by their quality, starting from the most low-end (left) to the most high-
end (right) (see Figure 2.4). Participants were told that at the high-end water bottles 
had the most features and best materials and at the low-end they had the fewest 
features and poorest materials. They were then asked to indicate, by clicking on the 
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appropriate region of the scale, where they believed the water bottle that they were 
given (or were offered) ranked in terms of quality. 
 
Figure 2.4. Quality rank question as shown to participants. 
The rank participants gave was represented by a green rectangle on the graphic. After 
providing their single point estimates participants were asked to give low and high 
estimates of the water bottle’s quality such that they were 90% sure the water bottle 
fell above the low estimate and fell below the high estimate. These estimates were also 
made using the graphical interface shown in Figure 2.4. 
2.11 Results 
2.11.1 Exclusions 
We excluded two participants based on the same criteria as in Experiment 1. None 
of the participants provided us with extreme WTA/WTP values, but responses of two 
individuals were removed due to poor consistency in the distribution elicitation task 
(Kendall Tau < 0.7). We additionally excluded three participants who provided 
extreme values in the market price estimation question (> 4*SD). In total the sample 
consisted of 44 sellers and 43 buyers. 
2.11.2 WTA/WTP Ratio 
As in Experiment 1, we found a clear endowment effect, with WTAs of sellers (M 
= 5.07, SD = 3.41) exceeding WTPs of buyers (M = 2.87, SD = 2.30). The WTA/WTP 
ratio of 1.77 was smaller than the 2.64 found in Experiment 1, but the difference 
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between the groups was significant: two-tailed t-test, t (85) = -3.53, p < .001, ci = [-
3.45, -0.96], as well as a Mann-Whitney test, Z = -3.20, p = 0.001, r = 0.34.  
2.11.3 Market Price Analysis 
Despite the differences in WTA and WTPs buyers and sellers did not produce 
different estimates of the market price for the water bottle or of the 90% confidence 
intervals for that price (see Table 2.1 below). 
Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics (means) for the market price estimates of the water bottle. 
Condition N Market Price Standard 
Deviation 
Lower 
Market Price 
Upper Market 
Price 
Buyer 43 5.57 2.68 3.40 8.58 
Seller 44 6.07 3.07 3.73 10.68 
 
There were no significant differences for either the market price value (t (85) = -0.80, 
p = 0.43, ci = [-1.72, 0.73] and Z = -0.80, p = 0.63, r = 0.09), or for the difference 
between the upper and lower end of the possible market price value (t (85) = -1.95, p 
= 0.05, ci = [-3.58, 0.03] and Z = -1.57, p = 0.12, r = 0.17). 
2.11.4 Distribution Elicitation Task 
Next, we examined responses from the market price distribution elicitation task. 
Mean and median responses on the market price distribution task are plotted in Figure 
2.5. In line with the results of Experiment 1 there appear to be no differences between 
the estimates produced by owners and non-owners of the water bottle. Indeed, we 
conducted a MANOVA, in which the effect of ownership status was not significant, λ 
= 0.89, p = 0.390. A MANOVA with log-transformed values also produced a non-
significant result (λ = 0.8947, p = 0.442). T-tests between each percentile’s values 
among buyers and sellers also revealed no differences. 
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Figure 2.5. Median (left) and mean (right) percentile estimates of the market price in 
Experiment 2. Error bars in the right panel represent +- 1 standard errors of the mean. 
 
2.11.5 Quality Rank Analysis 
We now turn to the analysis of judgments of the target bottle’s quality rank. Table 
2.2 summarises the data for the average judged quality rank and for the upper and 
lower ends of the participant’s 90% confidence cut-offs. 
Table 2.2. Descriptive statistics (means) for the quality rank estimates of the water bottle. 
Condition N Quality Rank Standard 
Deviation 
Lower 
Quality Rank 
Upper 
Quality Rank 
Buyer 43 0.2820 0.1510 0.1703 0.4459 
Seller 44 0.3364 0.1794 0.1841 0.5614 
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There was no significant difference between the single point estimates of quality rank 
produced by buyers and sellers (Z = 1.32, p = 0.19, r = 0.14). We also examined 
whether buyers and sellers differed in the uncertainty of their quality rank estimates, 
which we define as the difference between the upper and lower quality ranks. We 
found a significant difference (Z = -2.39, p = 0.02, r = 0.26) such that sellers expressed 
a lower level of certainty about the water bottle’s quality rank. More specifically, 
owners and non-owners produced similar estimates of the lower end of the quality 
rank confidence interval, but owners gave a higher estimate of the upper end of the 
range. Although the effect is small in magnitude, this result provides evidence against 
the hypothesis that ownership status increases owners’ confidence in their estimates 
of the quality of the relevant product. In summary, there was very little difference 
between buyers’ and sellers’ estimates of either the quality of the product or its market 
price, indicating that the substantial endowment effect that we observed cannot reflect 
such differences. 
2.11.6 Distribution Fitting 
As in Experiment 2, we fitted a lognormal distribution to each participant’s 
responses on the market price elicitation task (Please see 2.14.2  Appendix II for 
results using a normal distribution, Figure S3 in 2.14.2  Appendix II shows an overall 
high quality of model fits in terms of 𝑅2 (M = 0.95, SD = 0.05)). We then determined 
the rank position of an individual’s WTA or WTP in the fitted distributions. As in 
Experiment 1, we found that the ranked position of sellers’ WTAs (M = 0.31, SD = 
0.28) was different from the ranked position of buyers’ WTPs (M = 0.14, SD = 0.20), 
U = -3.27, p = 0.001, r = 0.35. The distributions of ranks are plotted in Figure 2.6. 
Once again, we can see that both groups tended to provide valuations that ranked very 
low in the market price distribution. However, many more sellers than buyers provided 
valuations corresponding to market positions higher than the 10th percentile.  
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Figure 2.6. Histograms of WTA(P) ranks in Experiment 2. 
 
2.11.7 Quality Matched Prices 
Our results so far showed that owners and non-owners do not differ in their 
perception of the global distribution of market prices for a given class of consumer 
goods. In addition, ownership status does not seem to dictate people’s perception of 
quality or perception of the object’s market value. None of these quantities can, at least 
in isolation, explain why we observe the WTA-WTP gap. If we assume that 
participants believe the market price of the item is a monotonically increasing function 
of its quality (so that if a quality of an item increases each market price increases), 
then the rank of the item’s quality is the same as the rank of its market price. We can 
now use each individual’s estimates of the quality of the water bottle to quantify the 
good-dealness of the price they are willing to pay or accept. This is done in the 
following way. For each participant, we take their estimate of the ranked quality of the 
water bottle and find the market price that occupies the corresponding rank position in 
the distribution that represents that participant’s market beliefs. For example, if a 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
5
10
15
20
25
Buyers
WTP Rank
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
5
10
15
20
25
Sellers
WTA Rank
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
140 
 
person stated that the water bottle was at the 30th percentile for quality, we calculate 
the 30th percentile price in the distribution of market prices that we elicited from that 
participant. 
We refer to this estimate as the quality matched price (QMP). In the same fashion, 
we obtained the high quality matched price (HQMP), and lower quality matched price 
(LQMP), which correspond to the lower and upper bounds of the confidence intervals 
provided by the participant. More formally, if 𝐹−1(𝑒; 𝜇, 𝜎) is the fitted lognormal 
inverse CDF for a participant’s elicited market price distribution, where 𝑒 is the 
percentile and (𝜇, 𝜎) are the parameters for the lognormal distribution, then the quality 
matched price, QMP, is related to the quality rank QR, by: 𝑄𝑀𝑃 = 𝐹−1(𝑄𝑅; 𝜇, 𝜎). 
Summary statistics for the three measures of quality matched prices are shown in Table 
2.3. The quality price is a measure of participant’s perceived market price of the item, 
given only the rank estimate for the quality of the item. It is what the participant 
perceives to be an appropriate market price for the item of that specific quality. 
Table 2.3. Descriptive statistics (means) for appropriate prices. 
Condition N Average Quality 
Price 
Standard Deviation Average 
Low Quality 
Price 
Average 
High Quality 
Price 
Buyer 43 5.30 3.09 3.48 8.46 
Seller 44 5.71 2.86 3.99 10.86 
 
Since we have not found any differences in quality ranks or market price distributions, 
it is unsurprising that we do not find any differences for the appropriate prices (U = -
0.66, p = 0.51, r = 0.07) or the HQMP-LQMP range (U = -0.46, p = 0.64, r = 0.05) 
between sellers and buyers. 
2.11.8 A Tale of Three Prices 
For each participant, our analysis gave us three prices for the water bottle: the 
offer price WTA(P), the appropriate price and the market price. It is evident that the 
estimates of the appropriate prices are very similar to participants’ estimates of the 
market prices of the product (see Table 2.1). Specifically, considering first buyers, the 
range of market prices estimated directly by the participants was from 3.40 to 8.58. 
141 
 
The corresponding estimates obtained from the relative rank matching procedure just 
described were 3.48 and 8.46. A similar pattern is seen for sellers: direct estimates 
were 3.73 and 10.68 for the lower and upper ends of the confidence intervals 
respectively; the corresponding estimates obtained by relative rank matching were 
3.99 and 10.86. There was therefore a high degree of coherence in participants’ 
estimates; their direct estimates of the market price for the water bottle were highly 
predictable from their estimates of the water bottle’s quality combined with their 
beliefs about the market price distributions of water bottles’ prices. 
We summarise the results in Figure 2.7. This figure shows, for both buyers and 
sellers, three different prices. One is the WTA or WTP; the second is the participants’ 
estimate of the market price for the water bottle, and the third is the estimate of the 
appropriate price as inferred from the quality matching procedure.  
 
Figure 2.7. Valuations of buyers and sellers together with elicited market prices and 
estimated appropriate prices for the water bottle. Error bars represent +/- 1 standard errors 
of the mean. 
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All price estimates made by both buyers and sellers were within statistical error of 
each other except for a single price: the buyers’ WTP. This suggests that it is the buyers 
who, in this experiment, are driving the endowment effect, as we discuss below. Note 
that all the prices are between £5 and £6, with exception of WTP, which is at £2.87. 
While comparisons within price category (WTA(P)/Quality/Market) have already 
been performed in this chapter, we wish also test for differences between these 
categories. We therefore ran a two-way mixed ANOVA with buyer/seller as a between 
factor and price type (WTA/WTP, appropriate price and market price) as a within 
(repeated measures) factor, with the output shown in Table 2.4 below. 
Table 2.4. Two-way repeated measures ANOVA results. 
Variable df F p  Partial 𝜂2 
Ownership status 1 3.87 0.05  0.044 
Error (Owner status) 85     
Price Type 2 22.09 <.001   0.206 
Interaction term 2 5.88 0.003   0.065 
Error (Price Type) 170     
 
The results of the ANOVA show a strong effect of Price Type, as well as a strong 
interaction effect and a significant effect of the Ownership status (the means of these 
groups are plotted in Figure 2.7 above). To check if buyers’ WTPs are responsible for 
the significant ANOVA results we conducted pairwise t-tests, using Bonferroni 
adjustments (there are 15 pairwise t-tests, so we find 0.05/15= 0.003 as a Bonferroni 
adjusted significance level). The t-tests were paired where necessary and unpaired 
otherwise. The results, shown in Table S10 in 2.14.5 Appendix V clearly indicate that 
buyer’s WTP is significantly lower than all the other price estimates we obtained, with 
differences between all other estimates not being significant. 
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2.11.9 Appropriate Price Distribution 
We can extend the analysis of where WTA(P) ranks in the market price 
distribution (as in Figure 2.6) to see where participant’s WTA(P) ranks in an effective 
distribution of appropriate prices for the item. Using the three quality prices, LQMP, 
QMP and HQMP that we obtained we can form an appropriate price distribution 
(APD) for each participant. This distribution characterises the range of prices that each 
participant considers to be reasonable for the item, given its quality. 
The APD is defined in terms of the three data points corresponding to the LQMP, 
the QMP and the HQMP. The LQMP and HQMP must correspond to rank positions 
0.1 and 0.9 in the APD respectively. This is because low (high) quality rank estimate 
was elicited by asking for a quality estimate the participant was 90% sure the true 
value lay above (below). It follows from this that the LQMP and HQMP must 
correspond to rank positions 0.9 and 0.1 in the APD, respectively. The quality estimate 
itself was elicited as participants’ estimate of the quality of the water bottle – it follows 
that the QMP must correspond to a statistical average of the APD. We assume that the 
elicited quality rank corresponds to a median value, so that the median (rank of 0.5) 
of the appropriate price distribution is QMP. 
We then construct the CDF of the APD in a piecewise linear fashion, matching 
the (price, rank) values of (LQMP,0.1), (QMP,0.5) and (HQMP,0.9), so that the APD 
CDF consists of straight lines between these data points as well as the point (0,0). We 
also need to include a maximum price (MP) for the distribution, so that we can assign 
ranks in the APD to WTA(P) values above HQMP. For the maximum price, we take 
the price corresponding to the 99th percentile from the individual lognormal fits, and 
have it correspond to a rank of 0.99 in the APD. If the WTA(P) value is above MP, 
then we set its rank to 1.  
The resulting piecewise linear CDF for the APD is illustrated schematically in 
Figure 2.8. For example, if in Figure 2.8 we insert participant’s WTA(P) into the x-
axis such that it is between QMP and HQMP, then their rank in the APD will be 
between 0.5 and 0.9. Similarly, if their WTA(P) is between 0 and LQMP then their 
rank in the APD will be between 0 and 0.1. For analytic numerical computations of 
the ranks of WTA(P) in the APD please refer to 2.14.4 Appendix IV. 
144 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8. Schematic representation of the construction of the APD. 
 
Once we have the APD, we calculate an appropriate rank for the WTA(P) of each 
participant, by finding the rank position of WTA(P) in the APD. Conceptually, this 
corresponds to the rank position of WTA(P) in each individual’s distribution of 
appropriate prices for the particular water bottle in the study. We find the ‘appropriate 
price rank’ for buyers and sellers by inserting the WTA/WTP into the appropriate price 
distribution (APD) that we have just constructed and the result is shown in Figure 2.9. 
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Figure 2.9. Histograms showing the distributions of appropriate ranks for buyers and 
sellers.  
We can see that a lot of ranks are close to zero, though there are many lower ranks 
for buyers than sellers, as one would expect. Aggregate statistics are detailed in Table 
2.5.  
Table 2.5. Aggregate statistics for appropriate ranks. 
 Average Rank Std. Dev. Median 
Buyers 0.19 0.25 0.07 
Sellers 0.40 0.35 0.33 
 
The appropriate ranks for buyers and sellers were significantly different: U = -3.02, p 
= 0.003, r = 0.32. From this analysis, we observe that participants’ WTA and WTP 
rank significantly different in their appropriate price distributions, with buyers having 
a lower rank position on average than sellers. This finding is similar to the results 
reported previously in Figure 2.6, namely that participants’ WTA and WTP rank 
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significantly differently in their elicited market price distributions (with buyers having 
a lower rank position on average than sellers).  
An alternative analysis examines whether WTA(P), which we denote below by x, 
was lower than LQMP, between LQMP and QMP, between QMP and HQMP or above 
HQMP. The numbers of participants who fall into these four groups are reported in 
Table 2.6. 
We observe many more buyers than sellers having a WTP lower or equal than 
LQMP and more sellers having a WTA between QMP and HQMP and above HQMP. 
This means that buyers often provided WTP that was within a range suitable for an 
item of lower quality. Sellers’ WTA were more equally distributed so that some chose 
a price corresponding to a low-quality product, or even of a high-quality product. 
The spread in appropriate ranks for sellers in particular suggests that the simple 
explanations in terms of aggregate quantities are perhaps incomplete. Nevertheless, 
the strength of the aggregate analyses demonstrates their validity. There are 18 sellers 
that give a WTA lower than LQMP, but the average LQMP for sellers is 3.99 which 
is still greater than buyers’ average WTP (2.87), so these individuals might still 
contribute to the endowment effect. 
Table 2.6.  Number of participants with WTA(P) in each section of the APD. 
 x<=LQP LQP<x<=QP QP<x<=HQP x>HQP 
Buyers 29 7 5 2 
Sellers 18 8 8 10 
 
We would expect an average appropriate rank equal to 0.5 if WTA/WTP matched 
perfectly the appropriate price. Our analysis of the appropriate price distribution 
revealed two features of people’s valuation. Many owners and non-owners valued the 
consumer good as if it was of lower quality. However, considerably more sellers than 
buyers specified WTAs that correspond to the price of an object that is of a median or 
even higher than median quality.  
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2.12 General Discussion 
In the present work, we explored the hypothesis that the behaviour of both buyers 
and sellers can be understood as rational given good-dealness considerations rather 
than reflecting any bias or irrationality on the part of either owners or non-owners of 
the object. Building on the argument that the endowment effect may reflect strategic 
considerations (Brown, 2005; Isoni, 2011; Weaver & Frederick, 2012), we 
investigated whether the endowment effect could be understood in terms of rational 
consumers’ concerns with goodness and badness of a deal in the light of their 
perceptions of (a) quality of the item and (b) the distribution of market prices for such 
items.  
In Experiment 1, we set out to determine whether we can reliably elicit people’s 
beliefs about the market price distribution of a particular class of consumer goods, and 
whether these beliefs differ as a function of ownership status. Our experiment 
confirmed that it is possible to elicit coherent estimates of price distributions but we 
also found that these beliefs did not differ between owners and non-owners. In 
Experiment 2, we replicated these findings and also found that owners and non-owners 
did not differ in their estimates of the product’s quality (in terms of its rank among 
other similar products). Moreover, owners and non-owners produced similar estimates 
of the product’s actual market price. 
For each participant, we estimated the price that individuals believed to be 
appropriate for the relevant object given (a) that participant’s estimate of the ranked 
quality of the object and (b) that participant’s estimate of the distribution of market 
prices of such objects. Our results can be understood in terms of sellers’ rational desire 
to achieve something close to the appropriate market price and buyers’ rational desire 
to purchase an item which they probably do not want only if they can do so at the price 
that represents a good deal. 
For example, in Experiment 2, sellers estimated the water bottle to be at the 34th 
percentile of the quality distribution, and required a price at the 31st percentile of the 
price distribution to sell it. Buyers estimated the water bottle to lie at the 28th percentile 
of the quality distribution, yet were prepared to pay only the 14th percentile price. 
Thus, buyers were only prepared to offer a price that represented a good deal for them, 
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where good-dealness is quantified in terms of the difference between the quality rank 
and the price rank.  
We therefore suggest that the endowment effect can be naturally explained in 
terms of the different strategic considerations that apply to buyers and sellers. In a 
typical experiment, most participants will most likely not particularly want the 
relevant object (cf. Weaver & Frederick, 2012). Consider first the position of sellers. 
It is natural to assume that sellers, even if they anticipate little consumption utility 
from an object themselves, will be cognizant of the fact that somebody is likely to be 
willing to pay something close to the typical market price of the object. Imagine that 
you live in Australia, have a morbid fear of travel, and are left an apartment in New 
York by an elderly aunt. The consumption utility of the New York apartment for you 
is very low, but it is obvious that you would nonetheless put the apartment on the 
market for something near the appropriate market price, which (assuming efficient 
markets), is in itself an indication of what someone who wants that apartment would 
be willing to pay for that apartment. Clearly, a potential buyer of the apartment is in a 
different position. Assume now that a buyer, like a seller, anticipates relatively little 
consumption utility if they owned the apartment. The buyer will only be prepared to 
pay anything at all for the apartment to the extent that it constitutes a good deal that 
could potentially lead to a profit-making sale, and in the case of objects typically 
included in laboratory studies of the endowment effect such considerations may in any 
case largely be outweighed by transaction costs. 
Our account differs from previous explanations of the endowment effect in several 
key respects. Most importantly, unlike traditional accounts based on concepts such as 
loss aversion, our account does not assume ownership-induced changes in people’s 
underlying valuations of the object if such valuation is defined in terms of 
consumption utility (rather than, for example, the profit that could possibly be made 
by selling it). In this respect, our account is similar to that of Isoni (2011). However, 
unlike Isoni, we do not need to assume “bad deal aversion” in that we do not assume 
any asymmetry in hedonic impact of under- and over-paying. 
Our results are comparable to the findings reported in the endowment effect 
studies of risky and ambiguous gambles. Sellers, not buyers, tend to set the minimum 
selling price to be close to the actual objective worth of a risky asset (Yechiam et al., 
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2017a; Yechiam et al., 2017b). Although in the present study we can only approximate 
what the worth of a consumer good is for each person, all of our findings are consistent 
with the fact that sellers’ behaviour reflects their subjective view of what the item 
should be worth. Our results therefore extend previous efforts beyond the context of 
gambles. 
Our results have wider implications concerning the use of incentive compatible 
procedure like the BDM (Becker, Degroot, & Marschak, 1964) to elicit true 
valuations. If the amount that people are willing to sell or buy an item for reflects 
strategic considerations relating to appropriate prices for an item of that quality, rather 
than an individual’s desire to possess the object, the valuations obtained using BDM-
like procedures cannot be interpreted as measures of preferences. 
We note that the extent to which the strategic considerations based on beliefs 
about the market come into play will depend, in difficult to determine ways, on the 
overall true market prices of the relevant good. Returning to the example of New York 
flat, even the Australian with a fear of flying would plausibly still offer a substantial 
amount of money for the apartment because she could sell it for a profit. In this case, 
there is some willingness to pay for a good that would confer no consumption utility 
on the purchaser, and hence the willingness to pay is much higher than would be 
warranted by the individual’s desire to own the apartment. In the case of stimuli such 
as water bottles or coffee mugs, in contrast, the likely profit that could be made by 
selling the item is small or zero in the light of transaction costs and hence there is less 
incentive to provide a WTP that reflects anything other than the small amount of 
consumption utility the object might confer. 
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2.14 Appendices 
2.14.1 Appendix I 
1) Experiment 2-Instructions for Buyers 
Participants came to the lab, were greeted and told they were going to be given a flat 
fee of £7 in total for their participation. They were also told that, depending on their 
choices, they could earn between £0.00 and £20.00 extra. They completed a filler task 
(randomness production task) and then took part in our computer based study where 
they answered questions about the filler task and then they proceeded to the 
endowment effect study.  
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We placed a water bottle on each desk and participants were told: 
“Have a look at the water bottle that the experimenter put on your desk. We will give 
you an opportunity to buy this water bottle if you want to. You have the option of 
either buying the bottle and taking it home with you or keeping all your money. We 
would like to know the highest amount of money you would be willing to pay for the 
water bottle. Click the button to proceed for further instructions.” 
“On the next screen, we will ask you the maximum price you would be willing to pay 
for the bottle. We will use a random price method to decide whether or not you actually 
do buy the bottle. At the end of the experiment, the computer will generate a random 
price for the water bottle. If your buying offer is higher than this price, then you must 
buy the water bottle for the amount chosen by the computer. If your buying offer is 
lower than the randomly generated price, then you keep your money and do not get 
the bottle. On the next screen, you will find some examples.” 
Next the BDM was explained to them, and the random price method and we also gave 
some examples.  
Examples of the BDM procedure shown in the buyer condition. 
Example 1: You indicate that you are willing to pay X for the water bottle, and a higher 
price of Y is generated. Since the price of Y is greater than your stated buying price 
of X, you will not buy the bottle and will keep all your money.  
Example 2: You indicate that you are willing to pay X for the water bottle, and a lower 
price of Z is generated. Since the price of Z is less that your stated buying price of X, 
you will buy the bottle for Z.  
Choose your buying price carefully on the next screen because you will not be able to 
change it. Because the price is chosen by the computer at random, it is in your best 
interest to state your true buying price.  
“If you have any questions, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to 
assist you.” 
In the box below please enter the highest amount of money, in pounds, that you would 
be willing to pay for the water bottle (you can use up to two decimal points): 
Next, we asked participants some questions about consumer goods.  
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In the following part of the study you will be asked some questions about consumer 
goods. Please read the following instructions carefully. On the next screen, we will 
ask you how much water bottles typically cost. Water bottles are represented below in 
order of price starting from the cheapest (left) to the most expensive (right) bottle. Of 
course, you will not know the exact answers, but please give your best estimate. We 
will compare your responses to real price data for water bottles. The three individuals 
who give the best estimates for prices of water bottles will be awarded bonus payments 
of 15, 10 and 5 pounds for the first, second and third place respectively.        
 
 
We gave participants nine elicitation questions in random order that related to the 
picture of black water bottles of different shapes in a row, with Least Expensive on 
the left of the image and Most Expensive on the right. Each of the nine questions were 
of the following type: 
 
The line indicates a price. 10% of all water bottles cost less than the price indicated by 
the line, and 90% cost more. What is the price indicated by the line (in British pounds)? 
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The line indicates a price. 20% of all water bottles cost less than the price indicated by 
the line, and 80% cost more. What is the price indicated by the line (in British 
pounds)? 
 
The line indicates a price. 30% of all water bottles cost less than the price indicated by 
the line, and 70% cost more. What is the price indicated by the line (in British 
pounds)? 
 
The line indicates a price. 40% of all water bottles cost less than the price indicated by 
the line, and 60% cost more. What is the price indicated by the line (in British 
pounds)? 
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The line indicates a price. 50% of all water bottles cost less than the price indicated by 
the line, and 50% cost more. What is the price indicated by the line (in British 
pounds)? 
 
The line indicates a price. 60% of all water bottles cost less than the price indicated by 
the line, and 40% cost more. What is the price indicated by the line (in British 
pounds)? 
 
The line indicates a price. 70% of all water bottles cost less than the price indicated by 
the line, and 30% cost more. What is the price indicated by the line (in British 
pounds)? 
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The line indicates a price. 80% of all water bottles cost less than the price indicated by 
the line, and 20% cost more. What is the price indicated by the line (in British 
pounds)? 
 
 
The line indicates a price. 90% of all water bottles cost less than the price indicated by 
the line, and 10% cost more. What is the price indicated by the line (in British 
pounds)? 
Thank you for completing the consumer goods part of the study. We will compare 
your responses to real price data for water bottles. The 3 most accurate participants 
throughout our sessions will receive 20, 15 and 10 pounds respectively.      
In a subsequent screen participants were asked: 
What do you think the actual market price of the water bottle you were given is?   
Please specify your best estimate in the box below in pounds sterling.  
How confident are you of the estimate you specified above?  You may not be 
completely certain about the market price of the water bottle. We would now like you 
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to provide a range such that you are 90% sure that the market price of the water bottle 
falls within this range.  
 I am 90% confident that the market price would be more than:  
I am 90% confident that the market price would be less than: 
In the next screen participants were shown the following: 
In the picture below, water bottles are represented in order of quality starting from the 
most low-end (left) to the most high-end (right). At the high-end water bottles have 
the most features and best materials and at the low end they have the fewest features 
and poorest materials. Please indicate by clicking on the appropriate region of the 
scale below where you believe the water bottle that you have been given ranks in terms 
of quality. Of course, you will not know the exact answer, but please give your best 
estimate. 
 
In the previous question, you indicated where the water bottle you were given ranks 
in terms of quality. The rank you gave is represented by a green rectangle on the 
graphic below. You may not be completely certain about where the water bottle ranks 
in terms of quality. We would now like you to provide a range such that you are 90% 
sure that the quality of the water bottle falls within this range. Please indicate on the 
first graphic your LOWER limit for the range, so that you are 90% sure that the quality 
of the water bottle is HIGHER than this limit. You may click on the green rectangle if 
you believe that the LOWER limit is included in that region. On the second graphic, 
we would like you to indicate your HIGHER limit for the range, so that you are 90% 
sure that the quality of the water bottle is LOWER than this limit. You may click on 
the green rectangle if you believe that the UPPER limit is included in that region. If 
you are completely certain about where the water bottle ranks in terms of quality, 
please just click on the green rectangle in both graphics.  
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Please indicate your LOWER limit for the quality of the water bottle. 
 
Please indicate your HIGHER limit for the quality of the water bottle. 
We previously asked you to state the highest amount of money you would be willing 
to pay for the water bottle. Remember that the computer will randomly generate a 
price and compare it with your offer. If the price is lower than your stated offer, you 
will buy the water bottle. If it is higher than your offer you will not buy the water 
bottle. 
If the random price generated was bigger than a buyer’s WTP then the participant saw:  
Please do not progress from this screen until you have spoken to an experimenter. 
Your maximum offer was {ChoiceTextEntryValue} and the price generated was 
{Generated Price}, which is greater than your price. Therefore, you will not buy the 
item. Please now indicate by raising your arm that you have completed the study. An 
experimenter will come to give you a form so that you can write down the maximum 
offer you indicated, the generated price and the outcome of your transaction. After you 
have completed the form, present it to the experimenter in order to finalise your 
transaction.       
If the random price generated was smaller than a buyer’s WTP then the participant 
saw:  
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Please do not progress from this screen until you have spoken to an experimenter. 
Your maximum offer was {ChoiceTextEntryValue} and the price generated was 
{Generated Price}, which is less than your price. Therefore, you will buy the item 
for {Generated Price}. Please now indicate by raising your arm that you have 
completed the study. An experimenter will come to give you a form so that you can 
write down the maximum offer you indicated, the generated price and the outcome of 
your transaction. After you have completed the form, present it to the experimenter in 
order to finalise your transaction.  
2) Experiment 2-Instructions for Sellers 
Participants came to the lab, were greeted and told they were going to be given a flat 
fee of £3 in total for their participation. They were also told that, depending on their 
choices, they could earn between £0.00 and £20.00 extra. They completed a filler task 
(randomness production task) and then took part in our computer based study where 
they answered questions about the filler task and then they proceeded to the 
endowment effect study. The sellers experiment was the same, except that sellers were 
given the water bottle immediately when we welcomed them into the experiment and 
told it was theirs to keep.  
After the filler task participants were told the following: 
“At the beginning of this experiment we gave you a water bottle. This bottle is yours 
to keep if you want. However, we will give you an opportunity to sell your water bottle 
if you want to. You have the option of either selling your bottle that you were given 
or keeping it and taking it away home with you. We would like to know the lowest 
amount of money you would be willing to sell the water bottle for. Click the button to 
proceed for further instructions. “ 
“On the next screen, we will ask you the minimum price you would be willing to sell 
your bottle for. We will use a random price method to decide whether or not you 
actually do sell the bottle.  At the end of the experiment, the computer will generate a 
random offer for the water bottle. If your selling price is lower than this offer, then 
you must sell the water bottle for the amount offered by the computer and we will give 
you this amount in cash. If your selling price is higher than the randomly generated 
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offer price, then you must keep the bottle. On the next screen, you will find some 
examples.” 
Examples of the BDM procedure shown in the seller condition. 
Example 1: You indicate that you are willing to sell the water bottle for X, and a higher 
offer price of Y is generated. Since the offer price of Y is greater than your stated 
selling price of X, you will sell the bottle and receive Y.  
Example 2: You indicate that you are willing to sell the water bottle for X, and a lower 
offer price of Z is generated. Since the offer price of Z is less that your stated selling 
price of X, you will keep the bottle.  
“Choose your selling price carefully on the next screen because you will not be able 
to change it. Because the offer is chosen by the computer at random, it is in your best 
interest to state your true selling price.  
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to 
assist you.” 
“In the box below please enter the lowest amount of money, in pounds, that you would 
be willing to sell the water bottle for (you can use up to two decimal points):” 
The remaining parts of the experiment were the same for sellers as they were for 
buyers.   
At the end of the experiment participants were reminded: 
“We previously asked you to state the lowest amount of money you would be willing 
to accept for the water bottle. Remember that the computer will randomly generate an 
offer and compare it with your selling price. If the offer is lower than your stated 
selling price, you will keep the water bottle. If it is higher than your selling price you 
will sell the water bottle for the randomly generated offer. 
If the random price generated was bigger than a seller’s WTA, then the participant 
saw:  
Please do not progress from this screen until you have spoken to an experimenter. 
Your minimum price was {ChoiceTextEntryValue} and the offer price generated was 
{Generated Price}, which is greater than your price. Therefore, you will sell the item 
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for {Generated Price}. Please now indicate by raising your arm that you have 
completed the study. An experimenter will come to give you a form so that you can 
write down the minimum price you indicated, the generated offer price and the 
outcome of your transaction. After you have completed the form, present it to the 
experimenter in order to finalise your transaction.       
If the random price generated was smaller than a seller’s WTA, then the participant 
saw:  
Please do not progress from this screen until you have spoken to an 
experimenter. Your minimum price was {ChoiceTextEntryValue} and the offer price 
generated was {Generated Price}, which is less than your price. Therefore, you 
will keep the item. Please now indicate by raising your arm that you have completed 
the study. An experimenter will come to give you a form so that you can write down 
the minimum price you indicated, the generated offer price and the outcome of your 
transaction. After you have completed the form, present it to the experimenter in order 
to finalise your transaction.  
3) Experiment 1-Instructions for Buyers 
Instructions were the same as the Instructions for Buyers in Experiment 2 with the 
exclusion of the elicitations of the quality rank and the market price of the specific 
water bottle. 
4) Experiment 1-Instructions for Sellers  
Instructions were the same as the Instructions for Sellers in Experiment 2 with the 
exclusion of the elicitations of the quality rank and the market price of the specific 
water bottle. 
2.14.2 Appendix II 
Lognormal vs. normal distribution fitting 
In the main section of the manuscript, we fitted participants’ elicited price distribution 
only to a lognormal distribution. This was implemented because prices for water 
bottles are positive numbers and fitting a normal distribution results in a non-zero 
probability for a water bottle to have a negative price, which leads to negative quality 
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prices. Despite this, it may be possible for a normal distribution to fit participants’ 
elicited price distributions well. The results show that there are no participants who 
are substantially (𝑅2>0.1) better fitted by a normal distribution than a lognormal and 
that the resulting rank estimates of WTA(P) are similar and exhibit the same patterns 
as those found by using the lognormal distribution exclusively. In the following 
sections, we fit participants’ data to both normal and lognormal distributions and 
choose the best fitting distribution for each participant. 
Experiment 1 
We find data from 41 individuals to be best fit by the lognormal distribution and from 
36 to be best fit by the normal distribution. A histogram of the difference in 𝑅2 
between these two fits is shown in Figure S1 below. 
 
Figure S1. Histogram of the difference in 𝑅2 between normal and lognormal fits in 
Experiment 1. 
 
The aggregate statistics for the WTA(P) ranks are summarized in Table S1. 
Table S1. Aggregate statistics for the WTA(P) ranks in Experiment 1. 
 Average Rank Std. Dev. Median 
Buyers 0.1100 0.1392 0.0683 
Sellers 0.3329 0.2457 0.3349 
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The two values were judged significantly different by both a two-tailed t-test (t (75) = 
-4.9743, p = 4.0424e-06, ci = [-0.3122, -0.1337]), and a Mann-Whitney U test (Z  = -
4.4564, p = 8.3347e-06, effect size r = 0.5146). 
 
Figure S2. Histogram for the 𝑅2 values of the lognormal fitted distributions to participants’ 
elicited market price percentiles in Experiment 1. The outlier (participant 67) is shown in 
black. 
 
Experiment 2 
We find data from 47 individuals to be best fit by the lognormal distribution and data 
from 40 to be best fit by the normal distribution. A histogram of the difference in 𝑅2 
between these two fits is shown in Figure S3 below, where we see that overall the 
lognormal distribution fits better and at worst it has an 𝑅2 that is lower by less than 
0.1. 
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Figure S3. Histogram of the difference in 𝑅2 between these two fits in Experiment 2. 
 
The aggregate statistics for the WTA(P) ranks that come from fitting a normal 
distribution are summarized in Table S2. 
Table S2.  Aggregate statistics for the WTA(P) ranks in Experiment 2. 
 Average Rank Std. Dev. Median 
Buyers 0.1744 0.1915 0.1216 
Sellers 0.3264 0.2639 0.2240 
 
The two values were judged significantly different by both a two-tailed t-test: (t (85) 
= -3.0690, p = 0.0029, ci = [-0.2505, -0.0535]), and a Mann-Whitney U test (Z = -
2.9884, p = 0.0028, effect size r = 0.3204). 
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Figure S4. Histogram for the 𝑅2 values of the lognormal fitted distributions to participants’ 
elicited market price percentiles in Experiment 2. Outliers (participants 131 and 135) is 
shown in black. 
 
2.14.3 Appendix III 
Analysis of order effects in Study 2 
Results from ANOVAs were conducted to determine if we can combine the sessions 
where the order of the quality rank questions and market price questions for the 
specific water bottle were counterbalanced. We had a 2x2 design, with the factors 
being buy or sell condition and order of quality question and market price question. 
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Table S3. ANOVA output results (quality rank as the dependent variable). 
Source Sum Sq. d.f. Mean Sq. F p 
Ownership status 0.08851 1 0.08851 2.81 0.0975 
Quality question or Market 
question first 
0.00087 1 0.00087 0.03 0.8689 
Interaction term 0.09313 1 0.09313 2.95 0.0893 
Error 2.77646 88 0.03155   
Total 2.94457 91    
 
There is not a strong difference in quality ranks between buyers and sellers (p = 
0.0975). There is also a mild interaction effect (p values above 0.05). We can see this 
by looking at the means in each of the four groups in Table S4. 
Table S4. Means of quality ranks in each of the groups. 
 Buyer Seller 
Quality First 0.2631 0.3893 
Market Price First 0.3208 0.3192 
 
Table S5. ANOVA output results (quality rank range as the dependent variable). 
Source Sum Sq. d.f. Mean Sq. F p 
Ownership status 0.02924 1 0.02924 6.33 0.0137 
Quality question or Market 
question first 
0.00943 1 0.00943 2.04 0.1566 
Interaction term 0.01547 1 0.01547 3.35 0.0706 
Error 0.40636 88 0.00462   
Total 0.45733 91    
 
We see a broadly similar pattern to that seen in Table S3. There is a clear difference 
in quality range between buyers and sellers (p = 0.0137) but there is a weak interaction 
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effect and a weak effect of the ordering of the two sections (quality rank question for 
the specific water bottle appearing first or market price question first). We can see this 
by looking at the means in each of the four groups in Table S6. 
Table S6. Means of quality rank ranges in each of the groups. 
 Buyer Seller 
Quality First 0.0801 0.1420 
Market Price First 0.1265 0.1363 
 
Table S7. ANOVA output results (Market Price as the dependent variable). 
Source Sum Sq. d.f. Mean Sq. F p 
Ownership status 2.483 1 2.4829 0.28 0.5977 
Quality question or   Market 
question first 
16.314 1 16.3138 1.84 0.178 
Interaction term 8.783 1 8.7833 0.99 0.3219 
Error 778.836 88 8.8504   
Total 805.478 91    
 
None of the treatments had any effect on the market price. 
Table S8. ANOVA Output results (Market Price Range as the dependent variable). 
Source Sum Sq. d.f. Mean Sq. F p 
Ownership Status 99.88 1 99.8764 3.3 0.0727 
Quality question or Market question 
first 
7.48 1 7.48 0.25 0.6202 
Interaction term 10.04 1 10.0414 0.33 0.566 
Error 2540.24 84 30.2409   
Total 2653.34 87    
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There is only one weak effect between buyers and sellers. The means of each group 
can be seen in Table S9 below. 
Table S9. Means of market price ranges in each of the groups. 
 Buyer Seller 
Quality First 4.9250 7.7386 
Market Price First 6.1870 7.6458 
 
2.14.4 Appendix IV 
Computation of the rank of WTA/WTP in the quality price distribution 
To find the rank of WTA/WTP in the quality price distribution, we require the equation 
of a straight line that passes through two points (𝑥1, 𝑦1) and (𝑥2, 𝑦2), as we use linear 
interpolation in our calculation. The general equation for a straight line is simply 
𝑦 = 𝑚𝑥 + 𝑏 
Because the line passes through both points, we have the two conditions: 
𝑦1 = 𝑚𝑥1 + 𝑏 
𝑦2 = 𝑚𝑥2 + 𝑏 
Solving the system of simultaneous equations gives 𝑦2 − 𝑦1 = 𝑚(𝑥2 − 𝑥1) which 
allows us to find the slope as 
𝑚 = (𝑦2 − 𝑦1)/𝑥2 − 𝑥1 = ∆𝑦/∆𝑥 
To find the value of 𝑏, we substitute the value of 𝑚 back in to the equation with 𝑥 =
𝑥1 and 𝑦 = 𝑦1, and we find the relationship 
𝑦1 =
(𝑦2 − 𝑦1)
(𝑥2 − 𝑥1)
𝑥1 + 𝑏 
Which allows us to solve for 𝑏 as  
𝑏 = 𝑦1 −
(𝑦2 − 𝑦1)
(𝑥2 − 𝑥1)
𝑥1 
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This gives us the equation for the straight line between two points 
𝑦 =
(𝑦2 − 𝑦1)
(𝑥2 − 𝑥1)
𝑥 + 𝑦1 −
(𝑦2 − 𝑦1)
(𝑥2 − 𝑥1)
𝑥1 
Rearranging we find the convenient form 
𝑦 = 𝑦1 +
(𝑦2 − 𝑦1)
(𝑥2 − 𝑥1)
(𝑥 − 𝑥1) 
We use this formula to construct a linear interpolation which allows us to compute the 
rank of WTA/WTP in the quality price distribution. The scheme for this interpolation 
is shown by the diagram below. The values for the quality ranks are given as: 𝑞1 =
0.1, 𝑞2 = 0.5, 𝑞3 = 0.9, 𝑞𝑚 = 0.99. 
 
 
 
Depending on the value of WTA(P) we use one of four equations to determine the 
value of the rank, R. The equation we use is determined by the set of inequalities 
given below; where WTA stands for either WTA or WTP. 
𝑞1
= 0.1
𝑞2
= 0.5
𝑞3
= 0.9 
𝑞𝑚
= 0.99
0 𝑃1 𝑃2 𝑃3 𝑀𝑃 
𝐿1 
𝐿2 
𝐿3 
𝐿4 
𝑊𝑇𝐴(𝑃) 
𝑅 
173 
 
If 𝑊𝑇𝐴 ≤ 𝑃1 
𝑅 = 0 + (𝑞1 − 0)
(𝑊𝑇𝐴 − 0)
(𝑃1 − 0)
= 𝑞1
𝑊𝑇𝐴
𝑃1
 
If 𝑃1 < 𝑊𝑇𝐴 ≤ 𝑃2 
 
𝑅 =  𝑞1  + (𝑞2 − 𝑞1) 
(𝑊𝑇𝐴 − 𝑃1)
(𝑃2 − 𝑃1)
 
 𝑃2 < 𝑊𝑇𝐴 ≤ 𝑃3 
𝑅 = 𝑞2 + (𝑞3 − 𝑞2) 
(𝑊𝑇𝐴 − 𝑃2)
(𝑃3 − 𝑃2)
 
If 𝑃3 < 𝑊𝑇𝐴 ≤ 𝑀𝑃 
𝑅 = 𝑞3 + (𝑞𝑚 − 𝑞3)
(𝑊𝑇𝐴 − 𝑃3)
(𝑀𝑃 − 𝑃3)
 
 
As an example computation, suppose the LQP, QP and HQP of the participant were 
£3, £7 and £10 respectively, and the maximum price, MP, was equal to £15. In this 
case, the CDF of the APD, which we denote 𝐹(𝑝) where 𝑝 is WTA(P), would be 
equal to: 
 
𝐹(𝑊𝑇𝐴) =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.1 ×𝑊𝑇𝐴
3
                   𝑖𝑓 𝑊𝑇𝐴 < 3
0.1 + 0.4 ×
(𝑊𝑇𝐴 − 3)
7 − 3
   𝑖𝑓 3 ≤ 𝑊𝑇𝐴 < 7
0.5 + 0.4 ×
(𝑊𝑇𝐴 − 7)
10 − 7
      𝑖𝑓 7 ≤ 𝑊𝑇𝐴 < 10
0.9 + 0.09 ×
(𝑊𝑇𝐴 − 10)
15 − 10
    𝑖𝑓 10 ≤ 𝑊𝑇𝐴 < 15
                1                        𝑖𝑓 𝑊𝑇𝐴 ≥ 15
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2.14.5 Appendix V 
Pairwise comparisons for all valuation measures in Study 2 
Table S10. Pairwise t-tests.  
Comparison df sd t p Confidence Interval 
Buyer Quality 
Seller Quality 
85 2.98 -0.64 0.526 
 
[-1.68; 0.86] 
Buyer Quality 
Buyer WTP 
42 3.17 
 
5.04 
 
<.001 
 
[1.46; 3.41] 
Buyer Quality  
Seller WTA 
85 3.26 
 
0.32 
 
0.746 
 
[-1.16; 1.62] 
Buyer Quality  
Buyer Market 
42 
 
2.38 
 
-0.75 0.456 [-1.00; 0.46] 
Buyer Quality  
Seller Market 
85 
 
3.08 
 
-1.16 
 
0.250 
 
[-2.08; 0.55] 
Seller Quality 
Buyer WTP 
85 2.60 5.09 
 
<.001 
 
[1.73; 3.95] 
Seller Quality 
Seller WTA 
43 
 
3.21 
 
1.31 0.198 
 
[-0.34; 1.61] 
Seller Quality 
Buyer Market 
85 
 
2.77 
 
0.23 
 
0.820 
 
[-1.05; 1.32] 
Seller Quality 
Seller Market 
43 2.73 
 
-0.87 
 
0.389 
 
[-1.19; 0.47] 
Buyer WTP 
Seller WTA 
85 2.92 
 
-3.53 
 
<.001 
 
[-3.45; -1.00] 
Buyer WTP 
Buyer Market 
42 2.53 
 
-7.01 
 
<.001 
 
[-3.48; -1.93] 
Buyer WTP 
Seller Market 
85 2.72 
 
-5.49 <.001 
 
[-4.36; -2.04] 
Seller WTA 
Buyer Market 
85 
 
3.07 
 
-0.76 0.451 
 
[-1.81; 0.81] 
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Comparison df sd t p Confidence Interval 
Seller WTA 
Seller Market 
43 2.40 -2.75 
 
0.009 [-1.72; -0.26] 
Buyer Market 
Seller Market 
85 2.88 
 
-0.80 0.426 
 
[-1.72; 0.73] 
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Perceptions of Income and Wealth Inequality, Ranks 
and Subjective Well-Being 
 
 
 
“An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all 
republics.”-Plutarch.  
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3.1 Introduction 
It is important to understand the effects of economic inequality on a societal and 
on an individual level and to determine whether or how it affects citizens’ well-being. 
Nevertheless, it must be the case that subjective perceptions of inequality matter, and 
one motivation for the research in the present chapter is the possibility that the small 
or absent effects of inequality in the subjective well-being literature reflect the fact 
that perceptions of inequality differ from reality, and/or that individual differences 
exist in those perceptions. In fact, it appears that there is no research connecting 
perceived inequality to subjective measures of well-being. Moreover, the few studies 
that have measured people’s perceptions of inequality and compared them to objective 
measures have come to different conclusions. 
The aims of this chapter are therefore multiple. We develop a new methodology 
to allow us to ask (a) whether perceptions of inequality differ from reality, (b) what 
individual differences predict perceptions of inequality (e.g., personal income/wealth, 
age, gender and political ideology), and (c) whether subjective inequality might 
predict subjective well-being. We do this in two separate inequality domains: income 
inequality (Study 1) and wealth inequality (Study 3) which are often treated as 
identical in the literature. We also conducted a re-test study (Study 2) in order to 
investigate how or if our measure of perceived inequality changed over time within 
individuals as well as to check for changes in other individual measurements between 
the original (Study 1) and the re-test study (Study 2).  
3.2 Economic Inequality 
Rising inequality has become one of the defining economic and social issues of 
the twenty first century. Since the 1970s, economic inequality in the United States has 
steadily risen (Piketty & Saez, 2003). High inequality is associated with many social 
ills, such as an increased death rate (Zheng, 2012), reduced social mobility (Kraus & 
Tan, 2015) decline in health (Pickett & Wilkinson, 2015), lower productivity (Norton, 
2014), economic instability (Krugman, 2010) and reduced political equality (Solt, 
2008). In recent years, economic inequality has become increasingly relevant in 
British and American political discourse, being cited as one of the critical issues in the 
178 
 
2016 US Presidential Election (Darvas & Efstathiou, 2016), as well as being a possible 
factor behind the decision of the United Kingdom electorate to leave the European 
Union (Goodwin, 2016). 
3.3 Inequality and its Relationship to Societal and Individual 
Well-Being 
On a societal level, there is an overwhelming amount of evidence that, at least in 
developed nations, higher economic inequality leads to a plethora of social ills 
(Wilkinson & Pickett, 2011). For example, there is evidence that higher economic 
inequality leads to increased death rates (Kennedy 1996, Zheng, 2012); increased 
homicide rates (Daly, Wilson, & Vasdev, 2001) and general crime rates (Fajnzylber, 
Lederman, & Norman, 2002); higher levels of infant mortality (Wilkinson & Pickett, 
2011); reduced social mobility (Kraus & Tan, 2015); decline in health13, including 
increased obesity and calorie consumption levels (Pickett, Kelly, Brunner, Lobstein, 
& Wilkinson, 2005); economic instability (Krugman, 2010); reduced political equality 
(Solt, 2008), and decreased levels of trust and cooperation (Kawachi Kennedy, 
Lochner, & Prothrow-Stith, 1997; Paskov & Dewilde, 2012) as well as increased 
political polarisation (McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2006) among others.  
It seems natural to suppose that because income inequality has such wide-ranging 
negative effects on a society that there should be a corresponding effect of income 
inequality on individual well-being. Indeed, reports of subjective well-being measures 
have been found to correlate positively and strongly with psychological and economic 
objective well-being measures (Oswald & Wu, 2010). However, evidence for such an 
effect is mixed. Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2004) found a negative 
relationship between inequality and happiness in European countries, with no 
corresponding significant result for the US. Within European countries, wealthy 
individuals’ happiness was not affected by income inequality while poor individuals’ 
happiness was negatively affected. Within the US, poor individuals reported higher 
happiness levels with increasing income inequality, while for wealthy individuals, 
                                                 
13 Although Pop, Van Ingen & Van Oorschot (2012) and Lynch et.al 2004 found no such effects on population 
health for highly developed countries but only for low and middle developed countries with the exception of U.S.A. 
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inequality had no effect. Oishi, Kesebir and Diener (2011) analysed 40 years of 
longitudinal US data, finding that lower self-reported happiness was associated with 
increased inequality. Hagerty (2000) studied the relationship between happiness and 
income inequality at a community level in the United States as well as in 8 other 
countries over a 25-year period. He specifically investigated the effects of range and 
skewness of the income distribution, finding a negative relationship between these and 
happiness. Oshio and Kobayashi (2011) found the same relationship for a randomly 
chose sample of Japanese districts. Their study also revealed that inequality had the 
biggest effect on those who did not have stable employment and were already low on 
happiness rates. Tomes (1986) offered more evidence of individual related differences, 
showing that income inequality decreased the subjective well-being of females in 
Canada but increased that of males. Using data from the European and World values 
surveys from 84 countries, Verme (2011) found that income inequality had a negative 
effect on life satisfaction, though the relationship was not robust to the introduction of 
fixed effects of country and year. 
Several other studies have found an opposite effect. Clark (2003), using the 
British Household Panel Survey, found a positive relationship between income 
inequality and happiness. Berg and Veenhoven (2010) also found a positive 
relationship between income inequality and a variety of happiness measures in a study 
of 119 countries. O’Connell (2004), using European Community Household Panel 
data, found a positive relationship between income inequality and life satisfaction. In 
developing nations, both Ott (2005) and Helliwell and Huang (2008) found a positive 
association between subjective well-being and income inequality, with no such effects 
found for wealthy countries. Senik (2004) found increased happiness among Russian 
individuals whose reference’s group income had increased. However, overall, she did 
not find an effect of inequality. 
There have also been studies finding a negligible relationship between well-being 
and income inequality. Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2008) found, by utilising 
longitudinal data over 5 years across 60 countries, that the skewness of a country’s 
income distribution did not affect the happiness of its citizens. Fahey and Smyth 
(2004) found that inequalities in European societies had little effect on life satisfaction 
but the effects were significant within poorer European societies. Grosfeld and Senik 
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(2010) argued that the effect of inequality on well-being has reversed over time in 
Poland.  
A recent review by Kelley and Evans (2017a) found no effect of income inequality 
on subjective well-being in developed nations. Their study used data from 68 countries 
between 1981-2009 from the pooled World Values/European Values Surveys with 
more than 200,000 respondents. Kelley and Evans (2017b) also found no effect of 
inequality on happiness for rich nations but for developing nations there was a slight 
increase attributed to foreshadowing future prosperity. The recent meta-analysis by 
Ngamaba, Panagioti, and Armitage (2017; included 24 studies between 1980-2017) 
found that the relationship between income inequality and subjective well-being was 
very close to zero and not significant and remained nonexistent even if the subjective 
well-being measure, or the geographic region was changed.  
So far there have been very few efforts to understand these mixed results. One 
explanation proposed by Verme (2011) is the collinearity problems relating to the use 
and choice of country and year effects. Alesina et al. (2004) and Clark (2003) tried to 
explain their findings by utilising the idea of the “tunnel effect”14 (Hirschmann & 
Rothschild, 1973). They related this concept to people’s perceptions about social 
mobility and anticipation of future earnings which can lead the poor in believing that 
opportunities exist to increase their incomes even under high inequalities. 
Recently, Brown, Boyce and Wood (2018) also addressed this paradox, arguing 
that a rank-based model of well-being and income predicted an interaction effect of 
income inequality on the relationship between income and subjective well-being. 
Indeed, in their inter-country study they found that the relationship between income 
and well-being was stronger in countries with more equal income distributions. Their 
approach originated with the notion that the driver of the relationship between income 
and well-being is comparative, rather than absolute; that rank of income, rather than 
income itself is important.  
To summarise, the results are mixed as to whether inequality affects subjective 
well-being. Moreover, even if studies find negative relationships between these 
                                                 
14 There is a traffic jam in a tunnel, although your lane is not moving, you can see the lane next to you slowly 
moving increasing your belief that you are too not going to be stationary soon. Therefore, paying attention to future 
progress you can make compared to noticing that others are doing better than you (in traffic terms). 
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variables, the effects have been small or even absent compared to what one would 
expect by knowing the degree of the adverse effects of inequality on society. Perhaps, 
this is because almost all studies have used objective, rather than subjective, measures 
of inequality. 
3.4 Income, Rank of Income and Individual Well-being  
Although the effects of inequality on well-being have not been clearly established, 
effects of income on well-being have been widely documented and hence income is a 
necessary factor to consider alongside income inequality. Moreover, as with 
inequality, perceptions of income distributions may influence the relation between 
income and well-being to the extent that perception of relative, rather than absolute, 
income determines well-being. 
It is well established (Easterlin, 1974) that there is a strong within-country 
relationship between income and subjective well-being at a point. This relationship 
persists in more recent studies. For example, Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) found, 
using 2007 Gallup data, that there was a strong relationship between life satisfaction 
and income in the United States, with no satiation point even at high incomes 
($500,000). Sacks, Stevenson and Wolfers (2010) found similar results.  
The relationship between income and subjective well-being is far from 
straightforward however. Easterlin’s paradox (Easterlin, 1974) notes that within a 
country subjective well-being does not grow over time, despite increases in 
incomes/GDP over that period. Indeed, there is evidence that the relationship between 
income and well-being is comparative, rather than absolute; driven by a comparison 
with a group rather than the absolute level of income itself. For example, Clark and 
Oswald (1996) found that people derive higher satisfaction from having a high income 
in comparison with others. Furthermore, Luttmer (2005) found that individuals’ 
happiness increased as their income increased in comparison with their neighbours’. 
Brown, Gardner, Oswald and Qian (2008), using both survey data and laboratory 
experiments, found that the relative rank of a person’s wage predicted their satisfaction 
with their wage. More generally, Boyce, Brown and Moore (2010), using data from 
the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), found that the rank of an individual’s 
income, rather than their income itself, better predicted life satisfaction, particularly 
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when the ranks were taken within relevant geographic, gender, education and age 
reference groups. Similar results have also been found by Clark and Senik (2012) 
regarding the relationship between well-being and income rank in Chinese villages, as 
well as Clark, Westergård-Nielsen and Kristensen (2009), who found that income rank 
within one’s neighborhood had a positive effect on subjective well-being.  
Despite satisfaction and perceptions, concerns with relative rank have also been 
shown to affect reward activity in the brain (Fliessbach et al., 2007) ill-health in 
humans and animals (Sapolsky, 2005), as well as subjective judgments of diverse 
quantities within a comparison set (Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006). It is therefore 
important to also document its influence on well-being and not just concentrate on the 
effects of inequality or perceived inequality of income/wealth.  
3.5 Perceptions of Inequality –Literature and Methodologies 
Many studies have examined the relationship between actual levels of economic 
inequality in various countries and measures other than subjective well-being, such as 
education, health and other important societal and individual outcomes. However, 
individuals’ decision-making and choices must necessarily be influenced by their own 
subjective perceptions of inequality rather than objective inequality. More 
importantly, while the ills of inequality suggest that it is in the interest of most societies 
to reduce inequality, society must be able to perceive the inequality (and reductions in 
it) in order to be influenced by it. Indeed, Gimpelson and Treisman (2015) argue that 
discussion of the political effects of inequality should be replaced by discussion of the 
political effects of perceived inequality. In addition, Cansunar (2016) argues that, 
when making decisions about taxation policies, individuals depend upon their 
(inaccurate) perceptions of income inequality and their position within a perceived 
income distribution.  
Perhaps then the absent or negligible effects of inequality in the subjective well-
being literature discussed previously reflect perceptions of inequality that differ from 
reality, and/or individual differences in those perceptions. It is therefore important to 
guide our research efforts towards an accurate elicitation and understanding of these 
perceptions and their relationship with objective measures. Unfortunately, research 
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has mainly focused on the effects of actual levels of income inequality, with the 
literature on the perceptions of inequality being new and relatively small. 
Studies consistently show, that measures of perceived economic equality differ 
greatly from objective measured values (Gimpelson & Treisman, 2015; Brunori, 2015; 
Engelhardt & Wagener, 2014) and indeed vary also between studies of differing 
methodology. In a controversial paper, Norton and Ariely (2011) (see also Norton, 
Neal, Govan, Ariely & Holland, 2014 for an Australian study) found that Americans 
dramatically underestimated (by a factor of more than ten) the true level of wealth 
inequality when asked what they perceived to be the percentage of wealth held by each 
wealth quintile (the definition of net worth was used). Underestimation of inequality 
was also found in when people stated their beliefs about the ratio of pay between CEOs 
and workers in a cross-national study by Kiatpongsan and Norton (2014). Less 
dramatic underestimation of wealth inequality was found by Eriksson and Simpson 
(2012, 2013), who modified the methodology of Norton and Ariely (2011) to elicit 
average wealth in each quintile, rather than percentage of total wealth in each quintile, 
and who argued that the dramatic underestimation of wealth inequality was due, in 
part, to methodological issues. Questions that ask for a percentage of total wealth may 
be more difficult than questions about average wealth. Moreover, if people have 
negative wealth, which some do, asking for a percentage of the total wealth the first 
quintile has would make people give positive values as percentages must be positive, 
while it could be for example that 25% of people are in debt. 
Moderate underestimation of income inequality was found by Page and Goldstein 
(2016), who elicited a probability mass function (PMF) for the perceived income 
distribution explicitly from each participant in their study. Nevertheless, such a 
method could introduce anchoring effects and thus biases in responses and their 
associated elicited distributions because participants were presented with prespecified 
income ranges that required them to indicate how much mass of the relevant 
distribution fell within each interval. In an inter-country study, Engelhardt and 
Wagener (2014) used data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) to 
construct a countrywide estimate, rather than estimates on an individual level, of 
perceived income inequality. In this survey, respondents had to indicate the diagram 
(income distribution) that best represented the society they live in, among five options 
that ranged between a very unequal society to a very equal society. Responses were 
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aggregated by country and formed a new diagram. Perceived inequality was then 
measured as the mean income to median income ratio of this diagram. In each country 
examined, the estimate was below the true value. Using a similar methodology, 
Cruces, Perez-Truglia, and Tetaz (2013) found that the self-reported distribution of 
income ranks showed a lower degree of dispersion than the actual distribution. 
While the studies above find underestimation of economic inequality, several 
studies have in contrast shown that individuals overestimate the level of economic 
inequality. Chambers, Swan and Heesecker (2014) used a variety of methodologies 
including: eliciting the percentage of individuals with income in three intervals ($0-
$35,000, $35,000-$75,000, $50,000+); eliciting the ratio of the average income of the 
top 20% to the average income of the bottom 20% (the 20-20 ratio); asking forced-
choice questions regarding the income of the top 1% and bottom 1%, and eliciting the 
incomes of the top 20% and bottom 20% directly, as well as eliciting incomes of three 
high percentiles. Their results showed that individuals consistently overestimated 
income inequality in the USA, as well as the rise of income inequality over time. They 
also found a pattern of individuals overestimating the income of high percentile 
individuals (a pattern that is also observed in the present study). Kuhn (2015) used 
ISSP data to construct a measure of subjective income inequality from individuals’ 
estimates of the average wage for various professions, finding that, on aggregate, 
individuals overestimated income inequality. Engelhardt and Wagener (2016) 
presented Germans with several pre-generated income distribution diagrams, and 
asked participants which distribution best represented their country, and these authors 
also found that, on average, participants overestimated income inequality.  
A similar methodology was used in a cross-country study by Gimpelson and 
Treisman (2015) who presented participants with several pre-generated income 
distribution diagrams with known Gini coefficients, and asked participants which 
distribution best represented their country. They found that while perceived and actual 
Gini coefficients were correlated (r = 0.60), there was considerable error, both 
underestimation and overestimation, on a country-by-country basis. Further country 
dependence was found by Niehues (2014) who also used ISSP data to compare 
perceived income distributions to actual distributions and found that in many 
European countries individuals underestimated the number of people in the middle of 
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the income distribution, whereas Americans underestimated the number of people at 
the bottom of the income distribution.  
In conclusion, the results from the studies on perceptions of inequality are not 
clear and seem to be methodology dependent.  
3.6 Perceived Inequality and Individual Differences 
3.6.1 Income 
The absent or negligible effects of inequality on subjective well-being may be 
potentially caused by individual differences that might exist in the perceptions of 
inequality. Generally, it is assumed that wealthy individuals are opposed to wealth 
redistribution (e.g. Alesina & Giuliano, 2011; Kaltenthaler, Ceccoli & Gelleny, 2008; 
Cruces et al., 2013) and that there are rational economic reasons for their doing so, 
with the burden of redistribution falling mainly on the wealthy. Furthermore, in the 
USA, high income individuals perceive themselves as deserving of their wealth; 
indeed, Kreidl (2000) finds that high income Americans were more likely to reject 
structural and embrace individualistic causes of wealth. These results are in line with 
those of Kaltenthaler et al. (2008) who found that high income Europeans perceived 
lower inequality (measured as attitudes towards inequality). Perhaps then people’s 
attitudes towards inequality influence their perceptions of how much of it there is. 
Indeed, Page and Goldstein (2016) found that wealthy individuals overestimated the 
incomes of the poorest 90% of individuals. Similar results have also been found by 
Dawtry, Sutton and Sibley (2015) who found that individuals whose social circle was 
of high income perceived less inequality and Binelli, Loveless and Whitefield (2015) 
who found that urban based high-income individuals perceive less inequality. Despite 
this, the evidence is not unanimous. Norton and Ariely (2011) did not find statistically 
that the estimation of wealth inequality depended on the income of their respondents 
or other demographic characteristics.  
3.6.2 Ideology 
Turning now to ideology, Norton and Ariely’s 2011 paper found that liberals and 
conservatives had similar perceptions of wealth inequality, and similar results were 
also found by Chambers et al. (2014). Kaltenthaler et al. (2008) found that individuals 
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on the left were more likely than those on the right to suggest that eliminating big 
inequalities in income between citizens is important. Kraus and Tan (2015) found the 
conservatives were slightly more likely to overestimate social mobility compared to 
liberals. Also studying social mobility, Davidai and Gilovich (2015) and Chambers et 
al. (2014) found that conservative individuals perceived more social mobility 
compared to liberals. Using data from the International Social Survey Programme, 
Kuhn (2015) showed that those who identify with the political right perceived lower 
inequality, as measured by the average perceived salary of individuals in various 
professions. In Page and Goldstein (2016), out of all people with all political leanings, 
conservatives assigned the highest incomes to poorer individuals.  
3.7 Present Work 
3.7.1 Aim 1 
Among the studies on perceptions of inequality discussed previously some have 
elicited percentages of wealth or average wealth for quintiles and not the whole 
distribution (e.g. Norton & Ariely, 2011; Eriksson & Simpson, 2013). Others have 
elicited the whole distribution of incomes but simultaneously introduced possible 
anchoring effects (e.g. Page & Goldstein, 2016). Others have elicited average top and 
bottom incomes for specific percentiles of the distribution (e.g. Chambers et al., 2014). 
Many of them have used pre-generated income distribution diagrams, and asked 
participants to choose among these (e.g. Niehues, 2014). None of these methodologies 
produce results directly comparable to a robust measurement of economic inequality 
such as the Gini coefficient. Moreover, there is a huge misunderstanding in the 
literature when it comes to attitudes and perceptions of inequality, with elicited 
attitudes mistakenly translated to perceptions. Finally, the terms wealth and income 
inequality have been used interchangeably even within a single paper even when only 
one of these quantities was actually investigated in a study.  
In the present chapter we address these issues by eliciting estimates of the income 
distribution from participants, as well as estimates of the wealth distribution and hence 
deriving measures of income and wealth inequality.  
Using methods from relative rank theory we develop a new methodology allowing 
us to explore individuals’ perception of income and wealth inequality in a systematic 
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and comprehensive manner. Our methodology is robust, permits self-validation, and 
allows for the computation and use of more compact summary indices, such as the 
Gini coefficient. To obtain estimates of perceived income and wealth inequality we 
elicit estimates of income and wealth percentiles for individuals in the USA. The 
methodology is founded upon the concept that subjective judgements or estimates of 
quantities are influenced by the relative ranked position of the quantity within a 
context (Stewart, Chater & Brown, 2006), with quantities as diverse as fairness 
(Mellers, 1982) and prices (Niedrich, Sharma, & Wedell, 2001) for example, being 
determined partly by the relative ranked position they occupy within a comparison 
context. The distributions are elicited by presenting participants with a graphical 
representation, a tool that has been found to increase individuals understanding of 
probability distributions (Goldstein & Rothschild, 2014). 
Our methodology also leverages the insights of Eriksson and Simpson (2012, 
2013), who argued in favour of eliciting average wealth of individuals in a quintile 
rather than the percentage of total wealth in each quintile. In a similar manner, our 
methodology elicits the income and wealth of specific percentiles, rather than the 
percentage of total income/wealth in each percentile. Our methodology permits a self-
consistency check to validate and confirm its robustness. We compute a rank position 
for each individual within their own elicited income/wealth distribution. By 
comparing this rank position with an independently elicited subjective rank position 
(where individuals think they rank in the overall income/wealth distribution) we 
demonstrate that the elicited distributions accurately portray each individuals’ beliefs 
about the distribution of income/wealth in the USA.  
To foreshadow: using this methodology, we find that individuals consistently 
overestimate the incomes of individuals in each percentile, compared to the Census 
data for individual incomes. The perceived level of income inequality among our 
participants, as measured by the Gini coefficient of the elicited aggregate CDF, is only 
slightly higher than the measured value obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
and Census Bureau. In terms of wealth, we find that participants overestimate the 
wealth of the low percentiles, and of the highest percentile but accurately estimate the 
middle ones when judged against data from the Survey of Consumer Finance. We also 
find that the perceived level of wealth inequality among our participants, as measured 
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by the Gini coefficient of the elicited aggregate CDF, was very close to the actual US 
Gini for wealth. 
Using our elicited measures of perceived income and wealth inequality, we are 
also able to investigate the relationship between individual differences and perceived 
income and wealth inequality. The principal factors we investigated were personal 
income, age, gender and political ideology, as measured on a left-right spectrum as 
well as a conservatism scale that accounts for social and economic conservatism. Our 
findings indicate that high income/wealth individuals perceive lower levels of income 
inequality and wealth inequality in the society than low income/wealth individuals. 
We also show that conservative individuals perceive a lower degree of income/wealth 
inequality compared to less conservative individuals.  
3.7.2 Aim 2 
In the well-being literature presented above, most studies investigating the 
relationship between inequality and well-being use objective measures (actual levels) 
of inequality. Indeed, as noted by Bjørnskov, Dreher, Fischer, Schnellenbach, and 
Gehring (2013), it is often assumed that subjective perceptions and objective realities 
of fairness in society coincide, an assumption that is not necessarily supported by 
much of the evidence discussed above. In the same study Bjørnskov et al. (2013), 
using data from the World Values Survey, found that people who perceived the income 
generating process in their society to be fair had higher self-reported happiness. The 
issue of perception of fairness was also addressed by Alesina et al. (2004). These ideas 
are consistent with the notion that perceptions of inequality might affect well-being. 
In fact, it appears that there is remarkably little research connecting perceived 
inequality to subjective measures of well-being. Firstly, we know that not all people 
attend to or have the same information, so actual levels of inequality may not matter 
but perceptions might. Secondly, the mixed evidence regarding individual well-being 
and inequality may reflect individual differences in the perceptions of inequality. If 
people underestimate inequality for example, their perceptions are lower than reality, 
any effects of actual levels of inequality on an individual’s well-being might be 
underestimated. The opposite could also be true. Therefore, in this chapter, we also 
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examine the relationship between perceived income and wealth inequality and 
subjective well-being. This relationship has not been examined so far in the literature.  
Moreover, given the evidence discussed above that rank of income matters for an 
individual’s well-being more than income, we could ask: Is this also true compared to 
perceived inequality? What influences individuals’ subjective well-being the most? 
To foreshadow: we find, firstly, that an individual’s belief about their rank of 
income/wealth is a better predictor of their subjective well-being than their 
income/wealth. Indeed, while Norton (2013) claims that ‘all ranks are local’, it appears 
that individuals’ rank position within their perceived global income/wealth 
distribution is a better predictor than their personal income/wealth.  
While we find no relationship between perceived income/wealth inequality and 
affect measures, evaluative and aspirational measures of subjective well-being show 
some very marginal associations. Nevertheless, controlling for an individual’s belief 
regarding their rank of income/wealth diminishes these marginal effects.  
3.8 Study 1-Income Inequality 
3.8.1 Methodology 
3.8.1.1 Design 
In this study we developed a new method, based on work on eliciting distributions 
from other domains. These psychological studies have elicited distributions (inverse 
CDFs) similar to our account (however not utilizing a visual instrument or random 
ordering) (e.g. Aldrovandi, Wood, Maltby, & Brown, 2015; Melrose, Brown, & Wood 
2012) and showed how people’s perception of their relative ranked position in this 
perceived distribution predicts subjective judgements of quantities varying from 
mental distress to attitudes towards debt, perceptions of alcoholism and willingness to 
pay for healthy vs unhealthy foods.  
This elicitation allowed us to collect more detailed data about individuals’ 
perceived income distributions than previous studies. An additional feature of our 
methodology was the elicitation of incomes for the tails of the income distribution – 
the incomes of the top and bottom 1% of the population. These individuals, 
particularly the top 1%, have been the subject of much media attention in recent years, 
and this attention may have influenced participants’ beliefs due to availability bias. 
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3.8.1.2 Participants 
The experiment was conducted using the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform. Our 
sample consisted of 1003 participants subject to a United States location filter (Mage = 
36.6, 47.3% female). The experiment lasted on average 30 minutes and participants 
were paid $1 for completion.  
3.8.1.3 Procedure 
Prior to the elicitation of incomes participants were given instructions and a 
graphical representation of what would follow and what would be asked from them.  
Participants were told: 
“Look at the graphic below. Imagine that it represents the entire population of 
the USA. All residents are ordered from the poorest (left side of the graphic) to the 
richest (right side of the graphic). In other words, the leftmost person in the row has 
the lowest income, whereas the rightmost person has the highest income. 
On the next screen, we will ask you some questions about the incomes of other 
people.” 
 
The income distributions were elicited by asking participants for their estimate of the 
incomes of 11 different percentiles. An example of such a question is shown below: 
Figure 3.1. Example question shown to participants in Study 1. 
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“The red line points towards those whose income is higher than 10% of the US 
population, and lower than 90% of the US population. 
 
What do you think is the income of such a person (per year)?” 
 
Participants saw a series of these pictures for the different percentiles 1, 10, 20, 30, 
40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, and 99. The order of the questions was randomised for each 
participant. The elicited data were therefore in the form of an inverse cumulative 
distribution function for each participant. From these data we were then able to 
compute each participant’s perception of inequality in the form of the Gini coefficient 
as well as calculating the rank position of their own personal annual income in their 
perceived income distribution (inferred rank). We also elicited subjective measures of 
the participant’s income rank by asking them directly to choose into which percentile 
of the income distribution they fell (subjective rank).  
Participants were asked: 
“Think again about your own income, i.e. how much you earn per year (wages, 
salary, commissions, bonuses, tips). 
Where do you think you rank in terms of income (per year) comparing with the rest 
of the US population? Click on the picture to indicate your approximate position.” 
 
Figure 3.2. Subjective Rank question. 
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This allowed us to validate our methodology by examining the degree to which the 
two different measures of rank, inferred and subjective, coincided. 
We also elicited information about subjects’ well-being as well as their political 
ideology. These measurements allowed us to test the relationship between perceived 
inequality, rank, subjective well-being and political ideology. Political ideology was 
measured using the Everett scale (Everett, 2013) as well as a left to right scale ranging 
from very liberal to very conservative (“Please select which of the following best 
represents your views on politics today, where 1 represents extremely liberal and 7 
represents extremely conservative”). We also elicited political affiliation (Democrat, 
Republican, Independent and Other).  
Six measures of subjective well-being measured on 0-10 scale were elicited, 
including overall life satisfaction (“How satisfied are you with your life nowadays?”; 
used in the UK Office of National Statistics -ONS-, Annual Population Survey, 2012), 
happiness (“Overall, how happy did you feel yesterday?”; used in ONS, 2012 survey), 
anxiety on the previous day (“Overall, how anxious did you feel yesterday?”; used in 
ONS, 2012 survey), eudemonic well-being (“Overall, to what extent do you feel that 
the things you do in your life are worthwhile?”; used in ONS, 2012 survey) and two 
ladder estimates (Candril ladders used in Bjørnskov, 2010). Ladder 1 (“Look at the 
ladder presented below. Imagine that the top of the ladder represents the best possible 
life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you. On 
which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time?”), 
ladder 2 (“On which step do you think you will stand about five years from now?”). 
These measures were obtained at the beginning of the study as per the OECD 
guidelines on the investigation of subjective well-being (OECD, 2013) because 
introducing the experimental tasks first could have influenced responses on the well-
being questions. We included this set of measures also known as “core measures” 
which is the minimal set of life evaluation and affect measures of subjective well-
being shown to be valid and comparable by OECD (2013). 
Other questions asked in the beginning of the study included demographic 
information of age, gender annual personal income (“What is the total amount that you 
have earned in the last 12 months. This should include all wages, salary, commissions, 
bonuses or tips from all jobs in $”), and the CEO-worker index (“We would like to 
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know what you think people in particular jobs actually earn. Please write in how much 
you think they usually earn each year, before taxes. Many people are not exactly sure 
about this, but your best guess will be close enough. This may be difficult, but it is 
very important. So please try. How much do you think a chairman of a large national 
corporation earns per year? How much do you think an unskilled worker in a factory 
earns per year?”). This allowed us to obtain additional measures of income inequality, 
to compare with the Gini coefficients computed for each individual from the elicited 
income distributions.  
3.9 Results 
3.9.1 Measuring Aggregate Perceptions of Income Inequality 
The study was completed by 1003 participants. 279 individuals who stated that 
they had a yearly income less than $10,000 were excluded from all the analysis 
presented in this section15. This was due to the assumption that it would make little 
sense to examine the relationship between income and subjective well-being for 
individuals who either have no income or are likely to be surviving on supplements 
(e.g. food stamps). Moreover, these participants might not be similar to other income 
earners, representing part time employees or being unemployed. In the US the 
minimum wage is approximately $7 per hour, with individuals working part time 
earning around $12,000 per year. Therefore, we decided to exclude individuals with 
an income less than $10,000 as they might not have a job or might be working part 
time.  
Figure 3.3 shows the aggregate income distribution elicited from participants, 
computed as the median income in each percentile, along with the personal income 
distribution for 2015 taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and Census Bureau 
Current Population Survey (CPS)16 (personal income data which were given in 
intervals). The median was used rather than the mean as participants’ responses for 
each income percentile demonstrated high positive skew. 
                                                 
15 The analysis was also conducted with all participants included. The results obtained in this way did not differ 
qualitatively from those reported here and later in this chapter. 
16 Table PINC-01, http://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/cps-pinc/pinc-01.html. 
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Figure 3.3. Aggregate (median) estimated incomes for each percentile along with offset 
lognormal fit (solid line) and Personal Income distribution data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and the Census Bureau Current Population Survey (dashed line). 
 
Table 3.1. Elicited median incomes in dollars for all percentiles (k denotes thousands, M 
millions).  
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Table 3.1 above shows the median estimated income values for each elicited 
percentile in dollars for all participants in our study as well as for participants with 
reported income above $10,000. Note that the median incomes for each percentile are 
unchanged if all participants are included. 
We found that in each income percentile, individuals consistently overestimated 
the income compared to the CPS personal income distribution (by a factor of 
approximately 2 between the 20th and 60th percentiles). To evaluate the Gini 
coefficient of the elicited aggregate income distribution we fitted an offset lognormal 
distribution to the data. The offset lognormal distribution is given as a regular 
lognormal distribution, with all values increased by a constant 𝜃 so that the PDF is 
defined on the interval [𝜃,∞). This distribution was fitted to both the median data and 
the individual-level data (see also Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6), and the particular 
parametric form was chosen because, while it is established that lognormal 
distributions are good approximations to income distributions, the data suggested that 
many participants’ elicited income distributions would be best fit by a distribution 
whose lowest value was greater than zero. We note that the offset lognormal and 
standard lognormal distributions form nested models, so for example, an individual 
that gives an income of 0 for the first percentile would be best fit by a standard 
lognormal distribution (𝜃 = 0).  
The elicited distributions consisted of incomes for eleven pre-determined 
percentiles, and were thus points on the inverse CDF curve of the income distribution. 
To estimate the parameters, we fitted our target function (inverse CDF) to the data 
using non-linear least squares. We found an excellent fit17 to the median data, with R2 
= 0.9998. We calculated the analytic formula for the Gini coefficient of this 
distribution starting from the standard formula for the lognormal distribution and 
adapted it to account for the constant 𝜃 (see 3.17.1 Appendix I). The Gini coefficient 
obtained from this procedure was equal to 0.6163, which is a little greater than the 
CPS reported Gini of 0.519 for personal income data. Note that this value of 0.6163 
was robust to the removal of, for example, the 99th percentile data and or 90th 
percentile. 
                                                 
17 Parameter values: 𝜇 = 10.79, 𝜎 = 1.32, 𝜃 = 5890. 
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We also fitted the personal income CPS data to the offset lognormal distribution, 
see Figure 3.4. 
Figure 3.4. Offset lognormal fit (solid line) to Personal Income distribution data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Census Bureau Current Population Survey. 
 
The Gini coefficient for this fit was equal to 0.5578 with an R2 = 0.88975. By removing 
the first data point from the dataset, we found an improved fit. This was associated 
with a lower Gini coefficient of 0.5299, and a much better R2 of 0.95605. Note that 
this Gini coefficient is higher than the one quoted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
and Census Bureau which is 0.519 but the difference is only 0.01, confirming that our 
fitting method is valid.  
Note that we can evaluate participants’ accuracy both for the Gini coefficient and 
for income values for the different percentiles. If participants gave exactly half the 
income value for each percentile, Gini would be exactly the same numerically but 
perceived incomes would be lower. On the other hand, some elicited incomes could 
be close to actual values while at the same time the Gini coefficient could be different 
compared to the actual one.  
Figure 3.5 shows the aggregate income distribution elicited from participants, 
computed as the median income in each percentile, along with the personal income 
distribution for 2015 taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and Census Bureau 
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Current Population Survey (CPS), the CPS 2015 Household income data and the 
Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) 2016 data that contains income data from a 
mixture of households and individuals. We observe that participants gave very close 
estimates compared to the CPS household and SCF data at least for the middle 
percentages, although participants were asked to elicit individual incomes and not 
household incomes. Since we did not also elicit household income distributions from 
participants it is theoretically possible, although intuitively implausible, that 
participants could be perhaps arbitrary to deduct that participants were not able to 
differentiate between personal and household incomes. Note that participants still 
overestimated high end incomes even when their estimates were compared to 
household incomes.  
 
Figure 3.5. Aggregate (median) estimated incomes for each percentile along with offset 
lognormal fit (solid line), CPS Individual refers to the Current Population Survey data on 
Personal Incomes (Gini reported by Census 0.519), CPS Household refers to the Current 
Population Survey data on Household Incomes (Gini reported by Census 0.479), SCF refers 
to the Survey of Consumer Finance that has income data from a mixture of households and 
individuals.  
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3.9.2 Measuring Individual Perceptions of Income Inequality 
To measure inequality on an individual level, we estimated the Gini coefficients 
of the income distributions elicited by participants in the same manner as for the 
aggregate data. We note that the majority of participants did not give wholly consistent 
answers (stating that the income of the 40th percentile was lower than the income of 
the 20th percentile, for example) and because of this not all participants’ responses 
could be well fit, especially for those from whom we elicited a particularly non-
monotonic income distribution (as measured by the Kendall tau coefficient). 
Therefore, to ensure estimates of this Gini coefficient and other quantities derived 
from this distribution were reliable, we included only those individuals for whom we 
found an adequate fit. To measure goodness of fit we used the standard R2 measure. 
We included only individuals with an R2 bigger than 0.9 in all subsequent analysis. 
This resulted in a sample of 551 individuals out of 724 individuals whose income was 
higher than $10,00018.   
Figure 3.6 shows example fits obtained with this method for participants with a 
range of distribution shapes and Gini coefficients, demonstrating that this method is 
flexible enough to capture a variety of distributions.  
Figure 3.7 shows the distribution of Gini coefficients for the participants in our 
study with stated income above $10,000 and R2 > 0.9. The median Gini coefficient 
was 0.6567 and the mean 0.6669, both of which are slightly higher than the values for 
the aggregate case. Indeed, the majority (417/551) of individuals’ estimated 
distributions had a Gini coefficient greater than that of the CPS personal income data, 
showing that individuals consistently overestimated the Gini coefficient. 
 
 
                                                 
18 The analysis was also conducted for different cutoffs of R2; R2 > 0.7, R2 > 0.8 but such changes did not result 
in any qualitative differences in these or any of the following results.  
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Figure 3.6. Example results of fitting an offset lognormal distribution to elicited Income 
distributions for four participants with differing levels of perceived Inequality measured by 
the Gini coefficient. 
 
Figure 3.7. Distribution of Gini coefficients for participants with Personal Income greater 
than $10,000 and R2 >0.9. Gini coefficients computed by fitting an offset lognormal 
distribution to the elicited inverse CDF. Mean Gini coefficient found to be 0.6669, median 
0.6567. 
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3.9.3 Comparing our Measure of Income Inequality  
To evaluate the robustness of our method for calculating the Gini coefficient we 
compared it to participants’ estimates of the CEO-worker measure of inequality. 
However, we do not believe that the CEO-worker measure is likely to be a valid 
measure of perceived inequality as people may bring to mind, using an availability 
heuristic, famous examples of CEO’s like Bill Gates or Mark Zuckerberg resulting in 
high overestimations of inequality. In our study individuals’ estimates of the income 
for an average CEO and average worker were elicited. To facilitate easy comparison 
with the Gini coefficient, we used the following inequality CEO-Worker (CW) index: 
𝐶𝑊 = 1 −
𝐼𝑊𝑅𝐾
𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑂
 , 
equal to one minus the ratio of the income of the worker to the income of the CEO. In 
this way, perfect equality, where the worker and CEO receive the same income, 
corresponds to 𝐶𝑊 = 0 and perfect inequality, where the worker earns nothing and 
the CEO earns everything corresponds to 𝐶𝑊 = 1, as in the case of the Gini 
Coefficient. We found that the Gini coefficient and this index were positively 
correlated within an individual (rs = 0.260, p < .001). Taking instead the log of the 
worker’s income and the log of the CEO’s income, we again found that the Gini 
coefficient and this index were positively correlated within an individual (rs = 0.249, 
p < .001).  
Instead of using the individual Gini coefficient, we also compared the CW ratios 
of individuals with the ratios of incomes elicited for different percentiles. Three ratios 
were used to compare with the CW ratios, the 99th to the 1st percentile, the 90th to 
the 10th percentile and the 80th to the 20th. Correlation coefficients of these ratios and 
the CW ratio are shown in Table 3.2.19  
 
 
                                                 
19 Note that only individuals who estimated that the income of a CEO was equal or greater than that of a worker 
were used in all the relevant calculations.  
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Table 3.2. Spearman’s correlation coefficients between CEO/Worker ratio and various 
elicited percentile ratios. Coefficients are all significant at p < .001.  
Percentile ratio 99/1 90/10 80/20 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
0.274 0.197 0.145 
 
3.9.4 Where Do the Different Perceptions about Percentiles Come From? 
 
Figure 3.8. Median estimated incomes for different elicited percentiles by equally split 
Income groups. 
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There was a degree of heterogeneity in participants’ perceptions of inequality. 
Where do these differences in perceptions come from when it comes to income levels? 
Each graph in Figure 3.8 corresponds to a different percentile (0.01, 0.2, 0.3 etc. as 
used in our study). Each of the five groups, or quintiles, corresponds to the individuals 
with income in the bottom 20%, 20%-40%, 40%-60%, 60%-80% 80%-100% of our 
sample. This meant that each group had the same number of individuals, based on their 
personal income. We then took the median elicited income values for each group. The 
black line is the reference income from the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF). We 
used the SCF data as reference here because the CPS personal income and household 
data give incomes in intervals. The main effect of participant income is evident in the 
estimates of the high percentiles (0.8, 0.9, 0.99), where we see that group in quintile 1 
gave the highest estimates for the income and correspondingly group 4 and 5 gave the 
lowest estimates. Also, for the first percentile, group 1 gave the lowest estimates 
compared to the other groups. This implies that lower income individuals should 
perceive more income inequality which is what we report later (see Table 3.4 and 
Table 3.5) by using a continuous scale for personal income and avoiding issues of 
aggregation. 
3.9.5 Individual Differences in Perceptions of Income Inequality 
Figure 3.9 shows the relationship between individuals’ computed Gini 
coefficients and their reported personal income. We see a negative relationship, with 
a correlation coefficient of r = 0.110 (p = .009). We find that distributions elicited 
from higher income individuals displayed lower levels of inequality than those elicited 
from individuals with lower incomes.  
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Figure 3.9. Income versus Gini Coefficient. 
 
To understand the effect of individual differences between participants more 
fully, we performed an analysis incorporating demographic information, age and 
gender, as well as measures of political ideology. To measure political ideology, we 
used the Everett scale of conservatism (Everett, 2013), which yields two estimates of 
conservatism, economic and social, which can be combined to form an overall 
measure of conservatism. We also used a left-right scale, measuring political ideology 
from very liberal to very conservative. We note that two individuals did not 
successfully complete the Everett scale questions and so were excluded from this 
analysis20. Table 3.3 shows the correlations between the predictor variables. There 
were no significant collinearities outside of the measures of political ideology, which 
we expected to be heavily correlated.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 This accounts for the slight difference between the income/Gini correlation coefficient in Table 3.3 and that 
reported in the text. 
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Table 3.3. Pearson’s (Spearman’s) correlation matrix between variables for the regression 
reported in Table 3.4.  
 Age Gender Social Economic Overall Left-
Right 
Ideology  
Gini 
Income 0.032 
(0.097) 
-0.099 
(-0.122) 
0.116 
(0.128) 
0.066 
(0.092) 
0.109 
(0.123) 
0.091 
(0.124) 
-0.112 
(-0.112) 
Age 
 
0.089 
(0.070) 
0.291 
(0.278) 
0.102 
(0.102) 
0.248 
(0.241) 
0.165 
(0.136) 
0.055 
(0.066) 
Gender 
  
0.111 
(0.107) 
-0.046 
(-0.063) 
0.061 
(0.051) 
-0.087 
(-0.096) 
0.038 
(0.039) 
Social 
   
0.573 
(0.567) 
0.944 
(0.944) 
0.674 
(0.662) 
-0.106 
(-0.088) 
Economic 
    
0.812 
(0.799) 
0.701 
(0.698) 
-0.115 
(-0.120) 
Overall 
     
0.763 
(0.752) 
-0.122 
(-0.111) 
Left-Right 
Ideology 
      
-0.126 
(-0.110) 
 
The results of an OLS regression of individual Gini coefficients against the 
demographics, income and political ideology measures are shown in Table 3.4 with 
the results for an equivalent quantile regression shown in Table 3.5. Apart from 
gender, the estimated coefficient for each predictor was found to be significant. The 
results of Figure 3.9 are reproduced — we once again see that higher income is 
associated with a lower measured Gini coefficient. Furthermore, we find that higher 
levels of conservatism are associated with a lower measured Gini coefficient. The 
magnitude of the OLS regression coefficient for the overall conservatism measure is -
0.001288, meaning that, as measured by the Everett scale, an extreme liberal (overall 
conservatism = 0) and an extreme conservative (overall conservatism = 100) differ in 
their perceived Gini coefficients by approximately 0.13. As an example, this 
difference is approximately equal to the difference in the Gini coefficient of household 
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income between the USA (45.0) and Canada (32.1) for 2007 (values taken from the 
CIA World Factbook21). 
Table 3.4. OLS regression results for Gini coefficient (*** denotes p <.05, standard errors in 
parentheses). 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Income -6.565e-07*** 
(2.863e-07) 
-6.507e-07*** 
(2.865e-07) 
-7.042e-07*** 
(2.850e-07) 
-6.520e-07*** 
(2.857e-07) 
-6.829e-07*** 
(2.850e-07) 
      
Age 1.388e-03*** 
(7.029e-04) 
1.457e-03*** 
(7.014e-04) 
1.093e-03* 
(6.771e-04) 
1.420e-03*** 
(6.925e-04) 
1.251e-03*** 
(6.825e-04) 
      
Gender 1.030e-03 
(1.648e-02) 
1.315e-02 
(1.635e-02) 
6.276e-03 
(1.630e-02) 
1.103e-02 
(1.626e-02) 
3.806e-03 
(1.633e-02) 
      
Social 
Conservatism 
-6.528e-04* 
(4.253e-04) 
-9.764e04*** 
(3.477e-04) 
   
      
Economic 
Conservatism 
-6.708e-04 
(5.102e-04) 
 -1.123e-03*** 
(4.173e-04) 
  
 
Overall 
Conservatism 
    
-1.288e-03*** 
(4.164e-04) 
 
 
Left-Right 
Ideology 
     
-1.464e-02*** 
(4.917e-03) 
R2 Multiple 0.0336 0.03053 0.0294 0.03346 0.03225 
R2 Adjusted 0.02472 0.02341 0.02228 0.02637 0.02515 
DoF 545 546 546 546 546 
 
                                                 
21 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2172.html. 
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Table 3.5. Quantile regression results for Gini coefficient (*** denotes p <0.05, standard 
errors in parentheses). 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Income -7.974e-
07*** 
(3.983e-07) 
-7.927e-
07*** 
(3.983e-07) 
-7.763e-07** 
(3.987e-07) 
-7.962e-
07*** 
(3.96126e-07) 
-8.669e-
07*** 
(4.008e-07) 
      
Age 0.00120 
(0.00099) 
0.00153* 
(0.00203) 
0.00115 
(0.00098) 
0.00129 
(0.00101) 
0.00160* 
(0.00102) 
      
Gender 0.01297 
(0.02639) 
0.01991 
(0.02596) 
0.01154 
(0.02576) 
0.01751 
(0.49561) 
0.00489 
(0.02595) 
      
Social 
Conservatism 
-0.00007 
(0.00068) 
-0.00100** 
(0.00057) 
   
      
Economic  
Conservatism 
-0.00200* 
(0.00082) 
 -0.00201*** 
(0.00068) 
  
 
Overall 
Conservatism 
    
-0.00146*** 
(0.00068) 
 
 
Left-Right 
Ideology 
     
-0.01658*** 
(0.00811) 
Koenker and 
Machado R2 22  
0.0237269 0.01634415 0.02371589 0.01968813 0.01834235 
DoF 545 546 546 546 546 
 
                                                 
22 Goodness of fit measure defined in Koenker and Machado (1999). 
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While conservative individuals perceive there to be less inequality, these results 
did not extend to political allegiance. A one-way ANOVA was run, examining the 
difference in Gini coefficients between participants of different political allegiance 
(Republican, Democrat, Independent and No Preference). No significant differences 
were found (F (3, 547) = 1.19, p = 0.314) between their perceived Gini coefficients. 
3.9.6 Measuring Inferred, Subjective and Objective Ranks of Income 
Our study elicited both an individual’s perceived income distribution and their 
individual income. With our fitted distributions we were therefore able to compute an 
inferred income rank for each individual by computing their rank position within the 
fitted CDF. To calculate the rank, let xi be the income of individual i, and 𝐹 the fitted 
offset lognormal CDF; then the rank of individual i is given by the formula  
𝑟𝑖 = 𝐹(𝑥𝑖). 
We will denote this measure inferred rank. We also elicited a rank measure 
explicitly for each participant, asking where they felt their income ranked within the 
countrywide distribution of personal incomes. We term this measure the subjective 
rank. The subjective rank is given in 12 steps. If we suppose that the first step 
corresponds to a rank of 0.01 and the final step corresponds to a rank of 0.99, then we 
have 10 steps to fit the middle. These each were separated by a spacing of 0.98/11 = 
0.0890909 and we thereby obtained a set of 12 ranks. Finally, using the CPS personal 
income data we computed an objective rank for each individual, quantifying their 
actual rank position within the income distribution of the USA by matching the 
reported income of each individual to the corresponding percentile interval on the 
curve in Figure 3.3. Because the CPS personal income data do not record detailed 
information about income above $100,000, we could not compute detailed objective 
rank information for individuals with income above this value, and we set their rank 
to be equal to the rank that corresponded to an income of $100,000. 33 participants in 
our study reported an income above $100,000. 
Histograms of the three rank measures are shown in Figure 3.10. We see that 
while inferred and subjective ranks have similar shapes, the histogram of objective 
rank is different. A one-way ANOVA showed that the means of these measures were 
indeed significantly different (F (2, 1650) = 233.27, p < .01). Post-hoc t-tests revealed 
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that this difference came from the fact that the mean of the objective rank (0.6163) 
was significantly different (p < .001) from both the subjective rank (0.3942) and the 
inferred rank (0.4030). The means of subjective and inferred rank were not found to 
be significantly different.  
 
Figure 3.10. Histograms of the three Rank measures. 
 
3.9.7 Evaluating our Measure of Income Inequality 
One way to evaluate our methodology of measuring perceptions of inequality is 
to look at the relationship between subjective rank and inferred rank. Strong 
correlations would indicate that our methodology captured in fact an individual’s 
internally stored beliefs about the income distribution.  
Figure 3.11 illustrates the relationship between subjective and inferred rank, 
where we observe a strong positive linear relationship, further confirming the strength 
of the inferred rank measure. Subjective and inferred rank were also found to be highly 
correlated with personal income. These indicate that our methodology and the 
associated inferred rank are robust and valid measures. 
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Figure 3.11. Subjective versus Inferred Rank. 
Table 3.6 shows the correlation matrix for the three measures of rank, as well as 
personal income. All measures were found to be highly correlated with each other (all 
correlations significant at p < .01). We note that because objective rank and personal 
income give the same ranking of individuals (if individual A has greater income than 
individual B, then individual A’s objective rank is also greater than individual B), the 
Spearman’s correlation coefficient between subjective rank and personal income is the 
same as that between subjective rank and objective rank (the same holds for the 
inferred rank measure). 
Table 3.6. Correlation matrix between Inferred Rank, Subjective Rank, Objective Rank and 
Personal Income. All correlations were significant at p < .01. Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients with Spearman’s in parentheses. 
 Inferred Rank Personal Income Objective Rank 
Subjective Rank 0.8489 
(0.8488) 
0.7498 
(0.8221) 
0.8006 
(0.8226) 
Inferred Rank  0.7897 
(0.8533) 
0.8388 
(0.8536) 
Personal Income   0.8658 
(0.9991) 
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3.9.8 Ranks, Income, Income Inequality and Analysis of Well-Being 
We turn to the analysis of individuals’ subjective well-being data. What best 
predicts different aspects of well-being? Is it income, subjective rank, inferred rank or 
perceived Gini? In the present section, we examined which of the rank measures 
(subjective, inferred, objective), income or income inequality (measured by an 
individual’s perceived Gini coefficient we calculated previously) is better at predicting 
various measures of subjective well-being. We also considered the logarithm of 
income as a potential predictor because people’s utility might increase as a function 
of income but not do so linearly. We used six measures of well-being: overall life 
satisfaction, eudemonic well-being, measures of individual’s happiness and anxiety 
on the day prior to the study, as well as two ladder estimates (one representing one’s 
life from best to worst, the second one’s life in about five years from now). Figure 
3.12 shows the histograms for all the subjective well-being measures (with only 
anxiety being heavily negatively skewed) and Table 3.7 shows the correlations of the 
subjective well-being measures and some of the predictor variables. 
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Figure 3.12. Histograms for all Subjective Well-being measures. 
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Table 3.7. Pearson’s (Spearman’s) correlations between Well-being measures (correlations above 0.5 in bold). 
 
 
Happiness 
Yesterday 
Anxiety 
Yesterday 
Eudemonic Well-
being 
Ladder 1 Ladder 2 Personal 
Income 
Gini Age Gender 
Overall Life 
Satisfaction 
0.792 
(0.773) 
-0.497 
(-0.494) 
0.774 
(0.751) 
0.697 
(0.667) 
0.556 
(0.511) 
0.247 
(0.301) 
-0.066 
(-0.075) 
0.074 
(0.086) 
0.049 
(0.053) 
Happiness 
Yesterday 
 -0.583 
(-0.570) 
0.703 
(0.679) 
0.552 
(0.528) 
0.479 
(0.441) 
0.184 
(0.225) 
-0.039 
(-0.042) 
0.068 
(0.058) 
0.041 
(0.044) 
Anxiety 
Yesterday 
  -0.452 
(-0.458) 
-0.320 
(-0.288) 
-0.223 
(-0.206) 
-0.054 
(-0.101) 
0.004 
(-0.003) 
-0.122 
(-0.107) 
-0.018 
(-0.018) 
Eudemonic 
Well-being 
   0.602 
(0.564) 
0.610 
(0.540) 
0.210 
(0.216) 
-0.048 
(-0.046) 
0.110 
(0.117) 
0.059 
(0.049) 
Ladder 1     0.807 
(0.807) 
0.409 
(0.439) 
-0.091 
(-0.106) 
0.092 
(0.102) 
0.034 
(0.029) 
Ladder 2      0.333 
(0.334) 
-0.161 
(-0.1812) 
-0.038 
(-0.010) 
0.048 
(0.056) 
Personal 
Income 
      -0.112 
(-0.112) 
0.032 
(0.097) 
-0.099 
(-0.122) 
Gini        0.055 
(0.066) 
0.0381 
(0.039) 
Age         0.089 
(0.070) 
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To identify which of subjective rank, inferred rank, objective rank, income and 
perceived Gini best predicted each of these well-being measures, we ran a regression 
for each well-being measure, rank/income/perceived Gini pair, with each regression 
controlling for both age and gender. Note that Delta Rank is the difference between 
subjective and objective rank23. The rank/income/perceived Gini with the associated 
highest R2 was then considered as the best predictor for each of the subjective well-
being measures.  
The results of this procedure are shown in Table 3.8. Although income had a 
significant effect on all the measures besides anxiety, log of income seems to be a 
better predictor than income. Moreover, all rank measures were strong significant 
predictors of all the subjective well-being measures except anxiety. All five 
rank/income measures had the same relationship (in terms of direction) with each of 
the well-being measures. Gini on the other hand had the opposite relationship. We 
observe that perceived Gini had negative marginal effects on the evaluative measures 
of well-being (overall life satisfaction, ladder 1) and a significant effect on ladder 2; 
increasing Gini by 0.1 led to a 0.08 decrease in overall life satisfaction, 0.1 decrease 
in scores on ladder 1 and a 0.2 decrease in ladder 2. Nevertheless, Gini had no effect 
on any of the affect measures of well-being. 
We clearly see that subjective rank outperformed all other variables in predicting 
the subjective measures of well-being reported by our participants (based on the R2s). 
All well-being measures, except for anxiety, had a positive relationship with 
subjective rank. Increasing subjective rank by 0.1 increases overall life satisfaction by 
0.5, eudemonic well-being by 0.4, Happiness by 0.3, scores on ladder 1 by 0.6 and 
ladder 2 by 0.5. The relationship between subjective rank and anxiety was in the other 
direction; increasing subjective rank by 0.1 decreased reported levels of anxiety by 
0.2.  
                                                 
23 If the Delta Rank difference is positive, subjective rank is bigger than objective rank, an individual thinks she is 
more highly ranked than she is. If it is negative, then the individual thinks that her rank is lower than it actually is. 
As shown in Table U2 in  Appendix II, higher income individuals thought that their rank was lower than it actually 
is. Also, there was a marginal effect of gender with females showing a stronger tendency to report a rank lower 
than their actual one. 
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Table 3.8. OLS Regression results for measures of Well-being against Income, Rank measures, 
perceived Gini etc. Multiple R2 reported, DoF=547 for all regressions. Independent variables 
inserted separately in the regressions. Controlling for Age and Gender in each regression. 
Well-being 
measure 
 Income Log(1+Income) Subjective 
Rank 
Inferred 
Rank 
Objective 
Rank 
Delta 
Rank 
Gini 
Overall Life 
Satisfaction 
Coefficient 1.996625e-
05 
1.164565 4.644026 3.168968 3.662401    0.96421     -0.86625 
p value < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 0.233     0.0879 
R2 
 
0.06942968 0.09826081 0.14325632 0.08669727 0.1048 0.01006 0.01275 
Eudemonic 
Well-being 
Coefficient 1.764647e-
05 
0.9823169 3.789083 2.598100 3.023970    0.693194    -0.68097 
 
p value 
 
< .001 
 
< .001 
 
< .001 
 
< .001 
 
< .001 
 
0.4062     
 
0.1940 
R2 
 
0.05964740 0.07474522 0.09878612 0.06417315 0.07635 0.01579 0.01758 
Happy 
Yesterday 
 
Coefficient 
 
1.482658e-
05 
 
0.8342541 
 
3.235752 
 
2.024472 
 
2.586600    
 
0.580915    
 
-0.53559 
 
p value 
 
< .001 
 
< .001 
 
< .001 
 
< .001 
 
< .001 
 
0.471     
 
0.290 
R2 
 
0.04042492 0.05293951 0.07240561 0.03858074 0.05489 0.006962 0.008049 
Anxiety 
Yesterday 
 
Coefficient 
 
-4.72668e-06 
 
-0.3783597 
 
-1.718013 
 
-1.212304 
 
-1.34554 
 
-0.38106 
 
0.042878 
 
p value 
 
0.2244 
 
0.0433 
 
0.0048 
 
0.0262 
 
0.0179 
 
0.6791     
 
0.9410 
R2 
 
0.01749782 0.02217425 0.02906132 0.02371321 0.02489 0.01515 0.01485 
Ladder 1 
 
Coefficient 
 
2.845537e-
05 
 
1.474790 
 
5.824579 
 
4.398112 
 
4.500019    
 
1.453266    
 
-1.02851 
 
p value 
 
< .001 
 
< .001 
 
< .001 
 
< .001 
 
< .001 
 
0.0387 
 
0.0198 
R2 
 
0.1751950 0.2012015 0.2906886 0.2104133 0.2029 0.0173 0.01937 
 
 
Ladder 2 
 
Coefficient 
 
2.466047e-
05 
 
1.259699 
 
5.031715 
 
3.773918 
 
3.815927 
 
1.44228 
 
-1.74634 
 
pvalue 
 
< .001 
 
< .001 
 
< .001 
 
< .001 
 
< .001 
 
0.0485 
 
0.00013 
R2 0.1197713 0.1341049 0.1991724 0.1416077 0.1333 0.01119 0.03035 
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Since subjective rank24 was found to be the best predictor of all well-being 
measures, we used it over the other measures in order to run regressions with each of 
the well-being measures as dependent variables and subjective rank, Gini, age and 
gender as independent variables. We found no significant effects for the Gini while 
controlling for subjective rank on any of the well-being measures except for a very 
marginal effect on the ladder 2 measure (how individuals felt their life will be in 
several years’ time), the results for which are summarised in Table 3.9. 
 
Table 3.9. OLS regression results for the Ladder 2 measure, p values in parentheses. 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Subjective Rank 4.857 
(<.01) 
0.442 
 
Gini  
 
-0.894 
(0.033) 
 
0.419 
Age -0.0100 
(0.129) 
0.007 
Gender 0.537 
(<.01) 
0.160 
R2 Multiple  0.2058  
DoF 546  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 We also investigated a nonlinear relationship between subjective rank and overall life satisfaction, testing for 
effects of last place aversion (not liking being ranked very high or very low compared to other ranks, with no such 
effects found, see Figure U1 and Table U1 in  Appendix II). 
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3.10 Study 2-Income Inequality Re-test  
The goal for this study was to see how or if our Gini measure of perceived 
inequality changed over time as well as to check for changes in other individual 
measurements between the original (Study 1) and the re-test study (Study 2). 
3.10.1 Methodology 
3.10.1.1 Design 
In this study we followed the same design as in Study 1. We contacted the 
participants who took part in Study 1, 10-12 months after they had completed the first 
study.  
3.10.1.2 Participants 
The experiment was conducted again using the Amazon Mechanical Turk 
platform. Our sample initially consisted of the 1003 participants who took part in our 
first study, with 481 out of 1003 willing to take part in the second study. The 
experiment lasted on average 30 minutes and participants were paid $1.50 for 
completion.  
3.10.1.3 Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in Study 1. As a reminder the main task involved 
participants seeing a series of these pictures for the different percentiles 1, 10, 20, 30, 
40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, and 99. The order of the questions was randomised for each 
participant. The elicited data were therefore in the form of an inverse cumulative 
distribution function for each participant. From these data we were then able to 
compute each participant’s perception of inequality in the form of the Gini coefficient 
as well as calculating the rank position of their own personal annual income in their 
perceived income distribution (inferred rank). We also elicited participants’ subjective 
rank of income. Prior to the main task we also elicited the same measures of subjective 
well-being, ideology, demographics as in Study 1. 
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3.11 Results 
3.11.1 Measuring Aggregate Perceptions Over Time 
Aggregate information for the re-test study, is shown below in Table 3.10 and 
Figure 3.13. No exclusions were applied here based on income or R2. There was an 
aggregate insignificant increase for the first, 50th, 60th, 80th and 90th percentiles 
compared to Study 1. 
 
Table 3.10. Elicited median incomes in dollars for all percentiles (k denotes thousands, M 
millions) between Study 1 and Study 2.  
Percentile 1st 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th 99th 
Medians 
Re-test 
Study 2 
(481 
participants) 
7.5k 15k 25k 30k 40k 54k 75k 100k 175k 350k 1M 
Medians 
Original 
Study 1 
(1003 
participants) 
7k 15k 24k 30k 40k 50k 70k 100k 150k 300k 1M 
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Figure 3.13. Comparison between Study 1 aggregate (median) elicited incomes for each 
percentile (solid line) and Study 2 aggregate (median) elicited incomes for each percentile 
(dashed line). 
 
Figure 3.14. Aggregate (median) elicited incomes for each percentile along with offset 
lognormal fit (solid line) and personal income distribution data from Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and the Census Bureau Current Population Survey (dashed line). 
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Overall these values were very close, suggesting that the re-test was consistent with 
the original study, further validating our methodology. We plot Figure 3.14 and fitted 
an offset lognormal distribution, finding an R2 of 0.9956 and a Gini of 0.6458, which 
is comparable to the original Gini of 0.6163.  
3.11.2 Changes Over Time - Looking for Changes in Measures between 
Study 1 and Study 2 
We also looked at how individual perceptions have changed during the months 
between the experiments. This was a comparison analysis, the goal of which was to 
compare measurements between experiments. The only purpose was to see if the 
measurements were consistent. Participants included had income >$10,000 and R2 > 
0.9 in both studies resulting in 285 out of 481 who completed the re-test study. 
 
Figure 3.15. Histograms of Ginis; comparison between Original study and Re-test 
(Income>$10,000, R2>0.9 in both). 
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the Gini coefficients across studies and no significant differences among these, t (284) 
= -0.64255, p = 0.521. 
We further looked for changes between other measures we elicited from 
participants in both studies such as the CW Index, conservatism, overall life 
satisfaction. We found no significant differences for these measures between the 
studies. Similarly, our rank measures showed no significant differences between the 
two studies. Subjective rank in Study 1 correlated significantly with subjective rank in 
Study 2, r = 0.835, p < .001. Inferred rank’s correlation between Study 1 and Study 2 
was r = 0.752, p < .001.  
The only measure that changed significantly for individuals between the two 
studies was personal income. Study 2 revealed an aggregate increase in personal 
income, Wilcoxon signed rank test, V (282) = 7068.5, p < .001, which could be 
expected given annual raises etc. 
3.11.3 Did Changes in Personal Income Influence Changes in Subjective 
Rank of Income? 
Asking our participants questions relating to their personal income and subjective 
rank less than a year apart, provided us with the ideal means to test if changes in 
personal income would influence changes in participants’ subjective rank of income. 
To our knowledge this is the first test for this relationship. 
We computed a Delta subjective rank = subjective rank of an individual in the re-
test study – subjective rank of an individual in the original, and Delta personal income 
= personal income of an individual in the re-test study – personal income of an 
individual in the original. We found that a dollar increase in income between the two 
studies increased Delta subjective rank by 0.00001, see Table 3.11 below. To account 
for two outliers that showed dramatic changes in income between the two studies we 
also used a log transformation of incomes to decrease the skewness in the data. This 
specification showed that increasing log of income by 1% increased Delta subjective 
rank by 0.0009 (as a reminder subjective rank is measured on a 0-1 scale). 
We found no significant effects of changes in income and conservative measures 
on changes in participants’ perceived Ginis (see Table U3 in  Appendix III). Finally, 
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we found no effects of changes in income, log of income, subjective rank, inferred 
rank, objective rank on changes in any of the subjective well-being measures (see 
Table U4, Appendix III). 
Table 3.11. OLS regression results for the Delta Subjective Rank of Income response measure, 
*** denotes p values less than .001. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
(Intercept) -5.742e-03 
(2.627e-02) 
-0.0141420 
0.0256820 
Delta Income 1.101e-06*** 
(2.750e-07) 
 
Delta  
Log Income 
 0.0939305*** 
(0.0167160) 
Age  -4.062e-04 
(4.962e-04) 
-0.0002985 
(0.0004840) 
Gender 1.680e-02 
(1.184e-02) 
0.0178763 
(0.0115460) 
R2 Multiple 0.06163 0.1083 
DoF 281 281 
 
3.12 Discussion Study 1 and Study 2 
We found that on aggregate individuals consistently overestimated all percentiles 
of the income distribution, not just the low ones. While some studies found that on 
aggregate individuals underestimate inequality (Norton & Ariely, 2011; Eriksson & 
Simpson 2012) the difference between our estimated Gini coefficient (0.6163) and the 
actual value is 0.097 which is small compared to that found by other methods, and 
compared to the degree of underestimation found in Norton and Ariely (2011) 
(although their study was measuring wealth not income inequality, they used the term 
income inequality). In addition, Page and Goldstein (2016) who elicited household 
income PMFs from individuals, found an aggregate estimate for the Gini coefficient 
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of 0.34, 0.139 away from the value of 0.479 reported in the 2015 US Census for 
household incomes (data: Table HINC-01)25, suggesting our method promotes more 
accurate responses from people. We note also that the CPS stated Gini coefficient of 
0.519 is likely an underestimate due to extremely high-income individuals not being 
included in the dataset. However, the goal of our methodology was not to measure 
perceptions of inequality closest to the actual levels but to measure them reliably. 
Indeed, on an individual level our method was able to capture a variety of income 
distributions and their associated Ginis.  
One way we evaluated our methodology of measuring perceptions of inequality 
was to look at the relationship between subjective rank and inferred rank. The inferred 
rank was computed by inserted a participant’s personal income in their elicited income 
distribution and finding its corresponding rank position. Subjective rank was measured 
by explicitly asking participants to provide their estimated position in the income 
distribution. These rank measures correlated positively and strongly suggesting that 
we indeed captured an individual’s internally stored beliefs about the income 
distribution.   
Moreover, we found that perceptions of income inequality as measured by the 
Gini coefficient in Study 1 did not play a role. They did not have significant strong 
effects on the six subjective well-being measures we used. Furthermore, subjective 
rank explained more of the variance of the subjective well-being data, compared to 
income, log of income, inferred rank, objective rank (although they all had significant 
effects on all six well-being measures). The biggest effects of subjective rank were for 
the evaluative measures of well-being (overall life satisfaction, ladder 1) and the 
aspirational measure (ladder 2) compared to the affect measures (eudemonic well-
being, happiness, anxiety). That was true for income as well, confirming Kahneman 
and Deaton’s (2010) finding that income has a greater effect on life satisfaction than 
on emotional aspects of well-being. 
In Study 2 we showed that there were no significant aggregate deviations in the 
Gini coefficients measured within individuals 10-12 months apart, further validating 
our methodology. Although our Gini coefficient depended on 11 values and an offset 
lognormal fit making it complicated at least computationally, we found that the 
                                                 
25 http://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/cps-hinc.html 
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correlation between the Ginis in Study 1 and Study 2 was high. In addition, we found 
that changes in participants’ personal income between the two studies influenced 
positively and significantly the changes in their subjective estimates of where they 
rank in the overall income distribution, capturing for the first time subjective rank’s 
dependency on an individual’s income. This is important because Brown et al.’s 
(2018) finding that income has a bigger effect on life satisfaction in more equal 
societies was attributed at least partially to the relative social rank position that income 
can confer; if income increases in an equal society then an individual is able to move 
higher up the ladder of the income distribution compared to an unequal society where 
incomes are more spread out and so one would need a larger increase in income to 
increase their social rank. 
3.13 Study 3-Wealth Inequality  
This study investigated the perceptions of wealth inequality and not income. Very 
often in the literature these two economic quantities are treated as the same, although 
they are not. Participants may as well exhibit different perceptions in these two 
domains, and our methodology is able to capture perceptions for a range of different 
domains. 
3.13.1 Methodology 
3.13.1.1 Design 
In this study we followed the same design as in Study 1 but converted our 
questions in order to elicit wealth values for the different percentiles and not income. 
Everything else remained the same. 
3.13.1.2 Participants 
The experiment was conducted using the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform. Our 
sample consisted of 1000 participants subject to a Unites States location filter (Mage 
=37.2, 47.2% female. The experiment lasted on average 30 minutes and participants 
were paid $1 for completion. Participants who had taken part in Study 1 and Study 2 
were not able to take part in this study and we filtered them through their MTurk ID’s 
as well as their IP addresses.  
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3.13.1.3 Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in Study 1. Prior to the elicitation of wealth for 
the different percentiles, participants were given instructions and a graphical 
representation of what would follow and what would be asked from them. Moreover, 
the definition of wealth (taken by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and Census Bureau 
Survey of income and Program Participation) was provided to participants as follows: 
''Wealth, also known as net worth, is defined as the total value of everything 
someone owns minus any debt that he or she owes. A person’s net worth includes his 
or her bank account savings plus the value of other things such as property, stocks, 
bonds, art, collections, etc., minus the value of things like loans, mortgages and 
credit card bills''. 
The wealth distributions were elicited by asking participants for their estimate of the 
wealth of 11 different percentiles. An example of such a question is shown below: 
“Look at the graphic below. Imagine that it represents the entire population of the 
USA. All residents are ordered from the poorest (left side of the graphic) to the 
richest (right side of the graphic) in terms of total wealth. In other words, the 
leftmost person in the row has the least wealth, whereas the rightmost person has the 
most wealth. 
    
On the next screen, we will ask you some questions about the wealth of other 
people.” 
 
Figure 3.16. Example question shown to participants in Study 2. 
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“The red line points towards those whose wealth is higher than 50% of the US 
population, and lower than 50% of the US population. 
  
 What do you think the wealth of such a person is?” 
Participants saw a series of these pictures for the different percentiles 1, 10, 20, 
30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, and 99. The order of the questions was randomised for each 
participant. The elicited data were therefore in the form of an inverse cumulative 
distribution function for each participant. From these data we computed each 
participant’s perception of wealth inequality in the form of the Gini coefficient as well 
as calculating the rank position of their own personal wealth in their perceived wealth 
distribution. We also elicited subjective measures of the participant’s wealth rank by 
asking them directly to choose into which percentile of the wealth distribution they 
fell.  
As in Study 1, other wealth inequality measures (CW Index for wealth) were also 
elicited as well as information about subjects’ subjective well-being, demographics 
and political ideology. Again, these were asked at the beginning of the study and prior 
to the elicitation of distributions. Finally, at the end of this study we asked participants 
to tell us whom did they vote for in the last US presidential elections. This was a new 
question not asked in Study 1 and therefore we positioned it at the end of Study 2. 
3.14 Results 
3.14.1 Measuring Aggregate Perceptions of Wealth Inequality 
Table 3.12 below shows the median wealth values for each elicited percentile in 
dollars for all participants in Study 3. The Census Bureau data reported in the table are 
2011 household wealth data updated for inflation (cumulative inflation from 2011 to 
2016 was 7.3%26). We asked participants for individual wealth not household wealth. 
The Survey of Income and Program Participation from the Census Bureau does not 
provide data on individual wealth on their database, only household data. The Census 
data reported in the table therefore refer to households. 
                                                 
26 http://www.usinflationcalculator.com 
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Table 3.12. Elicited median Wealth in dollars for all percentiles (k denotes thousands). 
Percentile 1st 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th 99th 
Medians 
All 
participants 
1k 10k 20k 30k 50k 75k 100k 250k 500k 1000k 20000k 
Census  -6k  8k  73k  221k  676k  
SCF -8k -2k 4k 15k 39k 83k 151k 253k 439k 967k 8000k 
 
The Census data27 give medians for each quintile. These correspond to percentile 
values for 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9. The 0.1 percentile is negative for the Census data, so 
it is not visible on the log plot below (values must be positive for a log plot). We note 
that people overestimated the wealth of the low percentiles (10th, 30th) and high 
percentile (90th) compared to the household census data but were accurate for the 
middle percentiles (50th, 70th). 
Since the Census data only contained information on household wealth and solely 
for quintiles, we also utilised the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) because it could 
provide us with all the percentile values (not just quintiles) and their corresponding 
wealth values. Moreover, the SCF has collected responses from a mixture of 
households and single individuals28. The primary economic unit in a married couple 
was one of the two, and for unmarried couples but living together the primary 
economic unit was the male of the house. For people living alone the primary 
economic unit was themselves. As the authors warn and advise, in the SCF it is 
impossible to know which member of the house has what in terms of wealth. The SCF 
data also helped us with computing an objective rank of personal wealth because the 
Census household data could only provide us with 4 percentiles. We note that people 
overestimated the wealth of the low percentiles compared to the SCF data but were 
accurate for the middle and higher percentiles (except for the 99th percentile). 
Moreover, they underestimated the wealth of the low percentiles less when compared 
                                                 
27https://www.census.gov/people/wealth/data/disttables.html; 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2011/demo/wealth/wealth-asset-ownership.html. 
28 There were no other available databases that could provide us solely with personal wealth data.  
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to the Census data (see Figure 3.17). Of course, this is because the SCF data give 
higher values for wealth at the low percentiles compared to the household Census data.  
 
Figure 3.17. Aggregate (median) Wealth for each percentile along with offset lognormal fit 
(solid line), Census data refers to the Survey of Income and Program Participation data on 
Household Wealth, SCF refers to the Survey of Consumer Finance that has Wealth data 
from a mixture of households and individuals. 
To evaluate the Gini coefficient of the elicited aggregate wealth distribution we 
fitted an offset lognormal distribution to the data because again the data suggested that 
many participants’ elicited wealth distributions would be best fit by a distribution 
whose lowest value was lower (net worth can take negative values) or higher than 
zero. The elicited distributions consisted of wealth values for eleven pre-determined 
percentiles, and were thus points on the inverse CDF curve of the wealth distribution. 
To estimate the parameters, we fitted our target function (inverse CDF) to the data 
using non-linear least squares. We found an excellent fit, with R2 = 0.9878. The Gini 
coefficient obtained from this procedure was equal to 0.8636, which is very close to 
the US Gini for wealth of 0.801 (Davies, Sandström, Shorrocks, & Wolff, 2011).  
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3.14.2 Measuring Individual Perceptions of Wealth Inequality 
In the same manner as for the aggregate data we measured wealth inequality on 
an individual level. Similar to Study 1, in order to ensure estimates of the perceived 
Gini coefficient and other quantities derived from this distribution were reliable, we 
included only those individuals for whom we found an adequate fit. To measure 
goodness of fit we used the standard R2 measure. We included only individuals with 
an R2 bigger than 0.9 in all subsequent analysis. This resulted in a sample of 592 
individuals out of 1000 participants in our study. Figure 3.18 shows example fits for 
wealth obtained with this method for participants with a range of distribution shapes 
and Gini coefficients. 
Figure 3.18. Example results of fitting an offset lognormal distribution to elicited Wealth 
distributions for four participants with differing levels of perceived Inequality measured by 
the Gini coefficient. 
Figure 3.19 shows the histogram of the Gini coefficients. The median Gini 
coefficient was 0.9360 and the mean was 0.8668 with the histogram being highly 
skewed to the right. This seems consistent with our aggregate results and the aggregate 
Gini was equal to 0.8636 (we would not expect these values to be the same as one 
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comes from the aggregate fit, while the other is the mean of all Ginis from the fitted 
distributions of individuals who had an R2 > 0.9).  
 
Figure 3.19. Distribution of Gini coefficients for participants with R2 >0.9. Gini coefficients 
computed by fitting an offset lognormal distribution to the elicited inverse CDF of Wealth.  
 
3.14.3 Comparing our Measure of Wealth Inequality  
To evaluate the robustness of our method for calculating the Gini coefficient for 
wealth we compared it to the CEO-worker measure of inequality. Participants reported 
their estimates of the wealth for an average CEO and an average worker. We used 
again the following inequality CEO-Worker (CW) index: 
𝐶𝑊 = 1 −
𝐼𝑊𝑅𝐾
𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑂
 , 
Many individuals reported the wealth of a worker negative or zero. So, for this section 
we only considered individuals whose ratios did not become infinite. This resulted in 
a total of 555 individuals, so 37 were excluded by these criteria.  
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We found that the Gini coefficient and this index were positively correlated within an 
individual (rs = 0.3160, p < .001). We also used the index’s logarithmic version which 
was also positively correlated with Gini (rs = 0.307, p < .001).  
Finally, we looked at the different indices for various ratios of percentiles. Correlation 
coefficients of these ratios and the CW ratio ( 
𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑂
𝐼𝑊𝑅𝐾
) are shown in Table 3.13.  
 
Table 3.13. Spearman’s correlation coefficients between CEO/Worker ratio and various 
elicited percentile ratios. Coefficients are all significant at p < .001.  
Percentile ratio 99/1 90/10 80/20 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
0.3174 0.3068 0.3224 
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3.14.4 Where Do the Different Perceptions about Percentiles Come 
From? 
Figure 3.20. Median Wealth for the different elicited percentiles by equally split Wealth 
groups. 
To identify how the perceptions for each percentile were affected by personal 
wealth levels, we plotted graphs in Figure 3.20 with each corresponding to a different 
wealth percentile: 0.01, 0.2, 0.3 etc. Each of the five groups (quintiles), corresponded 
to the individuals with wealth in the bottom 20%, 20%-40%, 40%-60%, 60%-80% 
80%-100% of our sample. This meant that each of these 5 groups had the same number 
of individuals, based on their wealth. We then took the median wealth value for each 
group. The black line is the reference wealth value from the Survey of Consumer 
Finance (SCF) data. For the first two percentiles, 0.01 and 0.1, the SCF value is 
negative and therefore, is not visible in the plot. We observe that quintile 5 is always 
the highest, except for percentiles 0.8, 0.9 and 0.99. This shows that wealthier 
individuals overestimated the wealth of the lower percentiles in comparison to the 
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other groups. At the high percentiles, 0.8, 0.9 and 0.99, they were similar to the other 
groups. This implies that wealthier individuals should perceive lower wealth 
inequality, which is what we see in Table 3.15 using a continuous scale for personal 
wealth. We also observe quintile 1 and 2 overestimating the wealth of the 0.99 and 
0.90 compared to the 3rd and 4th quintile.  
3.14.5 Individual Differences in Perceptions of Wealth Inequality 
We investigated individual differences among participants’ perceptions of 
inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, in the wealth study also. We performed 
the same analysis incorporating demographic information; personal wealth, age and 
gender, as well as measures of political ideology. Table 3.14 shows the correlations 
between the predictor variables. Again, there were no significant collinearities outside 
of the measures of political ideology. 
Table 3.14. Pearson’s (Spearman’s) correlation matrix between predictor variables.  
 Age Gender Social Economic Overall Left-Right 
Ideology  
Wealth Gini 
Personal 
Wealth 
0.303 
(0.340) 
0.040 
(-0.0003) 
0.145 
(0.310) 
0.085 
(0.2168) 
0.137 
(0.304) 
0.081 
(0.229) 
-0.018 
(-0.083) 
Age 
 
0.140 
(0.147) 
0.266 
(0.248) 
0.116 
(0.100) 
0.234 
(0.217) 
0.081 
(0.061) 
0.130 
(0.094) 
Gender 
  
0.028 
(0.036) 
-0.129 
(-0.136) 
-0.032 
(-0.027) 
-0.091 
(-0.100) 
-0.054 
(0.004) 
Social 
   
0.582 
(0.584) 
0.945 
(0.948) 
0.708 
(0.707) 
-0.020 
(-0.006) 
Economic 
    
0.816 
(0.806) 
0.658 
(0.666) 
-0.0036 
(-0.0025) 
Overall 
     
0.768 
(0.769) 
-0.0158 
(-0.0430) 
Left-Right 
Ideology       
-0.045 
(-0.068) 
 
The highly skewed residuals (see  Appendix IV) in Model 1, 2, 3, 4 using OLS 
regression diagnostics revealed and suggested that a quantile regression was more 
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appropriate (see also Appendix V for notes on quantile regressions), results of which 
are shown in Table 3.15. 
Table 3.15. Quantile regression results for Gini coefficient versus Personal Wealth, Age, 
Gender and Conservatism measures (*** denotes p <.05, standard errors in parentheses). 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Personal Wealth -8.949710e-08*** 
(2.938129e-08) 
-8.718972e-08*** 
(948061e-08) 
 
-8.750899e-08*** 
(2.925744e-08) 
-9.090003e-08*** 
(2.825611e-08) 
 
Age 
 
2.270117e-03*** 
(6.717661e-04) 
 
2.044558e-03*** 
(6.603550e-04) 
 
2.236549e-03*** 
(6.685207e-04) 
 
1.568714e-03*** 
(341120e-04) 
 
Gender 
 
3.965316e-03 
(1.459513e-02) 
 
-7.875234e-03 
(1.508299e-02) 
 
-4.126052e-03 
(1.482956e-02) 
 
1.321324e-03 
(1.442764e-02) 
 
Social 
Conservatism 
 
-8.023867e-04*** 
(3.304256e-04) 
   
 
Economic 
Conservatism 
 
 
 
-3.539783e-04 
(3.692589e-04) 
  
 
Overall 
Conservatism 
   
-7.017939e-04** 
(3.795288e-04) 
 
 
Left-Right 
Ideology 
 
    
-8.845491e-03*** 
(4.263349e-03) 
Koenker and 
Machado R2 
0.02123207 0.02123207 0.02200846 0.02123207 
DoF 587 587 587 587 
 
The estimated coefficient for each predictor apart from gender was found to be 
significant (as was observed in Study 1). We see that individuals with higher wealth 
had a lower measured Gini coefficient. In fact, if personal wealth increases by 
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$10.000.000, in Model 4, the median Gini would decrease by 0.9, which is a small 
effect but still significant. 
The effect of overall conservatism and left-right ideology is also in the same 
direction to that of personal wealth, with the effect of overall conservatism being 
driven mainly by social conservatism. The magnitude of the coefficient for the left-
right ideology measure is -0.009, meaning that, as measured by this scale, an extreme 
liberal (0) and an extreme conservative (10) differ in their perceived Gini coefficients 
by approximately 0.09. 
Because the wealth study was run after the last US elections we also asked 
participants whom they voted for in the last elections. We then tested for differences 
between the perceived wealth Ginis among Hilary Clinton and Donald Trump voters. 
155 participants stated they voted for Trump, 269 stated they voted for Clinton 
(summing to 424 out of the 592 sample of participants used in the analysis). We only 
tested for differences in perceptions of inequality between these two groups as running 
an Anova between 7 groups (these included other candidates, a did not vote option and 
a prefer not to say option) of very unequal sizes would yield unreliable results. A 
Wilcoxon rank sum test revealed no significant differences in the wealth Gini 
estimates between the two groups (W (423) = 19633, p = 0.3178).  
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3.14.6 Measuring Inferred, Subjective and Objective Ranks of Wealth 
 
Figure 3.21. Histograms of the three Rank measures. 
 
With our fitted wealth distributions, we computed an inferred wealth rank for each 
individual by computing their rank position within their fitted CDF. We also elicited 
a subjective rank measure explicitly for each participant, asking where they felt their 
wealth ranked within the countrywide distribution of personal wealth. Finally, using 
the SCF data (because the Census data only provided us with 4 quintiles), we 
computed an objective rank for each individual, quantifying their actual rank position 
within the wealth distribution of the SCF data for US individuals and households by 
matching the reported personal wealth of each individual to the corresponding 
percentile on the SCF curve in Figure 3.17. Figure 3.21 shows a big difference between 
inferred rank and the other rank measures, with inferred rank having a big spike at 0. 
Participants actually placed their own wealth below or equal to their perceived first 
percentile of wealth (less than half the people in the first bar on the leftmost chart). 
This means that their inferred rank corresponded to zero, because their wealth would 
be below the 1st percentile in their fitted distribution. It seems that this phenomenon is 
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associated with the systematic overestimation of low-percentile wealth that we 
observed in the aggregate statistics. 
Nevertheless, when looking at the relationship between subjective rank and 
inferred rank we found strong correlations, validating our methodology in the case of 
the wealth study too.  
 
Table 3.16. Pearson’s correlation coefficients and Spearman’s in parentheses. All 
correlations were significant at p < .01 
 Inferred Rank Personal Wealth Objective Rank 
Subjective Rank 0.7585 
(0.7411) 
0.5058 
(0.7134) 
0.7163 
(0.7134) 
Inferred Rank  0.5684  
 
Personal Wealth 
 (0.8708) 
 
 
 
 
0.7004 
(0.9990) 
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3.14.7 Ranks, Wealth, Wealth Inequality and Analysis of Well-Being 
 
Figure 3.22. Histograms for all Subjective Well-being measures. 
Do wealth-related measures predict different aspects of subjective well-being? Is 
personal wealth, subjective, inferred, objective rank of wealth or perceived wealth 
Gini better at predicting various measures of subjective well-being? We also 
considered the logarithm of absolute wealth times the sign function as a potential 
predictor (log is not defined for negative values which wealth can take; we also added 
1 because log of zero is undefined). Participants rated, on a scale from 0 to 10, six 
measures of well-being: overall life satisfaction, eudemonic well-being, happiness and 
anxiety on the day prior to the study, as well as ladder 1 and 2 estimates. Figure 3.22 
shows the histograms for all the subjective well-being measures (with only anxiety 
being heavily negatively skewed). 
To identify which of the subjective rank, inferred rank, objective rank, personal 
wealth and perceived wealth Gini best predicted each of these well-being measures, 
we ran a regression for each well-being measure, rank/wealth/wealth Gini pair, with 
each regression controlling for both age and gender. The rank/wealth/wealth Gini with 
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the associated highest R2 was then considered as the best predictor for each of these 
measures. The results of this procedure are shown in Table 3.17. Personal wealth and 
the transformation of personal wealth had a positive significant effect on all the 
measures besides anxiety for which it had a significant negative effect. The 
transformation of wealth explained more of the variance in all the subjective well-
being data compared to wealth. All rank measures were strong significant predictors 
of all the subjective well-being measures. All five rank/wealth measures had the same 
relationship, in terms of direction, with each of the well-being measures.  
Turning to the effects of perceived wealth inequality as measured by the Gini we 
observe that Gini had a negative miniscule marginal effect on two of the evaluative 
measures of well-being (overall life satisfaction, ladder 1), with increases in wealth 
Gini leading to lower levels of overall life satisfaction and lower scores on ladder 1. 
Nevertheless, the results were marginal. Moreover, Gini had no effect on any of the 
affect measures of well-being. 
Subjective rank again outperformed all other variables in predicting the subjective 
measures of well-being reported from our participants (based on the value of the R2s). 
All well-being measures, except for anxiety, had a positive relationship with 
subjective rank, increasing subjective rank by 0.1 increased overall life satisfaction by 
0.5, eudemonic well-being by 0.3, Happiness by 0.4, and scores on the ladder 1 by 0.5 
and ladder 2 by 0.4. The relationship between subjective rank and anxiety was in the 
other direction; increasing subjective rank by 0.1 decreased levels of anxiety by 0.26.  
Running OLS regressions that included wealth Gini, subjective rank, age and 
gender as independent variables against overall life satisfaction and ladder 1 made the 
small effect of wealth Gini disappear but the effect of subjective rank remained. To 
note here that the correlation between wealth Gini and subjective rank was r = -0.09 
and rs = -0.09. 
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Table 3.17. OLS Regression results for measures of Well-being against Wealth and Rank 
measures independently inserted in the regressions. Multiple R2 reported, DoF=588 for all 
regressions, controlling for Gender and Age. 
Well-being 
measure 
 Wealth Transformed 
Wealth(sign(wealth)
*log(1+|wealth|)) 
Subjective Rank Inferred 
Rank 
Objective 
Rank 
Wealth 
Gini  
Overall Life 
Satisfaction 
Coefficient 1.825e-06 0.119772 5.153400 3.133373 4.105101 -0.8514 
p value <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 0.134 
R2 
 
0.04328 0.1067 0.1903 0.1324 0.1566 0.009928 
Happy 
Yesterday 
Coefficient 1.237e-06 0.083944 3.432816 2.155196 2.937273 -0.6485 
p value 0.00144 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 0.2542 
R2 0.02555 0.05779 0.08999 0.06806 0.08528 0.01075 
Eudemonic 
Well-being 
 
Coefficient 
 
1.173e-06 
 
0.084871 
 
3.713935 
 
2.139055 
 
2.899223 
 
-0.17493 
p value 0.00497 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 0.77495 
R2 0.03099 0.06101 0.09956 0.06811 0.08194 0.01803 
Anxiety 
Yesterday 
 
Coefficient 
 
-1.176e-06 
 
-0.058629 
 
-2.64538 
 
-1.70935 
 
-2.52371 
 
0.677856 
p value 0.0117 0.00158 <.001 <.001 <.001 0.3204 
R2 
 
0.02285 0.02885 0.04571 0.03814 0.05144 0.01387 
Ladder 1 
 
Coefficient 
 
2.118e-06 
 
0.114524 
 
5.449680 
 
3.281504 
 
4.127181 
 
-1.1057 
p value <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 0.024 
R2 0.1053 0.1597 0.3074 0.2199 0.2375 0.04879 
Ladder 2 
 
Coefficient 
 
1.440e-06 
 
0.076049 
 
3.662793 
 
2.069545 
 
2.634737 
 
-0.2669 
p value <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 0.593 
R2 0.03504 0.05768 0.1259 0.07655 0.08551 0.005453 
 
3.15 General Discussion  
In this chapter we measured participants perceptions of income and wealth 
inequality. We measured these perceptions using a new methodology which for a set 
of 11 percentiles — including the often talked about highest 1% as well as the lowest 
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1%, participants were asked to estimate the corresponding income/wealth of the US 
population. These percentiles represent rank positions, which we know from the 
psychological literature have a heavy influence on decision-making. Our methodology 
worked well and was validated as in both studies we found that subjective rank was 
significantly and positively correlated with inferred rank.  
Our studies and methodology assisted in differentiating between income and 
wealth elicited distributions. In Study 1, we found that on aggregate participants 
overestimated all percentiles, compared to Study 3, where participants overestimated 
the low and accurately estimated the middle and some of the higher percentiles. The 
methodology was also able to capture the different individual perceptions of income 
and wealth, finding that the histograms for income Ginis and wealth Ginis had 
completely different shapes. Therefore, also on an individual level, participants 
exhibited different perceptions of income and wealth inequality. Moreover, one of the 
unifying themes of these two studies was that the same individual differences, personal 
income/wealth and conservative ideology, affected the perceptions of income and 
wealth inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) and these effects were in the same 
direction in both studies (although these effects were small). It is noteworthy that the 
effect of personal income/wealth has a different origin in Study 1 and Study 3. High 
wealth individuals overestimated the wealth of low-wealth individuals while low 
income individuals overestimated the income of high-income individuals. 
Moreover, perceptions of inequality either of income or wealth, measured by an 
individual’s Gini do not seem to matter for well-being. Our methodology may have 
elicited more reliable and accurate estimates for these perceptions compared to 
previous studies but individuals seem to not care about them. What they are influenced 
by, at least for the six subjective well-being measures we gathered responses for, was 
where participants thought they ranked in the overall income or wealth distribution in 
their country.  
Given that that we found that rank matters it makes sense that a number of studies 
find no relationship between individual well-being and actual levels of inequality. 
What is more surprising is that these subjective rank estimates regarded the whole 
distribution of income or wealth in the US and not that of participants’ neighbours or 
local area. It is possible that individuals sampled from their memory and local 
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surroundings to create these distributions. Nevertheless, we did not have enough data 
to split participants by state and compare their elicited distributions to the actual 
distributions in their state. 
Future work can look more closely into the perceived Gini and its association with 
a desired Gini. If perceived Gini did not predict any of the subjective well-being 
measures strongly in our studies maybe the discrepancy between perceived and 
desired or objective Gini would be able to shed more light to these findings. A future 
study can also identify causal relationships in the laboratory by manipulating 
perceived subjective rank of income and discern if it would create corresponding 
effects on subjective well-being and preferences for taxation policy. 
On a general note, we do not conclude that governments should place less 
emphasis and efforts on reducing economic inequalities, as its adverse effects on 
societies have been well documented. We would propose that attention and focus 
should also be placed on what influences and how to increase one’s perception of 
where they rank in the income/wealth distribution. 
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3.17 Appendices 
3.17.1 Appendix I 
Calculation of the Gini Coefficient  
 
The Gini coefficient is defined as 
𝐺 =
𝑀𝐴𝐷
2 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁
 
where 𝑀𝐴𝐷 is the mean absolute difference of the distribution. In the case of the 
lognormal distribution we have 
𝐺 = erf (
𝜎
2
) 
The mean of the lognormal is equal to 𝑒𝜇+
𝜎2
2⁄  so we have that 
𝑀𝐴𝐷 =  2𝑒𝜇+
𝜎2
2⁄ erf (
𝜎
2
) 
Because the offset lognormal just adds a constant amount to each individual’s income, 
the MAD is the same as the lognormal, since the differences between individual’s 
incomes do not change if they both get the same constant amount. The mean of the 
offset lognormal is  
𝜃 + 𝑒𝜇+
𝜎2
2⁄  
where 𝜃 is the constant that we add. We thus find the Gini coefficient for the offset 
lognormal as 
 
𝐺 =
𝑒𝜇+
𝜎2
2⁄
𝜃 + 𝑒𝜇+
𝜎2
2⁄
erf (
𝜎
2
) 
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Gini is bounded between zero and 1, with zero corresponding to a perfectly equal 
society, while 1 corresponds to a perfectly unequal society. 
 
3.17.2 Appendix II 
 
Figure U1. Relationship between Subjective Rank and Overall Life Satisfaction. 
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Table U1. OLS Regression results for measures of Well-being against Subjective Rank, 
Subjective Rank squared, Subjective Rank cubed, Age and Gender (simultaneous independent 
variables). DoF=545, p values in parentheses. 
Well-being 
measure 
Overall Life 
Satisfaction 
Eudemonic 
Well-being 
Happy 
Yesterday 
Anxiety 
Yesterday 
Ladder 1 Ladder 2 
Subjective 
Rank  
14.871781 7.64776 8.179383    - 11.1169 7.619413 14.952470 
(0.00225) (0.1423) (0.1059)     (0.06156) (0.050149) (0.000514) 
      
Subjective 
Rank2 
-16.038482 -2.937651  -3.384331   13.90709 -0.814054 -22.973393 
(0.18602) (0.8214) (0.7888)     (0.34894) (0.933169) (0.0321780 
      
Subjective 
Rank3 
5.418040    -2.192697 -3.306583    -3.81594 -1.717381 15.328619 
0.54886   (0.8213) (0.7256)     (0.73027) (0.812473) (0.055166) 
      
Age  0.009035 0.017187 0.008890    -0.02416 0.010054 -0.010742 
(0.22454) (0.0317) (0.2516)     (0.00818) (0.091782) (0.102219) 
Gender  
      
0.517519 0.496031 0.394638 -0.17646 0.482426 0.532070 
(0.00446) (0.0111) (0.0372) (0.42692) (0.000949) (0.000944) 
R2 Multiple 
R2 Adjusted 
 
DoF 
0.1709 0.1094 0.09302 0.04918 0.2982 0.209 
0.1633 0.1012 0.08469 0.04044 0.2918 0.2017 
545 545 545 545 545 545 
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Table U2. OLS regression results. Dependent variable Delta Rank (Subjective-Objective). 
 Coefficient St. Error p value 
Intercept -1.507e-01 2.420e-02 < .001 
Personal Income -1.132e-06 1.752e-07 < .001 
Age 4.664e-04 4.248e-04 0.2728 
Gender -2.074e-02 9.977e-03 0.0381 
Overall Conservatism -1.547e-04 2.555e-04 0.5452 
R2 Multiple 0.07769   
R2 Adjusted 0.07092   
DoF 545   
 
3.17.3 Appendix III 
Table U3. OLS regression results. Did changes in Income, Overall Conservatism affect 
changes in Gini?  
Dependent Variable Delta Gini Coefficient St. Error p value 
(Intercept) -2.042e-02 4.807e-02 0.671 
Delta Income 3.457e-07 5.076e-07 0.496 
Age  4.577e-04 9.133e-04 0.617 
Gender 6.103e-03 2.186e-02 0.780 
Delta Overall Conservatism -2.676e-05 1.222e-03 0.983 
R2 Multiple 0.002838   
R2 Adjusted -0.01141   
DoF 280   
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Table U4. OLS Regression results for measures of Delta Well-being against Delta Income, 
Subjective Rank etc. Independent variables were inserted individually in the regressions but 
we controlled for Age and Gender in all. Multiple R2 reported, DoF=281, for all regressions. 
Wellbeing 
measure 
 Delta Income Delta 
Log(1+Inc
ome) 
Delta 
Subjective 
Rank 
Delta 
Inferred 
Rank 
Delta 
Objective 
Rank 
Delta Gini 
Delta 
Overall Life 
Satisfaction 
Coefficient 3.541e-06 0.346813 1.815751 0.791262 1.305456 -0.110817 
p value 0.331 0.126 0.0177  0.157 0.0927 0.796 
R2 0.007832 0.01274 0.02426 0.01156 0.01447 0.004719 
Delta 
Eudemonic 
 
Coefficient 
 
8.065e-06 
 
0.417693 
 
0.575388 
 
1.366677 
 
1.077385 
 
-0.499925 
p value 0.112 0.187 0.592 0.0796 0.321 0.403 
R2 0.01352 0.01075 0.005619 0.01545 0.008091 0.007075 
Delta 
Happy 
Yesterday 
 
Coefficient 
 
3.351e-06 
 
0.314043 
 
-0.349302 
 
0.970636 
 
1.279954 
 
0.625086 
p value 
R2 
 
0.506 
0.001921 
0.317 
0.003904 
0.743 
0.0007301` 
0.209 
0.005944 
0.234 
0.005388 
`0.291 
0.004306 
Delta 
Anxiety 
Yesterday 
 
Coefficient 
 
-2.005e-06 
 
-0.247869 
 
-0.241723 
 
-1.555905 
 
-1.075770 
 
-0.29771 
p value 0.760 0.545 0.862 0.123 0.443 0.700 
R2 0.001032 0.002003 0.0008089 0.009152 0.002793 0.001228 
Delta 
Ladder 1 
 
Coefficient 
 
5.019e-06 
 
0.455089 
 
2.123417 
 
1.133265 
 
1.735731 
 
-0.350502 
p value 
R2 
 
0.251 
0.006663 
0.095** 
0.01186 
0.021 
0.02076 
0.0915 
0.01207 
0.0628 
0.01424 
0.496 
0.003638 
       
Delta 
Ladder 2 
Coefficient 7.224e-06 0.499991 0.262910 0.815747 1.74020 -0.427786 
p value 0.0921 0.0614 0.772 0.216 0.0572 0.397 
R2 0.01765 0.01997 0.007964 0.01306 0.02038 0.0102 
 
Delta denotes the difference between the values reported in Study 1 and Study 2. For 
example, Delta overall life satisfaction would be equal to the difference between the 
overall life satisfaction reported by an individual in Study 2 minus her overall life 
satisfaction reported in Study 1. We only observed a marginal effect for subjective 
rank; increasing subjective rank by 0.1 between the studies increased Delta overall life 
satisfaction by 0.18 
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3.17.4 Appendix IV 
OLS Regression Diagnostics for Models 1 to 4 
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3.17.5 Appendix V 
Notes on Quantile Regression 
Quantile vs. Quintile 
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For a dataset 𝑌 = {𝑦1…𝑦𝑛} quintiles are rank values (from the Latin quinque for five), 
they are the (5-1) = 4 values {𝑞1, 𝑞2, 𝑞3𝑞4} such that (100/5) = 20% of the datapoints 
are less than 𝑞1, 20% of the datapoints are between 𝑞1 and 𝑞2 and so on. In other 
words, they correspond to y values with rank positions 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8 
respectively.  
Quantiles (from the Latin quantus meaning ‘how much’ or ‘how many’) can refer to 
any particular rank point in a dataset, and so quantile regression refers to a regression 
for particular rank points, like the median. 
To connect them, quintiles are also known as 5-quantiles split it into 5 pieces = 
quintiles. In general, we can have n-quantiles for any n greater than or equal to 2. 
There are n-1 n-quantiles (there are four 5-quantiles) and in particular there is one 2-
quantile which is the median. 
OLS vs. Quantile Regression (Koenker & Hallock, 2001) 
The mean of a dataset 𝑌 = {𝑦1…𝑦𝑛} is given by 
?̅? =
1
𝑛
∑𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
But we can find the mean by minimizing a sum-of-squares. Define the loss function 
𝐿2 as a sum of squared differences of the data from a fixed value b. 
𝐿2(𝑏) =∑(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑏)
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Then we can minimize it by differentiating with respect to 𝑏 
𝑑𝐿2
𝑑𝑏
=∑2(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑏)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
and solving 
𝑑𝐿2
𝑑𝑏
= 0  
which gives us the equation 
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∑2(𝑦𝑖 − ?̅?)
𝑛
𝑖=1
= 0 
which has the solution 
?̅? =
1
𝑛
∑𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
= ?̅? 
i.e. we find the expected value of the data 𝐸[𝑦] because y is the random variable by 
minimizing the loss function 𝐿2. We can also perform a linear regression in this way. 
In linear regression we minimize the sum-of-squares distances between yi and the 
model 
𝐿2(𝑎, 𝑏) =∑[𝑦𝑖 − (𝑎𝑥𝑖 + 𝑏)]
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
The expected value conditioned on the value of x, is  
𝐸[𝑌|𝑋 = 𝑥] 
which is the mean value of 𝑦 given a particular value of 𝑥. Quantile regression is 
exactly the same, but instead of the mean, we use the median. We can calculate the 
median of a dataset by minimizing a loss function also (Baum, 2013).  
𝐿1(𝑏) =∑|𝑦𝑖 − 𝑏|
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Then the solution ?̅? is the median of the data 𝑌. A simplified version of the proof is 
given by differentiating the function 
𝑑𝐿1
𝑑𝑏
=∑
𝑑
𝑑𝑏
|𝑦𝑖 − 𝑏|
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Now  
∑
𝑑
𝑑𝑏
|𝑦𝑖 − 𝑏| = {
−1, 𝑦𝑖 > 𝑏
1, 𝑦𝑖 < 𝑏
 
So we get 
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𝑑𝐿1
𝑑𝑏
= −1 × 𝐴 + 1 × 𝐵 
where 𝐴 is the number of data points greater than 𝑏 and 𝐵 is the number of data points 
less than 𝑏. This derivative is zero only if the number of datapoints less than b is equal 
to the number of data points greater than b. This is satisfied by the median. 
Quantile regression (sometimes least absolute deviation) is simply performed by 
minimizing the absolute deviations as 
𝐿1(𝑎, 𝑏) =∑|𝑦𝑖 − (𝑎 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑏)|
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
What it estimates is the conditional median, so it tells us what the median of y will be, 
given the value of x. If we interpret the results of OLS regression as giving the mean 
of the dependent variable conditioned on the value of the independent variable, LAD 
regression gives the median of the dependent variable conditioned on the value of the 
independent variable (Baum, 2013).  
This means that the regression coefficients can be interpreted in almost the same way. 
In particular, suppose we have a quantile regression model 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛(𝑦) = 𝑎 𝑥 + 𝑏. If 
we increase x by 1, the median of y values which have x=1 will increase by a. Suppose 
x is income, and y is Gini. Then a*10,000 + b predicts the median Gini coefficient for 
all people with an income of $10,000. a*11,000 + b predicts the median Gini 
coefficient for all people with an income of $11,000. So, if income increases by 
$1,000, then the median Gini coefficient changes by 1000*a. 
Assumptions and Robustness 
Quantile regression is more robust to unequal variances of the residuals, and skewness 
in residuals. In fact, if the residuals are highly skewed, then quantile regression is more 
efficient (meaning statistically powerful) than linear regression. One advantage of 
quantile regression, relative to the ordinary least squares regression, is that the quantile 
regression estimates are more robust against outliers in the response measurements. 
 
 
